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Intelligent design (ID) proponents assert that the cause of the origin of 
complex biological systems is best explained by the agency of an unembodied 
intelligent designer who abiotically infuses information into physical systems. As 
state and local boards of education review science standards for curricula in the 
biological sciences, they are confronted with the claim that intelligent design is a fully 
scientific theory that ought to be taught as an alternative to evolutionary theory to 
students in public school science classrooms.
This dissertation encourages public school policymakers, especially school 
board members, to approach the claims of intelligent design proponents from a 
deliberative democratic political perspective. A deliberative perspective weighs the 
claims of citizens against the political principles of reciprocity, publicity, 
accountability, basic liberty and basic opportunity to assure that public policies are 
justifiable to all who are bound by them.
I argue that once the scientific claims and religious content of intelligent 
design are assessed from a deliberative political perspective, it is clear that intelligent 
design is a religious theory that should not be included in public school science 
curricula as an alternative to evolutionary theory. Teaching intelligent design as a 
scientific alternative to evolutionary theory would violate the basic liberty of students 
by constraining their present and future religious or anti-religious beliefs. It would
also violate the basic opportunity of students to receive an adequate education in 
science.
I conclude that the virtue of mutual respect promoted by a deliberative 
perspective requires public school policymakers to develop public school policies that 
respect the deep moral and religious convictions of intelligent design proponents. 
Intelligent design can justifiably be taught in courses that teach about religion and in 
civics courses which examine the central role religious convictions have in the 
political decisions of many citizens. Teaching about intelligent design in these 
courses may help resolve and reduce future disagreements among citizens over the 
teaching of evolutionary theory in science classes.
For my dearly loved sons, 
Aidan, Ian and Colin.
“ .. .if you would know God, be not therefore a solver of riddles. 
Rather, look about you and you shall see Him playing with your children.”
Kahlil Gibran
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PREFACE
This dissertation employs a deliberative democratic political framework for 
public school policy decision-making in the current conflict over intelligent design 
and public school science education. Since the order of the chapters may give the 
impression that I began my research into intelligent design with a favored political 
theory that I am now forcing onto contemporary conflicts over the teaching of 
evolutionary theory, I would like to explain why I have chosen to promote a 
deliberative democratic political framework for public school policy decision-making 
on this topic.
I began this project over three years ago with the simple intent of learning as 
much as possible about intelligent design. One of the first things I learned was that 
people perceive a w'ide range of valued beliefs to be at stake if intelligent design were 
to be placed in public school science curricula as an alternative to evolutionary 
explanations for the origin of complex biological systems. I resolved to write about 
those perceived stakes and had no intention of addressing political theory at all.
My first attempts at writing a dissertation resulted in a table of contents that 
included ten chapters (not including the introduction and conclusion) and a total of 39 
sections within those chapters. None of the chapters or sections addressed political 
theoretical frameworks for decision-making. My next attempt was only slightly less 
inclusive of all possible topics one could address in the controversy over ID and 
evolutionary theory. It also did not include a political perspective for public policy 
decision-making. My third attempt, my prospectus, finally reflected an understanding 
of the fact that even if decisive scientific and theological arguments are made against
intelligent design theory, conflicts over the teaching of evolutionary theory will not 
end because those arguments do not address the fundamental cause for the conflicts -  
the competing moral values inherent in the perceived stakes. I finally realized that 
public school policymakers have to address the divisions in public opinion caused by 
deep moral disagreement about the values perceived to be at stake in conflicts over 
evolutionary theory.
The most promising political perspective that offers policymakers practical 
guidance on the process and content of fair deliberations in cases where the 
disagreements of citizens have moral dimensions is deliberative democratic political 
theory. Deliberative theory “promote[s] extensive moral argument about the merits 
of public policies in public forums, with the aim of reaching provisional moral 
agreement and maintaining mutual respect among citizens” (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996, p. 12). My prospectus reflected the history of my thinking about the topic of 
ID - 1 introduced a deliberative political framework for public policy decision­
making in the final chapters of the prospectus.
The suggestion was made at my prospectus defense to begin my dissertation 
with a description of democratic deliberative theory and to place my entire discussion 
of intelligent design and public school policy within that political framework. It was 
a good suggestion for two reasons. First, the scientific and religious claims of 
intelligent design are complicated and, at times, tedious. The demands of mutual 
respect made by deliberative theory require that citizens seriously consider all of 
those claims. By discussing the obligations of citizens within a deliberative 
democracy first, the reader is made aware of the principled reasons why grappling
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with the claims of ID is fundamental to fair public policy decisions. Second, placing 
a description of deliberative democratic political theory first and discussing the 
deliberative issues that arise for public school policymakers in each chapter of the 
dissertation provides a more cohesive understanding of how principled political 
reasoning can be applied to specific issues that divide citizens in conflicts that have 
moral components.
Placing a discussion of deliberative political theory first, however, also raises 
an important problem. It is not obvious when first investigating intelligent design that 
the conflict it engenders is at root a moral conflict in need of political framework for 
decision-making that takes seriously the moral claims of citizens. The more obvious 
conclusions are that it is strictly a scientific or religious debate that can be resolved if 
the right arguments are deployed and if citizens are “properly educated” in 
evolutionary theory and theological studies. The conclusion that it has fundamental 
moral dimensions based on deep moral disagreements is one I drew only after doing 
the difficult work of learning the details of the scientific and theological claims, I 
have attempted, therefore, to illustrate the moral content of the conflict at the 
beginning of chapter two by presenting a description of a recent debate in Ohio over a 
model lesson plan for biology teachers. A full understanding of the depth of the 
moral divisions can only, however, be achieved after the scientific and religious 
issues surrounding intelligent design are fully explored in chapters three and four.
One final happy note, this dissertation contains only five chapters, including 
the introduction and conclusion, and fifteen subsections.
3
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In December, 2001, Congress adopted a Conference Committee Report on the
2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) education bill that provides information about
the legislative history and purposes of the bill. Two sentences in that report read:
The Conferees recognize that a quality science education should prepare 
students to distinguish the data and testable theories of science from religious or 
philosophical claims that are made in the name of science. Where topics are 
taught that may generate controversy (such as biological evolution), the 
curriculum should help students to understand the full range of scientific views 
that exist, why such topics may generate controversy, and how scientific 
discoveries can profoundly affect society.1
These apparently benign sentences reflect the radically new face of the evolution vs. 
creation debate in public school science education. They reflect the new strategies 
and tactics being employed by people intent on allowing supernatural causes in 
scientific explanations for the origin of biological complexity offered to children in 
public school science classes. Past efforts to include supernatural causes in public 
school biology curricula typically were transparent exercises in Biblical literalism by 
Christian groups promoting “creation science.” Today’s efforts are opaque requests 
for schools to “teach the controversy” (DeWolf, 1999) and to “teach more not less 
about evolution” (Nesselroade, 2004) by “intelligent design” theorists who claim to 
be promoting a purely scientific theory. The language in the Congressional NCLB
1 Intelligent design theory proponent Phillip Johnson drafted these sentences for U.S. Senator Rick 
Santorum, R-PA (Johnson, 2002, p. 32). They were included (with slight differences in wording) in an 
amendment to the NCLB Act that passed in the Senate 91-8. Following intense lobbying by opponents 
of intelligent design, including a request by seventy-five representatives of scientific and educational 
organizations to delete the language from the final bill, the Joint House and Senate Conference 
Committee voted to move the language from the legislative text to the explanatory committee report, 
which is not legally binding (Wexler, 2003, p. 766).
5Conference Committee Report also marked a new venue for debates over the teaching
of evolution. It was the first time the United State Congress addressed the topic of
teaching evolution in public schools.
The persistence of debates over the teaching of evolution in public schools
and the constantly evolving contour of those debates is surprising to some, but
inevitable in the minds of many American historians, cultural anthropologists and
sociologists. In the same year, 1987, that the Supreme Court ruled in Edwards v.
Aguillard that Louisiana’s “Creationism Act” was unconstitutional because it
impermissibly endorses religion, a survey of American popular opinion on religion in
public life revealed that seven out of every ten persons polled thought public schools
should teach both evolution and the biblical account of creation of life in spite of the
fact that a clear majority felt “There should be a high wall of separation between
church and state” (Larson, 2003, p. 156-157). Sociologist James Davison Hunter
explained the seemingly contradictory results as follows:
The average American gives rhetorical assent to the strict separation of church 
and state, yet frequently approves of policies which involve considerable 
cooperation between church and state. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in 
the conflict over public education. In this context the particular and inviolable 
rights of parents to see that their children are taught within the value system of 
their own choosing (usually religious in nature) are pitted against the needs of 
the state for a universal system of education. (Ibid., p. 156)
Cultural anthropologist Christopher P. Tourney suggests that the enduring
controversies over evolutionary theory and the ambivalence of American public
opinion arises from the conflicting systems of cultural meanings that Americans
attach to Biblical creation, evolutionary theory and democracy.2 Historian Edward J.
Journey argues that modem creationism “.. .is a rich, complicated, and varied system of knowledge, 
values, and beliefs.. .that enable fundamentalist and evangelical Christians to come to terms with
6Larson argues that whatever the source of the contradictory opinions of Americans 
toward evolution and creationism, as long as “the creation-evolution controversy 
remain[s] unresolved in popular opinion, it [can] not be settled in law” because the 
courts, including the Supreme Court, “never deviate too far from popular opinion” 
(Larson, 2003, p. 212, 5). In other words, Larson argues that controversies 
surrounding the teaching of evolution cannot be resolved through legal measures if it 
cannot be settled in public opinion. Thus, following a resounding defeat in Edwards 
v. Aguillard, proponents of creationism, knowing they had a solid base of public 
support, quickly learned from their experience and optimistically began a new 
movement in the hope of finally securing a place in public school science curricula 
under the rubric of “intelligent design.”3
This dissertation examines intelligent design theory and offers public school 
policymakers a deliberative democratic framework for principled decision-making 
that promotes fair public school policy on the placement of ID in public school 
curricula. It explores the following important questions that public school 
policymakers face when confronted with requests to include design theory in school 
science curricula: 1) How can public school policymakers reach justifiable policy
certain realities, anxieties, uncertainties, and changes in U. S. life.” For creationists who are local 
activists, creationism “is much more than a model, a theory, or a strategy. It is the existential stuff of 
their lives, the glue that binds together all the disparate selves of a self-respecting scientist or engineer, 
a righteous Christian, a dutiful parent, and a good citizen. Their creationism makes them whole” 
(Tourney, 1994, p. 143,264-265).
3 In spite of the new label, the intelligent design movement recapitulates themes found throughout the 
history of religious resistance to evolutionary theory. Jon H. Roberts, for example, in his study of 
Protestant responses from 1859-1900 to the theory of “organic evolution,” found that prior to 1875 
many Protestant intellectuals were convinced that the “partisans of unbelief were currently engaged in 
an all-out effort to invest a naturalistic world view with the name and prestige of science.” In addition, 
theologians who “accommodate[d] the Christian world view to the theory of organic evolution... [were 
making] an implicit capitulation to the forces of secularism” (Roberts, 2001, p. xiv-xv). See also 
Numbers, 1992, 1995 and 1998.
decisions on the topic of ID when citizens have deep moral disagreements about its 
placement in school curricula? 2) Is intelligent design theory a scientific theory? Do 
the scientific claims of ID merit placement in public school science classrooms? 3) Is 
intelligent design a religious theory? What components of ID theory are important to 
consider in answering questions about its religious status? and 4) Where does 
intelligent design belong in public school curricula? What are reasons that would 
justify its placement in school curricula? The aim of this dissertation is to advance 
public understanding of the conflict over teaching intelligent design in public schools 
and to encourage policymakers to reduce the range of moral disagreement among 
citizens on this topic by engaging in principled deliberative decision-making when 
formulating public school policy concerning intelligent design.
Public policy regarding public schools is formulated at local, state and federal 
levels by elected school board members, legislatures and judges as well as by 
appointed federal and Supreme Court judges. State constitutions typically include 
provisions that grant states ultimate responsibility for public education, yet a long 
history and strong tradition of “local control” of schooling ensures that public 
education is implemented at the local level. In fact, according to a 1999 U. S. 
Department of Education study, over 15,000 school districts operate across the nation 
providing locally governed public education to tens of millions of students (Seder, 
2000, p. 1-2). As a result, it is typically in local school board meetings that 
controversies over teaching evolution first take place. When state legislatures and the 
courts address the topic of the teaching of evolution in public schools, it is normally
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in response to the fact that deep divisions in local public opinion do not allow local 
resolutions to disputes.
This dissertation is primarily interested the decision-making of local school 
boards who encounter local citizens daily regarding their children’s education and 
state boards of education who are currently creating or revising state science 
education standards. While the deliberative democratic political framework I present 
is just as pertinent to state legislative and judicial deliberations, my primary focus is 
on local and state school board deliberations for the following three reasons. First, 
judicial deliberations are limited to the facts of a particular case, and judges are 
required to listen only to the citizens involved in the case before the court. The 
opportunity to advance public understanding and to effect changes in or moderations 
of public opinion are therefore limited. At best, judicial decisions, as Edward Larson 
points out in his now classic Trial and Error: The American Controversy Over 
Creation and Evolution, provide only temporary legal relief for the winners in 
particular cases (Larson, 2003, p. 6). They do not address the underlying causes for 
the divisions in public opinion concerning the teaching of evolution and creationism. 
In fact, judicial decisions often stiffen resistance when they are deemed unfair by the 
losing side. Second, state legislative deliberations on the divisive issue of 
evolutionary theory often deteriorate into power politics that disregard or minimize 
the moral claims of one’s opponents or impugn the motives and character of citizens 
who hold viewpoints that differ from the people in power. While state legislatures at 
their best are fully capable of and sometimes do engage in principled deliberative 
decision-making, political debate in state legislatures on the topic of evolutionary
8
9theory is often too polarized to advance in any meaningful way public understanding 
of the issues that provide the impetus for enduring evolutionary debates and rarely 
change or moderate public opinion.4 Third, and finally, the meetings of local and 
state boards of education offer the best opportunity to engage large numbers of 
citizens across the United States in deliberations that can advance public 
understanding of the of the moral issues that continue to divide Americans over the 
teaching of evolutionary theory and can help reduce the range of disagreement among 
citizens. Local and state school board meetings and hearings provide policymakers 
the chance to cultivate widespread mutual respect among citizens and to seek 
principled reasons for policy decisions that can be justified to those who are bound by 
those decisions but who still may morally disagree with them.
Summary of chapters 
This chapter generally described some of the reasons American historians, 
cultural anthropologists and sociologists give for enduring conflicts over the teaching 
of evolutionary theory in public school science classrooms. I noted that historian 
Edward Larson argues that the conflict over the teaching of evolutionary theory will 
not be resolved through legal measures if it cannot be settled in public opinion. The 
fact that future legal opinions and state legislative efforts are unlikely to resolve or 
reduce the range of moral disagreements that divide citizens in the latest conflict 
between intelligent design and evolutionary theory has prompted a focus in this
4 A quick look at the long history of state legislative debates about the teaching of evolution in states 
across the nation and their failure to moderate public opinion justifies this claim. The National Center 
for Science Education archives contain newspaper descriptions of attempts by state legislatures to 
affect the teaching of evolutionary theory that have taken place over the last 10 years. Go to 
http://www.ncseweb.org/ to access those archives. For a discussion that “calls into question” 
assumptions that “contrast between the principled decision-making of courts and the prudential 
lawmaking of legislatures” see Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 45-49.
dissertation on the deliberations of local and state boards of education. I argue that if 
local and state boards of education employ a deliberative democratic framework for 
principled decision-making during public policy deliberations, their policies 
concerning the placement of intelligent design in school curricula are more likely to 
be justifiable to all who are bound by those policies and may contribute to reducing 
the range of disagreement among citizens.
Chapter two describes a recent conflict in Ohio over the placement of 
intelligent design concepts and references in a model lesson plan for tenth grade 
biology students and introduces the five process and content principles that constitute 
the substantive core of a deliberative framework for public school policy decision­
making. The description of events in Ohio is primarily offered to provide evidence 
that citizen disagreements over the placement of intelligent design in public school 
science classrooms have important moral dimensions, but it also provides insight into 
the strategies and tactics being employed by people who are intent upon including 
supernatural causes in scientific causal explanations. The introduction to the process 
and content principles of a deliberative perspective on decision-making begins with 
an outline of the rationale Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson use in their book, 
Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot be Avoided in Politics, 
and What Should be Done About It, to develop the principles of deliberative theory.
It continues with a detailed description of each of the process principles (reciprocity, 
publicity and accountability) and content principles (basic liberty and basic 
opportunity), and includes a discussion of the characteristics of public policy
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decisions that result from the principled political reasoning prescribed by a 
deliberative democratic perspective.
Chapter two ends with a retrospective assessment of the conflict in Ohio based 
on the deliberative principles developed by Gutmann and Thompson. The assessment 
demonstrates how deliberative political reasoning takes into account the moral claims 
of citizens and determines the extent to which the model lesson plan can be justified 
from a deliberative perspective. It also underlines the need for further investigation 
into three questions that remain unresolved in Ohio: 1) Is intelligent design a 
scientific theory? 2) Is intelligent design a religious theory? and 3) Do intelligent 
design concepts and references appear in the model lesson plan? In the conclusion to 
chapter two, I argue that the virtue of mutual respect requires policymakers to take 
the scientific and religious claims of intelligent design theorists seriously and to 
investigate whether ID is a scientific or religious theory for public school policy 
purposes. I also argue that policymakers ought to accommodate the reasonable moral 
claims of citizens to the greatest extent possible even if some citizens refuse to seek 
mutually acceptable fair terms of social cooperation.
Chapter three investigates the scientific claims of intelligent design theorists 
and the critical responses of evolutionary theorists to determine whether intelligent 
design should be treated as a scientific theory by public schools. It begins with an 
introduction to the principal advocates of intelligent design and the publications they 
have authored. It then proceeds to examine in detail the seven central scientific 
claims of intelligent design theory, six of which are authored entirely by intelligent 
design advocate William Dembski. Some critical responses of evolutionary theorists
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to the claims of ID are examined next as well as rebuttals of ID proponents to their 
critics. I argue that the reasons ID proponents and critics give for and against the 
scientific claims of ID are important to public school policymakers, because it is on 
the basis of those reasons that policymakers must determine whether ID should be 
treated as a scientific theory by public schools. A deliberative perspective requires 
that the reasons citizens give for empirical claims in moral disputes must be based on 
reliable methods of inquiry that are themselves mutually acceptable. Consequently, I 
next assess the reasons of critics and proponents of ID in terms of the deliberative 
process and content principles to find to what extent their reasons meet the demands 
of the principles. I conclude that since intelligent design proponents reject, among 
other principles, the requirements of reciprocity and promote a conception of science 
that allows public opinion and politicians to determine the scholarly boundaries of 
scientific inquiry, policymakers ought to exclude intelligent design as a scientific 
theory from public school science classrooms. However, I also conclude that the 
reasons policymakers give for excluding ID as a scientific theory would be more fully 
justified if they seriously investigated whether or not ID is a religious theory for the 
purposes of public school policy.
Chapter four investigates the claim by intelligent design theorists that the 
characteristics and identity of the intelligent designer are beyond the scope of the 
science of intelligent design. Given the assertion by design theorists that the 
unembodied intelligent designer detected through their scientific investigations is 
compatible with a variety of religious and philosophical traditions except theistic 
evolutionary religious traditions, the question arises: Why is intelligent design theory
12
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compatible with some religious perspectives and not others? Legal commentators 
note that the religious content, not the implications of intelligent design are relevant 
to determining whether ID should be considered a religion for First Amendment 
purposes. Consequently, the first section of this chapter examines the content of the 
idea of a supernatural5 intelligent designer who creates and guides life to determine if 
it is a religious idea. I argue that since the content of the animating idea of intelligent 
design theory is identical to the content of the central animating idea of traditional 
religions, the meaning of the idea of intelligent design is religious. Intelligent design 
is therefore a religious theory. The second section examines the content of two 
general ideas which are essential to intelligent design theory to determine if they have 
religious content. Those ideas are: 1) natural causes are in principle incapable of 
creating biological complexity and 2) the agency of the unembodied intelligent 
designer is empirically detectable. I argue that the meaning of the idea that natural 
causes are incapable of creating complex biological systems consists of necessarily 
implied sectarian religious ideas which exclude other religious and anti-religious 
views. I also argue that the idea that the agency of a supernatural designer is 
empirically detectable is a sectarian idea resulting from the religious literalism 
inherent in the defining concept of ID -  theistic realism. Finally, I argue that the 
religious literalism inherent theistic realism results in the identification of the 
unembodied intelligent agent detected by design theory. That agent is the Christian 
God. I conclude that intelligent design is a sectarian religious theory.
5 See footnote six in chapter four for design theorist William Dembski’s argument against using the 
term ‘supernatural’ when referring to intelligent causes and for my defense of the use of the term 
‘supernatural.’
The final section of chapter four examines, first, the effect the religious 
content has, from a deliberative perspective, on the arguments by design theorists for 
including ID in public school science classrooms. I argue that the religious content 
has a determinative effect on the arguments of ID proponents that appeal to fairness 
and freedom of thought, academic freedom, censorship and honesty. In each of those 
arguments, ID proponents violate the process and content principles of a deliberative 
democracy. Second, I briefly return to the conflict in Ohio over the model lesson 
plan to show where ID concepts and references occur in the plan, and I examine again 
those arguments by design theorists that support the model lesson plan to see the 
effect the sectarian religious content of ID has on those arguments. I conclude that 
the model lesson plan cannot be justified, from a deliberative perspective, to all 
citizens who are bound by it. Third, I discuss the moral stakes ID proponents 
perceive to be at risk in the dispute between citizens over intelligent design theory. 
Fourth, and finally, I argue that the virtue of mutual respect requires ID critics to 
practice civic magnanimity toward ID proponents. I argue that when ID critics 
extend civic magnanimity towards their opponents, ID critics are promoting values 
that can contribute to resolving the conflict over intelligent design and/or contribute 
to reducing the range of conflict between citizens.
In the concluding chapter to this dissertation I briefly address the question of 
where intelligent design can justifiably be placed in school curricula, and I defend 
once again the choice of a deliberative perspective by public school policymakers for 
weighing the claims of citizens in the conflict over intelligent design and public 
school science education.
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CHAPTER II
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS
An important conflict over public school science education is occurring 
between citizens in local and state school board meetings across the United States.
The conflict is over which theory offers the best scientific explanation for the cause of 
the origin of complex biological systems and therefore ought to be included in public 
school science curricula -  the theory of evolution or the theory of intelligent design 
(ID). Evolutionary theory asserts that the causal interaction of genetic mutation and 
variation with natural selection over vast expanses of time best explains the origin of 
complex living systems. Intelligent design theory asserts that the cause of the origin 
of complex biological systems is best explained by positing an unembodied 
intelligent designer who abiotically6 infuses information into physical systems. ID 
claims to be an empirical science without religious precommitments -  it is consistent 
with the Christian God, but it is also presumably consistent with the existence of 
other types of unembodied intelligent causes.
The conflict is important not only because intelligent design promises to 
redefine scientific inquiry by rejecting a fundamental presupposition of modem 
science that only natural causes are considered in the search for an explanation for 
natural phenomena. It is also important because Americans perceive much more at
6According to design theory, abiotic infusion is the causal mechanism an intelligent designer employs 
to create complex biological systems. Since “abiotic” means outside any physical, living organism and 
since ’infusion’ means “the direct introduction of novel information from outside the biological 
system,” abiotic infusion, for design theorists, refers to a process that does not “move [physical] 
particles” or “impart energy” to create complexity. Rather, it is “word-like” process that 
“persuasively” creates complex physical systems (William Dembski, 2002, p. 321-343).
stake in their disagreements over evolution and ID than ‘just’ a fundamental maxim 
of modem science. Valued beliefs about God, the promises of the Christian religion, 
the nature of reality, the nature of science, the possibility of human freedom, 
democratic education, the quality of American cultural life and the foundations of 
moral behavior appear to many Americans to be at risk of being lost. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the conflict over evolution and intelligent design includes 
deep moral disagreements. It is only partially concerned with the boundaries of 
science and religion. I also argue that public policy decisions on the placement of 
intelligent design in school curricula are best justified when the reasons for those 
decisions are conditioned by mutually agreed upon political principles that govern the 
process and content of democratic deliberations. When policy decisions result from 
principled reasoning that attempts to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving 
moral disagreement, those decisions are more likely to be justifiable to citizens who 
continue to disagree and may reduce the range of future disagreements.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce evidence that citizen disagreements 
over the placement of intelligent design in public school science classrooms have 
important moral dimensions and to introduce a theoretical framework for principled 
political decision-making, a deliberative democratic perspective, which encourages 
citizens to seek fair terms of social cooperation when attempting to resolve disputes 
which include moral issues. Section one of this chapter describes a recent dispute in 
Ohio between citizens over the placement of intelligent design concepts and 
references in a model lesson plan for tenth grade biology classes throughout the state. 
Section two introduces the general outlines of a deliberative democratic political
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framework for principled policy decision-making that promises to provide policy 
decisions that are more likely to be justifiable to citizens who continue to morally 
disagree and may reduce the domain of future disagreements. Section three examines 
in more detail five democratic deliberative principles that I suggest policymakers 
ought to consider as governing principles for the content and process of public 
deliberations that include morally divisive issues. Finally, in section four I apply a 
deliberative democratic perspective to the dispute in Ohio over the model lesson plan 
for tenth grade biology.
Presenting a description of events in Ohio first serves two purposes. First, it 
provides initial evidence for the claim that disagreements over ID in public schools 
include moral disagreements. Second, it provides a particular case against which the 
principles developed in the following sections of this chapter can be tested.
Ohio7
In 1997 the Ohio Department of Education (ODOE) and the Ohio Board of 
Regents, a board that provides higher education policy advice to the governor and 
general assembly of Ohio, began drafting a set of “common expectations” in subject 
areas for students in K-12 public schools. The ODOE then requested that the Ohio 
State Board of Education (OSBOE) transform the “common expectations” into 
“academic content standards.” Early in the year 2000 the OSBOE began developing 
standards for science education, and soon after the deliberations of the board began, 
board member Deborah Owens Fink introduced a motion to include intelligent design
17
7 The description of recent events in Ohio is not meant to be an exhaustive case study. It is simply a 
sketch of events and public reaction to those events created from documents that are easily available 
from internet sources with diverse points of view.
theory in the standards. It was rejected by the board at their March 2000 meeting.8 
Proponents of ID, however, continued during ensuing deliberations to press for 
language in the content standards that required students to learn about intelligent 
design.
In March 2002, the conflict over whether to include intelligent design theory 
in the standards reached a high point when the OSBOE decided to hear “expert 
testimony” at a public hearing from two proponents of ID, Stephen Meyer and 
Jonathan Wells, and two opponents of ID, Kenneth Miller and Lawrence Krauss. 
Meyers and Wells are both Senior Fellows at the Discovery Institute, a privately 
funded conservative Christian think tank in Seattle, WA that funds and supports some 
efforts of the intelligent design movement. Miller is a professor of cell biology at 
Brown University, and Krauss is chairman of the physics department at Case Western 
Reserve University in Ohio. At that hearing, Meyer suggested a compromise with 
three provisions: 1) Do not require students to study the scientific evidence and 
arguments for ID, “at least not yet;” 2) “Teach the controversy” about “Darwinian” 
evolution by teaching the scientific arguments for and against it; and 3) “Permit, but 
not require, teachers to tell students about the arguments of scientists who advocate 
the competing theory of intelligent design” (Meyer, 2002a, p. 2).9 In October 2002 
the board preliminarily adopted the following language in “Benchmark H, Indicator 
23” of the science standards: "Describe how scientists continue to investigate and
8 For historical information about the controversies over ID in Ohio, go to the archives of the following 
websites: http://www.ode.state.oh.us/ ; http://www.ohiosci.org/ ; http://www.ncseweb.org/: 
http://ecology.cwru.edu/ohioscience/about-ocs.asp: http://arn.org/: and http://www.discoverv.org/csc/.
9 See chapter three, footnotes 2 and 3 for more information about the Discovery Institute. An article 
about the hearing written by Francis X Clines for The New York Times is available at 
http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/nvtohioevdesigndebate031102.htm.
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critically analyze aspects of evolutionary theory. (The intent of this indicator does not
mandate the teaching or testing of intelligent design.)" According to associated press
reporter Liz Sidoti “The decision [came] after weeks of behind-the-scenes talks to
reach a compromise with members who wanted alternative concepts to evolution to
be included in the guidelines.” She reported that Michael Cochran, a board member
who had lobbied for intelligent design to be included in the standards, said “In no way
does this advocate for creation or intelligent design. I look upon this as a
compromise."10 The board scheduled a final vote on the language for December.
On October 22 Lawrence Krauss wrote “For the first time.. .the word
‘evolution’ appears in the Ohio Science Standards...Unfortunately, the proposed
standards also introduce language that can provide a victory for those who wish to
introduce religion into [the] state science curricula...” He went on to note that
“creationist author and law professor Phillip Johnson” promoted “what he called a
‘wedge strategy’ to bring God back into the classroom” and stated that the language
in the proposed standards gave “several key board members who have been vocal in
their support for intelligent design.. .the wedge they want...”
Debra Owens Fink, a board member who.. .[is a] supporter of introducing 
intelligent design into the curriculum, argued that evolution should be 
singled out because of the strong public reaction to this issue. It is true 
that evolution pushes many popular buttons. However, it is the business 
of the science standards committee to help promote scientific literacy, 
based on sound scientific scholarship, and not to cave in to political, 
religious or other popular pressures. (Krauss, 2002c, p. 1-3)
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10 See Liz, Sidoti, “Evolution to be a Part of Ohio State Science Curriculum,” Associated Press, 
October 15, 2002. Available at http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/ohioboardl01502.htm. Accessed 
11/02.
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In mid-November, Phillip Johnson who, as Krauss pointed out, is founder of
the “Wedge” political strategy11 adopted by ID proponents, published an article in a
magazine entitled Touchstone: A Journal o f Mere Christianity in which he announced
This is a significant breakthrough.. .1 toured northern Ohio just after the 
decision.. .trying to wake up well-meaning people to exactly what is at stake. 
Darwinism is only superficially about biology. ..[it] is culturally important 
because it implies that man created an imaginary God rather than that God 
created man.. .creation is not an issue that ministers can afford to delegate to 
scientists. It is futile to try to teach Christian morality if you do not also teach 
.. .that God is real.. ..I count the Ohio decision as a victory for the fact of divine 
creation.. .People who have been indoctrinated in a modernist mindset no longer 
believe in the final victory of Christ...Darwinists... say that they won [cultural] 
control in 1925 after the Scopes trial.. .Darwinists still dominate, but they are 
very worried, and they show it by their constantly shifting defensive tactics, 
ridiculing Christians one day and then proclaiming the harmony of religion and 
science the next.. .The ultimate triumph of He Who Is the Truth is assured, not 
the ultimate triumph of scientific materialism. (Johnson, 2002b, p. 1 -4)
Krauss wrote again on November 29 in the Chronicle o f Higher Education, “.. .the 
ambiguous language...gives the national movement against science education 
precisely the opening it wants.. .to bring God back into the classroom” (Krauss, 
2002d, p. 2).
On December 10, 2002 the OSBOE adopted unchanged the language passed 
in October. Meyer immediately hailed the language as “historic.” "Ohio has become 
the first state to require students to learn.. .the full range of relevant scientific 
evidence. This policy will help remedy the selective presentation of evidence made 
by most biology textbooks today" (Meyer, 2002b, p. 1). Mark Hartwig, a “social 
research analyst” for the conservative Christian organization Focus On The Family,
11 The governing goals of the wedge strategy are “1) To defeat scientific materialism and its 
destructive moral, cultural and political legacies and 2) To replace materialistic explanations with the 
theistic understanding that nature and human beings are created by God” (Wedge Document, 1999, p. 
4). For more information on the wedge strategy, see Forrest & Gross, 2004.
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wrote in “The Wedge Update,” a column devoted to reporting events that support the 
wedge strategy of the ID movement,
On Dec. 10.. .the Ohio board of education gave final approval to new 
science education standards requiring that students be able to think critically 
about contemporary evolutionary theory. The new standards also allow 
individual school districts to teach the theory of intelligent design...
Intelligent design proponents have been saying since March that science 
teachers should 1) be required to teach Darwin’s theory of evolution, including 
evidence both for and against it, and 2) be allowed to tell students about 
alternative scientific theories, such as intelligent design. That’s essentially what 
they got.. .Board members have repeatedly said that the new standards allow 
school districts to teach intelligent design.
The effect of the new standards speaks even louder than words. [Board 
member] Owens-Fink reports, “Many school districts have called to say they’re 
allowing students to openly debate it.” Previously, students didn’t know about 
intelligent design or didn’t feel comfortable discussing it in science classrooms.
Now they are scouring the Internet and other sources to learn more about it. 
(Hartwig, 2002; italics in original)12
The next step in the Ohio science Academic Content Standards process was 
the development of a Model Curriculum, a series of model lesson plans for use by 
Ohio teachers. The lessons were to be based on the benchmarks and indicators in the 
new science standards and are considered optional for district use by the OSBOE. 
The process began in the spring of 2003 with the creation of a 15 member advisory 
group and 40 member writing team to write the lessons for all areas of science. The 
committee was then divided into subgroups, one of which was assigned to write the 
model lesson plan for tenth grade biology. That subcommittee had seven members. 
By the fall of 2003 several lessons had been prepared which were then subjected to 
teacher field tests and a citizen review process. The first set of forty two lessons was 
submitted to the Standards Committee of the Ohio State Board of Education on 
January 12, 2004. One of these lessons was entitled "Critical Analysis of Evolution"
12 Focus On The Family (FOTF) sent a letter to its constituents in Ohio in January that repeated 
essentially the same text. Available at http://www.sciohio.org/start.htm. Accessed 3/17/04. The FOTF 
website is at http://www.familv.org/.
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which addressed “Benchmark H, Indicator 23” of the science standards: "Describe 
how scientists continue to investigate and critically analyze aspects of evolutionary 
theory. (The intent of this indicator does not mandate the teaching or testing of 
intelligent design.)" On February 10, 2004 the nineteen member OSBOE voted 13-4 
to preliminarily adopt the set of forty two science lessons including the lesson 
“Critical Analysis of Evolution” with a final vote scheduled for March 9.13
According to Bob Lattimer, founder of the intelligent design activist group 
Science Excellence for All Ohioans (SEAO), the forty member group assigned to 
write the model lesson plans included only four of “their people.” But, three of them 
managed to be appointed to the subgroup assigned to write the tenth grade biology 
lessons.14 Sam Schloemer, an OBOE member, told the press that the selection of the 
tenth grade biology subgroup “was closed” and “controlled by the pro-creationist 
chair Mike Cochran.” Another OSBOE member, Martha Wise, revealed that the 
lesson plan itself was “written by an [intelligent design] ideologist with limited 
stature as a scientist.”15
A draft of the “Critical Analysis Lesson Plan” or L10H23 first became public 
in November. It was “leaked,” according to Lawrence Krauss and Patricia 
Princehouse. “The Department of Education board approved this draft in September,”
13 See the “Science Excellence for All Ohioans” or SEAO website for more historical information 
about the formulation of the Academic Content Standards in Ohio. This website supports the efforts of 
ID proponents and presents their point of view. The site is available at 
http://www.sciohio.org/start.htm.
14 Scott Stephens, “How State Board Thinking Evolved on Biology Lesson,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
March 14, 2004.
15 Robert Arons, “Professors Debate Intelligent Design,” Case Western Reserve University Observer, 
February 27, 2004. Available at http://www.cwru.edu/orgs/observer/archive/04-02- 
27/stories/HeadOO.html. Accessed 3/04.
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wrote Krauss on November 24, “but withheld it from public scrutiny. We now 
understand why” (Krauss & Princehouse, 2003).16 The lesson included references to 
ID proponent Jonathan Wells’ much disputed book Icons o f Evolution and referenced 
websites devoted to the promotion of intelligent design theory including
17www.origins.org and www.am.org. In addition,
Students are required to “debate” each “challenge” as if they were in a 
government or English class, with some students required to take a position 
contradicting the results established by decades of sound science. There is little 
pedagogical value in requiring students to take positions that evidence has 
shown to be incorrect. Indeed, it is not clear that it is ethical.
.. .the nine supposed “challenges” to evolution come straight out of 
intelligent design creationism. A main source listed in the curriculum is the 
discredited book “Icons of Evolution,” by the Rev. Jonathan Wells, one of the 
Discovery Institute authors who came to Ohio to promote teaching intelligent 
design.
.. .It is unfair to our children to waste their time in science classes on 
unfair and disingenuous debates.. .Why insert such red herrings into the 
curriculum? The answer can only be that special-interest groups want to sneak 
intelligent design in the back door, because they cannot enter it the honest way, 
by submitting their ideas to critical analysis by otherwise disinterested 
scientists.. .Appropriate action must be taken now to ensure that they do not 
continue their attempts to subvert science education. (Krauss & Princehouse,
2003)
Dr. Steve Rissing, Professor in the Department of Evolution, Ecology, and 
Organismal Biology and Director of the Introductory Biology program at The Ohio 
State University, was a volunteer outside reviewer for lessons developed for indicator 
23. On December 4th and 5th the subgroup met to consider all the reviews, and
16 Patricia Princehouse, a Case Western professor and founder of the anti-ID group Ohio Citizens for 
Science, claimed that “writing committee members could not take home documents from the meeting. 
They collected and counted every piece of paper they gave out before they let anybody go home.”
Lynn Elfner, CEO of the Ohio Academy of Sciences, noted “The process to develop the model lessons 
was controlled [and] concealed, especially from scientists. The result is we have a fatally flawed 
model lesson that is riddled with errors both in pedagogy and scientific content “ (Robert Arons, 
“Professors Debate Intelligent Design,” Case Western Reserve University Observer, February 27,
2004; available at http://www.cwru.edu/orgs/observer/archive/04-02-27/stories/Head00.html: 
accessed 3/04).
17See the Ohio Citizens for Science or OCS website for more information about specific contents of the 
draft and final model lesson plan. This website supports the efforts of anti-ID activists and presents 
their point of view. The site is available at http://ecologv.cwru.edu/ohioscience/about-ocs.asp.
Rissing attended that meeting. On December 16 he requested to see final versions of 
the two lessons pertaining to indicator 23 and received those documents on January 8, 
2004. The writing committee had removed references to Wells’ book Icons but 
retained references to ID websites. On January 13, Rissing testified to the state board 
of education that “many points in L10H23 remained false and uncorrected even after
95  1 8the outside review process and that in general, the lesson was hopelessly flawed.” 
Several board members asked Rissing to develop a new lesson that could replace the 
one prepared by the writing committee subgroup. Rissing agreed and prepared with 
the help of others an alternative lesson plan which he intended to present at the 
February meeting of the OSBOE. At that meeting, however, Rissing and the others 
were informed that the alternative plan would not be considered until fall, 2004. The 
delay “was attributed to a decision by the Chairman of the Standards Committee of 
the Ohio Board of Education,” Mike Cochran, a supporter of intelligent design.19 As 
noted earlier, the board voted on February 10 to preliminarily adopt the set of forty 
two science lessons including the highly controversial lesson plan L10H23 and to 
vote on its final status March 9.
The week prior to February 10 and the weeks following until March 9, 2004 
were filled with a blizzard of public comments, letters and articles from supporters of 
intelligent design and the controversial “Critical Analysis Lesson Plan” and also from 
those opposed to ID and the lesson plan. The tone was occasionally less than civil
18 Steve Rissing, Alternative Model Lesson Plan. The alternative plan is included in this dissertation as 
Appendix B, and Rissing’s comments can be found on page 321 in the “Note regarding the 
development of this draft lesson.”
19 This quote is from the “Important Note” found at the beginning of the alternative lesson plan and can 
be found in Appendix B, p. 306, of this dissertation.
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and citizen remarks often contained bitter attacks on and accusations about other
citizens. An article that appeared in the Cincinnati Enquirer on February 8 attested to
the growing bitterness among citizens toward those who held opposing views. The
Enquirer reported that OSBOE member Debra Owens Fink declared
the over-reaction to even a modest challenge to evolution has been “very 
disturbing.” Most of the acrimony comes from what she calls “the whiny 
scientists” who oppose even a protozoa of intelligent design. “If you support 
this, you are labeled a Pat Robertson, fundamentalist wacko. What's so bizarre is 
that they never attack the science part, they just attack the people.”20
Teacher, Joel Roadruck, states in the same article "We've been indoctrinated,"
Roadruck said” If you teach a generation that we all evolved from pond scum, then
everything is relative. There is no truth."21
February 9, the day before the first vote on the lesson plan, Bruce Alberts,
President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Chairman of the National
Research Council, sent a letter to the president of the OSBOE, Jennifer Sheets.
Alberts indicated he had been contacted by several concerned members of the NAS
from Ohio about the lesson plan who told him that some board of education members
had publicly asked to hear from the NAS regarding the lesson plan. Alberts referred
20 Peter Bronson, “Ohio Wading into Debate on Biology.” In Cincinnati Enquirer, February 8, 2004. 
Article available at http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/Bronson020804.htm. Accessed 3/17/04.
In a letter to the editor in the Columbus Dispatch published February 20, 2004, Professor 
Jeffrey McKee from Ohio State University noted that Owens Fink had claimed that “Some of these 
scientists are so paranoid, they don’t understand it.” McKee claimed that the lesson plan made “highly 
misleading statements.. .and fraudulent claims.. .Owen Fink’s cavalier attitude is characteristic of 
certain board members who would rather play political games...Michael Cochran [is] the other main 
perpetrator of this fraud...” Lawrence Krauss noted in a National Public Radio interview on February 
6, 2004, that he and another colleague from the biology department of Case Western University were 
called by OSBOE member Michael Cochran “the kooks from Cleveland” when they testified before 
the board (Audio transcript available at http://www.npr.org/).
21 Peter Bronson, “Ohio Wading into Debate on Biology,” Cincinnati Enquirer, February 8, 2004. 
Article available at http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/Bronson020804.htm. Accessed 3/17/04.
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the matter to a biologist on his staff who reported “a number of serious problems”
with the plan which he listed. Alberts went on to say
...this document clearly includes links to websites containing information of a 
religious nature.. .The references that appear later in this lesson plan also contain 
a number of ID books.. .We are also concerned that the tenets of Intelligent 
Design also have been introduced into other lessons dealing with the age of the 
earth, the theory of continental drift, and the composition of the sun.
...What concerns us is that Intelligent Design is not scientific because 
its ultimate tenet that life on Earth is the result of the work of some intelligent 
being is scientifically untestable and therefore cannot be invalidated through 
scientific means.
...Evolution is the time- and evidence-tested theory that integrates the 
various disciplines of modem life science and ties the life sciences to the 
chemical, physical, and earth sciences...The tenets of Intelligent Design do not 
belong in science classrooms or lesson plans for science. (Alberts, 2004)
On February 11 the Discovery Institute issued a press release entitled “Efforts
to Sabotage Ohio’s Science Lessons Deplorable, Claims Discovery Institute.” The
article stated that
.. .efforts by Darwin-only lobbyists to misrepresent the issue by identifying it 
with intelligent design were deplorable. “Intelligent design isn’t even covered in 
this lesson,” said Bruce Chapman, President of Discovery Institute. “The 
curriculum only examines the evidence for evolution and the scientific 
challenges to Darwin’s theory that are under debate by scientists around the 
world.”
...Ohio’s science standards are clear that they do not mandate the 
teaching of intelligent design. (Discovery Institute, 2004a)
Writing for The Wedge Update on February 23, Paul Nesselroade said Ohio’s lesson
plan is a “reaction to dogmatic Darwinism” which has the “ridiculous, unmerited
privilege of being somehow unassailable in the science classroom” (Nesselroade,
2004).
The Ohio Academy of Sciences (OAS) wrote to Governor Bob Taft on 
February 23 asking that he “implore [his] appointees and other members on the State 
Board not to approve [the model] lesson.” Noting that a representative of one of the
board members had contacted the CEO of the Academy requesting the possibility of a 
compromise, the letter said that
.. .the nature of science demands that fully qualified peers derive consensus on 
scientific matters and that compromise, in the typical political sense, is not 
within the realm of science, especially when compromise would result in the 
issues of creationism or Intelligent Design creeping into either State Science 
Education Standards or model lessons.
Stating that “science education.. .should not be compromised by political or social 
agendas unrelated to learning contemporary science,” the letter included reasons why 
the model lesson plan L10H23 “is defective both scientifically and pedagogically” 
(Alberts, 2004).
The letter also listed six areas of significant concern to the OAS. First, the
lesson is “Damaging Ohio’s image for the Third Frontier” (this refers to Ohio’s
efforts to attract and retain high level scientific researchers). Not only will it be more
difficult, according to the OAS letter, to recruit serious scientists who want “an
intellectual environment with integrity and not political compromise,” the image of
Ohio to outside scientists who hear that a member of the OSBOE regards scientists
who testify at board meetings “sound to him like a couple of teenagers fussing in the
back seat of a car”22 adds to recruiting difficulties. The second and third concerns
expressed by the letter included “Advancing the Wedge of intelligent design” and
“Connecting the dots to religious politics.” The fourth area of concern was the
“opaque” rather than “transparent” public process that led to the model lesson plan.
According to the OAS, it took
“five weeks and $140 under a public records law request to secure the 
initial documents...[and] the process for making the model lesson
22 OSBOE member James Turner made this statement. Turner is an ID supporter and was on the 
subgroup assigned to write L10H23. (OAS, 2004)
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essentially was closed to the scientific community. Of the 55 members 
on the advisory group and writing team, the Ohio Department of 
Education selected only three scientists; the Department knew that two of 
these were creationists.
The final two concerns of the OAS included worries about “Uninspiring Science
Education44 and “Constitutionality Issue[s]” (Alberts, 2004).
The Discovery Institute (DI) responded to the OAS letter the day after it was
sent to Gov. Taft. Bruce Chapman, President of the DI, accused the OAS leadership
of launching a “scare campaign” that “is more science fiction than science.”
Regarding the claim by the OAS that “the lesson plan would result in the teaching of
‘creationism or intelligent,” John West, a senior fellow of the DI, replied
The lesson plan does not even mention creationism. And the only time it 
cites intelligent design is in the following disclaimer.. .’The intent of this 
benchmark does not mandate the teaching or testing of intelligent design.’ 
Only in an Orwellian world could a statement about NOT mandating 
intelligent design be turned into the exact opposite.. .Regarding the 
OAS”s hysterical claim that the lesson plan is part of a fundamentalist 
plot.. .What will OAS leaders claim next? That the lesson plan is pushed 
by people who want to bum witches? Such scare-tactics only serve to 
discredit the OAS leadership. (Discovery Institute, 2004b)
That same day, law professor and ID proponent David DeWolf commented in another
Discovery Institute press release
I hope they [the OAS] do science better than they practice law.. .First, they’re 
wrong about the facts. The proposed lesson plan says nothing about intelligent 
design.. .Additionally, they don’t seem to understand the law. The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard made it clear that the state may require 
schools to teach criticisms of existing scientific theories as a part of a good 
science education. Moreover, even if intelligent design were on the table for 
discussion,.. .alternative scientific theories can be taught as part of a teacher’s 
academic freedom. But this plan...doesn’t advance intelligent design as a 
theory. It’s hard to understand how such a basic mistake could be made.
(Discovery Institute, 2004c)
The Observer, the student newspaper of Case Western Reserve University, 
published on February 27 an article about a press conference held by three professors
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from Case Western concerning the model lesson plan L10H23. The professors were 
Dr. Cynthia Beall, Dr. Lawrence Krauss and Dr. Patricia Princehouse. The article 
noted that
...”A Critical Analysis of Evolution” is what has been called “a pattern of 
deception” by Princehouse.. .and “an attack on science” by Krauss.
The lesson plan has been criticized for lack of clarity, false historical 
information, incorrect or missing footnotes, footnotes directly from books on 
intelligent design, false definitions, using outdated scientific information, and 
errors of fact. For instance, the lesson plan defines a theory as a “supposition...
According to the article, OSBOE Vice President Richard Baker, “an avowed creationist,”
disagrees with the professors.
“I voted for it because I think you...need to...’critically analyze’ the theory of 
evolution, and that.. .does not violate laws that separate church and state.”
Baker accused the scientific community of wasting time debating the plan. “We 
spend all this malarkey and baloney when 99 percent of all the people who are 
taught this have nothing to do with [it] the rest of their lives...These scientists, 
they don’t care about wasting their own time or anybody else’s time. In 
business we don’t waste time.” According to Baker, the real reason scientists 
want to do away with the lesson plan is...’’[They] think [they] know everything. 
[They’re] just a bunch of paranoid, egotistical scientists afraid of people finding 
out [they] don’t know anything.”23
Late February and early March, many more people who supported intelligent 
design weighed in on the controversy over the Critical Analysis Lesson Plan. Focus 
On The Family, Charles Colson in Breakpoint, Ohio State University entomology 
professor Glen Needham (one of the two scientists on the 55 OSBOE advisory and 
writing team who is an ID supporter) and Benjamin Wiker, author of Moral 
Darwinism: How We Became Hedonists -  all wrote articles in support of the lesson 
plan. Claiming that the lesson has “no hidden agenda, no reference to intelligent 
design or faith-based views,” they called for “a balanced presentation of Darwinism,”
23 “Professors Debate Intelligent Design,” The Observer, published February 27, 2004. Available at 
http://www.ncseweb2.org/pn/print/php?sid=837. Accessed 3/11/04. On February 26 an intelligent 
design supporter, Chris Hogg, wrote in an article that OSBOE “members...are being denigrated 
without mercy” (Hogg, 2004).
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an “unbiased teaching of evolution,” “intellectual freedom,” and correctives to
“simplistic presentations” of evolutionary biology.” They condemned “censoring
what high school students can read and discuss,” “scientists [who are] against critical
analysis,” and the “shrill voices” of “Darwin-only activists” who are the “spokesmen
for ‘official science.’”24 In an opinion piece published by the Cincinnati Enquirer on
March 7 entitled “Don’t Let Dogma Censor Teaching,” Wiker wrote
Rather than honestly debate the merits of the new model curriculum, opponents 
are trying to prevail through use of a classic red herring. They allege that the 
proposed lesson on the critical analysis of evolution is merely Intelligent Design 
(ID) theory in disguise. If so, it’s a pretty good disguise. Intelligent Design 
proposes that some features of the natural world are best explained as the 
product of intelligence rather than an undirected natural process. The lesson 
plan in question doesn’t even address this topic, let alone discuss it...Ohio 
students should have the right to leam.. .free from threats of censorship by rigid 
defenders of an aging scientific orthodoxy. (Wiker, 2004)
On the same day that Wiker’s opinion in the Enquirer appeared Lawrence
Krauss wrote one final guest column before the OSBOE vote on March 9. He asked
Gov. Bob Taft “to fight to maintain science standards in his state, because it doesn’t
appear as if the Ohio Board of Education will.” He noted that board member Owen
Fink has claimed that “Ohio has set a standard for the whole nation on how to deal
with these issues.” Krauss called it “a lousy standard.”
Fink and her colleagues Michael Cochran and James Turner.. .say that the 
group of scientists from Ohio universities, who...submitted a replacement 
lesson plan, are over-reacting to the board’s effort to introduce what they 
argue are simply “scientific” objections to evolution. Actually, that 
doesn’t capture the depth of their rhetoric. They used phrases during 
meetings like “whiney scientists,” arrogant” and “egotistical” “kooks” 
who “lack perspective.” But since Fink has claimed we keep criticizing 
people and not the facts, let’s look at the facts.
24 See Needham, 2004; Colson, 2004; Focus on the Family, 2004; and Wiker, 2004.
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Krauss went on to note all the problems listed in Bruce Alberts’ NAS letter. He 
ended saying
These board members have made it clear that they are unwilling to listen 
to the scientific community. It is time for the governor.. .to come out and 
support scientists in their efforts to maintain scientific standards. If he 
weighs in on this issue, there is every reason to expect that the board, 
with eight of his appointees, will follow suit. (Krauss, 2004a)
On Tuesday, March 9 the Ohio State Board of Education voted 13-5 in favor
of the “Critical Analysis of Evolution” lesson plan. A week after the vote, March
16, The Cleveland Plain Dealer published an article by reporter Scott Stephens that
attempted to explain “how the lesson plan, castigated by mainstream groups such as
the National Academy of Sciences and the Ohio Academy of Science, gained such
strong support.. .People who observed and participated in the debate and the behind-
the-scenes machinations say several factors made the plan’s adoption possible.”26
Stephens cited four factors. First, the writing team members. As noted earlier, three
of the seven subgroup members were ID advocates, and they apparently had great
influence on the group.27 Second, the makeup of the 19 member BOE. An
amendment at the March meeting to remove the lesson from the curricula failed 10-7.
One of the 10 voting against was a relatively new member to the board, Stephen
25 The model lesson plan adopted on March 9, 2004 is included in this dissertation as Appendix A. It 
can be accessed on the web at
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/academic content standards/sciencesboe/pdf setA/LlO- 
H23 Critical Analysis of Evolution Mar SBOE changes.pdf.
26 In addition to the NAS and OAS, the Case Western Reserve Faculty Senate and the Ohio Faculty 
Council (a council with members from all public Ohio universities), passed resolutions opposing 
lesson plan L10H23. A biologist with a PhD in biology who lives outside of Ohio wrote a letter to the 
board that said in part, “What I’ve found most disturbing in these latest incidents is not the actions of 
the IDists, but is the lack of trust displayed by [the] board of education toward their state’s own 
university scientists” (Gutman, 2004).
27 The person who wrote the initial draft of L10H23 was a high school biology teacher who testified in 
support of ID in previous OSBOE meetings. See Scott Stephens, “How State Board Thinking Evolved 
on Biology Lesson,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 16, 2004.
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Millett, who is “a nationally renowned expert on technologies of the future.” 
Scientists viewed him as a potential swing vote. Millet, however “saw this not as the 
interjection of religion into the classroom. I saw it as freedom of thought.” The third 
factor, according to Stephens, was leadership and “in this case, silence was golden.”28 
Board president Jennifer Sheets “said little,” State Superintendent Susan Tave 
Zelman “kept a poker face,” stanch ID advocate Michael Cochran was chairman of 
the entire standards committee and Gov. Bob Tate said nothing. His eight appointed 
members “supported the critical-analysis lesson plan. Conversely, all seven board 
members who voted to remove the plan from the curricula were elected to serve 
geographic districts.” Lynn Elfner, CEO of the NAS noted “it reflects a lack of 
educational leadership in Ohio, from the governor on down.” Finally, Stephens cited 
the Wedge. Ohio was seen by ID proponents “as a state to test ‘The Wedge Strategy’ 
of the Discovery Institute, a plan designed to replace the ‘destructive moral aspects’ 
of scientific materialism with a theistic view that human beings and nature were 
created by God.” Anti-intelligent design board member Rob Hovis warned the board 
“It is the thin edge of the wedge. It will set a precedent.”29
Following the March 9 vote, Agape Press reported that SEAO founder Bob 
Lattimer said
28 Lack of media attention in the fall and tight control of the lesson plan development process were also 
important. Bob Lattimer, the founder of the pro-ED group SEAO, said in November 2003 “The debate 
this year has been very quiet, it’s not been in the news, and that’s good. Hopefully, it’ll stay out of the 
news. We don’t really think it deserves a big flap.” Also, “Opponents of the plan complained last fall 
they had trouble getting copies of the proposal, and they failed to generate much media attention. By 
the time they were able to drum up interest, the plan was nearing a vote.” Scott Stephens, “How State 
Board Thinking Evolved on Biology Lesson,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 16, 2004.
29Scott Stephens, “How State Board Thinking Evolved on Biology Lesson,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
March 16, 2004.
I think over time other states will look at this lesson and develop similar ones of 
their own.. .Our opposition has been very intent to paint this lesson as something 
that promotes religion -  intelligent design, creationism or both. It actually has 
no content that is religious at all. It’s totally science.
The article ended noting that “The scientist and educational excellence advocate 
[Lattimer] adds that the next step for his group is to get test questions pertaining to
Of)
criticisms of evolution included on Ohio’s statewide assessment exams.”
As Lattimer suggested in the Agape article, the next step in the process of the 
development of statewide academic content standards in Ohio is the development of 
statewide academic assessments including statewide achievement and diagnostic 
tests.
The Moral Character o f the Ohio Dispute over Science Education
The moral dimensions of the dispute in Ohio over the model lesson plan 
become apparent in the answers participants in the conflict gave to three pivotal 
questions. First, does the model lesson plan include intelligent design concepts and 
references to ID? Second, is intelligent design a scientific theory? And, third, is 
intelligent design a religious theory?
The first question appears to have a straightforward answer -  either ID 
concepts and references to ID are in the lesson plan or they are not. Yet, surprisingly, 
citizens disagreed -  some said ID concepts and references to ID are present, some 
said they aren’t. Even when the most prestigious science organization in the United 
States, the NAS, and in the state of Ohio, the OAS, indicated that ID theoretical 
assertions and references were contained in the lesson plan, many people remained
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30 Jim Brown, “Ohio Schools Adopt Curriculum Critically Challenging Evolution,” AgapePress, 
March 12, 2004.
unconvinced. Benjamin Wiker, for example, asserted “The lesson plan in question 
doesn’t even address this topic, let alone discuss it” (Wiker, 2004).
Ohio citizens also deeply disagreed over the scientific status of intelligent 
design. If intelligent design is a scientific theory, its presence in the model lesson 
plan would be unproblematic. If, however, it is not a scientific theory, then a strong 
argument could be made for excluding it from science lessons in public schools. 
Again, when the NAS and OAS stated unequivocally that intelligent design is not 
science because “its ultimate tenet that life on Earth is the result of the work of some 
intelligent being is scientifically untestable and therefore cannot be invalidated 
through scientific means,” many people remained unconvinced. Bob Lattimer, for 
example, said, “Our opposition has been very intent to paint this lesson as something 
that promotes religion -  intelligent design, creationism or both. It actually has no 
content that is religious at all. It’s totally science.”31
Finally, Ohio citizens are deeply divided over the religious status of intelligent 
design. Bob Lattimer and other members of SEAO consider intelligent design to be 
purely a scientific endeavor. Since, in their view, “intelligent design theory is limited 
to the observation and detection of design in nature, not the identification of the 
Designer,” and since “it draws its authority from investigation, observation and 
logical analysis per the scientific method - not from religious text,” then, ID is 
science, not religion (SEAO, 2004a). Other citizens, including OSBOE member 
Martha Wise, regard ID as “a shrouded way of bringing religion into the schools.. .1
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31 Jim Brown, “Ohio Schools Adopt Curriculum Critically Challenging Evolution,” 
March 12, 2004.
think intelligent design is a theology.” Given the reaction of some citizens to the 
expert opinion of the NAS and OAS, it is reasonable to assume that if distinguished 
theologians submitted expert opinions on the religious status of intelligent design, the 
result would be the same -  many people would remain unconvinced no matter what 
the expert theologians said.33
Given the apparent intractability of three pivotal questions in the Ohio dispute, 
other questions arise: Why do persons involved in the dispute disagree so deeply 
about the answers to these questions? Why do “expert” opinions fail to convince 
them? What would motivate citizens to disagree with or ignore what experts regard 
as overwhelming evidence? The answers to these questions are suggested by the 
values people perceive to be at stake in the conflict over Ohio’s “Critical Analysis 
Lesson Plan.”
Phillip Johnson, for example, regards divine creation, the reality of God, 
Christian moral values and the authority of Christianity in our culture to be at stake. 
Teacher Joel Roadruck claims that “truth” is at stake. OSBOE member Stephen 
Millet believes that “freedom of thought” is at stake. The Ohio Academy of Science 
argues that not only the “the nature of science” is at stake but also the “intellectual 
integrity” of the science within Ohio is at stake. Fair democratic governmental 
processes are also considered to be at stake. OSBOE members Schloemer and Wise
32 Francis X. Clines, “In Ohio School Hearing, a New Theory Will Seek a Place Alongside 
Evolution,” New York Times, February 11, 2002. Available at 
http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/newtheorvohio021502.htm. Accessed 3/23/04.
33 Indeed, as shall be shown in chapters three and four, even when compelling arguments are offered 
which include the opinions of distinguished theologians and demonstrate at length the lack of scientific 
content in ID theory and the religious content of ID, the conflict between citizens remains
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complained about the closed and controlled political process that created the model 
lesson plan. Krauss complained about “disingenuous debates” that “sneak” ID into 
science classrooms to “subvert science education. OCS president Princehouse,
OAS’s Elfner and the OAS itself complained of a “pattern of deception,” a lack of 
publicity, governmental “secrecy,” and “opaque rather than transparent” public 
processes which excluded citizen participation in deliberations over the plan.
The “stakes” that citizens perceive at risk in Ohio refer to valued beliefs or 
assumptions that are essential for a meaningful, worthwhile, “good” or moral life, 
including ethical professional and civic lives. Importantly, many of the valued beliefs 
and assumptions are incompatible with those of others, and many therefore feel these 
valued beliefs and assumptions will be lost if they “lose” the conflict with others. 
People disagree, then, about the answers to the pivotal questions in Ohio because 
cherished moral values are at stake. When individual citizens are motivated by 
cherished moral beliefs and professional and civic assumptions, expert opinions and 
policy decisions that challenge those beliefs and assumptions simply have no 
authority.
Since the perceived stakes in Ohio reflect beliefs about values that lead to a 
good, i.e. moral, life, the dispute in Ohio over the model lesson plan has a deep moral 
dimension. It is a dispute in which citizens believe that ‘losing’ ends in severe moral 
consequences for their lives, the lives of their children, and the future of the nation. 
Clearly, the perceived moral stakes fuel the passion and vitriol which surfaced in 
Ohio. When deliberations among citizens begins or ends in polarized, intractable 
disagreement, deliberations on the merits of controversial issues usually dissolve into
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what Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson describe as “communicating by sound 
bite, competing by character assassination, and resolving political conflicts through 
self-seeking bargaining” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 12). In such a political 
environment, the reasons public policymakers give for the policies they create are 
rarely justifiable to citizens who must abide by those policies despite their deep 
disagreement with the policies. The political environment also assures that the 
division among citizens over values that ought to govern our lives remains deeply 
entrenched in public discourse.
The first section of this chapter presented evidence from recent events in Ohio 
that citizen disagreements over the placement of intelligent design in public school 
science classrooms have important moral dimensions. I argued that the inability of 
citizens to reach agreement on three pivotal questions, including a seemingly simple 
question concerning the presence or absence of certain concepts and references in a 
model lesson plan, results from conflicting beliefs about values that lead to morally 
worthy lives. The next section, section two, introduces the general outlines of a 
deliberative democratic political framework for principled policy decision-making 
that (1) promises to provide policy decisions that are more likely to be justifiable to 
citizens who continue to morally disagree about the teaching of evolution and 
intelligent design and (2) may reduce the domain of future disagreements.
Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democratic political theory is a conception of democracy that 
places discussion about moral issues at the center of political life. In this section I
briefly introduce the conception of deliberative democracy developed by Gutmann
and Thompson in Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot be
Avoided in Politics, and What Should be Done About It. It is important to note that
my aim is to adapt and apply some of their central, pertinent ideas to the
contemporary conflict among citizens over the appropriate placement of intelligent
design in public school curricula. I generally describe deliberative democratic theory
and the principled political reasoning it engenders, and I use deliberative theory and
reasoning in this dissertation to critique the merits of the moral claims offered by
proponents of and opponents to the inclusion of ID in public school science
classrooms. I do not, however, offer a complete description and critical analysis of
the conception of deliberative democracy that Gutmann and Thompson develop.
Authors Gutmann and Thompson argue that past political theory and practice
have not adequately addressed the “formidable.. .problem of moral disagreement” in
civic life. They note that when citizens disagree morally with one another, a
democracy is preferable to other forms of government because “it is a conception of
government that accords equal respect to the claims of each citizen.. .If we have to
disagree morally about public policy, it is better to do so in a democracy that as far as
possible respects the moral status of each of us” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p.
26). But dominant conceptions of democracy, most notably procedural and
constitutional conceptions, pay attention primarily to moral arguments that justify the
foundations and conclusions of democratic government, not to the everyday moral
politics of what Gutmann and Thompson call “middle democracy.”
It is in middle democracy that much of the moral life of a democracy, for good 
or ill, is to be found. This is the land of everyday politics, where legislators, 
executives, administrators, and judges make and apply policies and laws,
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sometimes arguing among themselves, sometimes explaining themselves and 
listening to citizens, other time not. Middle democracy is also the land of 
interest groups, civic associations, and schools, in which adults and children 
develop political understandings, sometimes arguing among themselves and 
listening to people with differing points of view, other times not. It is a land that 
democrats can scarcely afford to bypass. A democratic theory that is to remain 
faithful to its moral premises and aspirations for justice must take seriously the 
need for moral argument within these processes and appreciate the moral 
potential of such deliberation. (Ibid., p. 40)
Given the inability of procedural and constitutional conceptions of 
democracy34 to adequately address moral conflict in middle democracy, Gutmann and 
Thompson offer a conception of democracy they call “deliberative democracy” whose 
“core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they 
should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions” (Ibid., p.
1). It is a conception that “is as much concerned with living with continual conflict as 
with trying to resolve it” (Macedo, 1999, p. 255).
The purpose of this section is to briefly describe why democratic deliberations 
are preferable to other democratic responses to moral conflict and to describe how 
Gutmann and Thompson identify political principles that ought to guide those 
deliberations. This section is divided into three parts. The first part outlines four 
sources of moral disagreement. Gutmann and Thompson argue that the sources of 
moral conflict provide compelling reasons for favoring extensive democratic 
deliberation when moral disputes occur over other possible democratic responses.
The second part describes the characteristic features of moral arguments that people 
commonly employ to justify their decisions and actions. Gutmann and Thompson
34 According to Gutmann and Thompson, procedural and constitutional democrats disagree over 
whether “democratic procedures have priority over just outcomes or just outcomes have priority over 
democratic procedures. Deliberative democracy rejects this dichotomy neither the principles that 
define the process of deliberation nor the principles that constitute its content have priority in 
deliberative democracy” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 27). See p. 26-49 for a discussion of 
procedural and constitutional conceptions of democracy.
argue that the characteristic features of common moral arguments provide the basis 
for developing three normative principles that ought to structure the process of 
deliberations over moral disputes. The final part presents Gutmann and Thompson’s 
rational for two principles that, they argue, ought to structure the content of political 
deliberations over moral disputes 
The Sources o f Moral Conflict
Gutmann and Thompson posit four sources of moral conflict among citizens. 
They are: scarcity of resources, the limited generosity of human nature, incompatible 
values and incomplete understanding. The sources of moral conflict, Gutmann and 
Thompson argue, provide compelling reasons for favoring extensive deliberation 
when moral disputes occur.
The first source of moral conflict, the problem of scarce resources, for 
example, means that schools have limited time with students, limited money and a 
limited range of authority over students and their schooling. One compelling reason 
for deliberating over school policies that distribute scare resources is that the 
legitimacy of policy decisions is enhanced. When policy decisions are made after 
extensive deliberations that seriously consider relevant conflicting moral claims to 
resources, the decisions of policymakers are more likely to be viewed by citizens as 
legitimate. Even when citizens disagree with policies, they “are likely to take a 
different attitude toward those that are adopted after careful consideration...and those 
that are adopted only after calculation of the relative strength of the competing 
political interests” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 41-42).
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The second source of moral disagreement, limited generosity, means that 
human beings are either unable or unwilling to be completely selfless toward others. 
Deliberation over moral disputes mitigates limited generosity by encouraging citizens 
to weigh the interests of others and to consider policies that include the reasonable 
moral claims of others. When citizens are asked to take seriously the claims of others 
in deliberations that respect all citizens as moral agents, they are more likely to 
extend the limits of their magnanimity thereby possibly reducing the domain of moral 
disagreement. The third source of moral conflict, incompatible moral values, also 
provides a reason for promoting extensive deliberations among citizens.
Deliberations can reveal the perceived moral stakes in a dispute and begin to separate 
them from the features of the disagreement that are not related to incompatible moral 
values and which might be settled through “bargaining, negotiation, and compromise” 
(Ibid., p. 43). When incompatible values remain, deliberation “can help citizens 
better understand the moral seriousness of the views they continue to oppose” and 
encourages “and economy of moral disagreement in which citizens manifest mutual 
respect as they continue to disagree...” (Ibid., p. 43).
Finally, the fourth source of moral disagreement, incomplete understanding, 
offers another compelling reason for a deliberative conception of democracy.
Humans do not have perfect understanding. That means that resolving some moral 
dilemmas will remain beyond the capacity of even “the most thoughtful and good- 
willed citizens” (Ibid., p. 25). Deliberation in these circumstances allows citizens to 
continue “to learn from one another, come to recognize their individual and collective
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mistakes, and develop new views and policies that are more widely justifiable” (Ibid., 
p. 43).
Given the sources of moral conflict identified by Gutmann and Thompson, it 
is clear that moral disputes are a permanent fixture of public life, but, they argue, that 
does not mean there is no hope of fairly resolving some of them and learning to live 
with those we cannot resolve. According the Gutmann and Thompson, the 
characteristic features of moral disagreement themselves point toward a deliberative 
way of dealing with disagreement and support the possibility of resolution of some 
moral conflicts (Ibid., p. 13, 25). In the next part of this section, I demonstrate how 
the three normative process principles are developed by Gutmann and Thompson 
from the characteristic features of moral arguments.
Characteristic Features o f Moral Arguments: Developing the Process Principles
The most prominent characteristic feature of moral argument is its generality. 
“Moral arguments apply to everyone who is similarly situated in the morally relevant 
respects” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 13). The argument that all children in 
public schools ought to receive a science education that will enable them to make 
informed scientific choices as citizens, for example, is a moral argument -  that is, it 
applies to all children in public schools. The argument would “impute right and 
wrongs, or ascribe virtue and vice” (Ibid., p. 13), to public school science 
policymakers in situations where they succeed or fail to provide adequate science 
education to students.
The criterion of generality, however, is not the only important feature of moral 
arguments in politics. Three other important characteristic features of moral
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arguments appear in arguments that are commonly used to justify public policies to 
citizens who are bound by the policies. Since political policy decisions are, according 
to Gutmann and Thompson, “collectively binding.. .they should therefore be 
justifiable, as far as possible to everyone bound by them” (Ibid., p. 13). The 
characteristic features of the arguments policymakers give to justify policy decisions 
suggest three normative principles that allow citizens to assess the fairness of the 
process that led to those policies.
First, justifying policies commonly consists of offering reasons that other 
citizens can accept even though there may be few shared values. This means that 
policymakers and citizens “recognize and respect one another as moral agents, not 
merely as abstract objects of others’ moral reasoning” (Ibid., p. 14). Appealing to 
reasons that others share or might come to share is the basis for the first principle that 
Gutmann and Thompson argue should guide the process of public deliberations -- the 
principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity “is a form of mutuality in the face of 
disagreement” (Ibid., p. 14). It is “the capacity to seek fair terms of social 
cooperation for their own sake” (Ibid., p. 52-53).
Second, justification of public policies commonly takes place in public forums 
where citizens speak not only among themselves but, in principle, to the public at 
large. Justifying policies requires public forums and media coverage that allows 
citizens to hear and question the reasons other citizens offer for their actions. The 
second principle Gutmann and Thompson identify for the process of deliberation, 
then, is the principle of publicity. “The reasons that officials and citizens give to
43
justify political action, and the information necessary to assess those reasons, should 
be public” (Ibid., p. 95).
Third, when policymakers offer arguments that attempt to justify policy 
decisions, they are commonly considered to be taking responsibility for the effects of 
those decisions on all citizens. Public policymakers are citizens who are publicly 
accountable to their fellow citizens for their political activities and decisions. This is 
the basis of Gutmann and Thompson’s third process principle -  the principle of 
accountability. Accountability requires policymakers to take public responsibility for 
the consequences of policies on all citizens. “In a deliberative forum.. .citizens and 
officials try to justify their decisions to all those who are bound by them.. .the reasons 
should.. .address the claims of anyone who is significantly affected by the laws and 
policies” (Ibid., p. 128-129).
The principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability, then, are normative 
standards that Gutmann and Thompson suggest citizens adopt when they create and 
assess the fairness of the process that produces universally binding public policies. 
Developing the Content Principles
Applying the process principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability 
would not alone assure fair public policy deliberations when citizens morally 
disagree. These three principles merely set possible conditions for deliberations that 
are justifiable to citizens who are motivated to find fair terms of cooperation; they do 
not address the difficult tasks of assessing the substantive content of competing moral 
claims and assessing the fairness of policy decisions. Further principles are needed to 
govern the content of deliberations. To identify justifiable content principles,
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Gutmann and Thompson first consider the political principle of utilitarianism since 
the “utilitarian way of thinking.. .pervades the public forum in middle democracy” 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 165).
Utilitarianism promotes the view that government ought to maximize the 
average welfare of citizens. It suggests this single principle as a way to adjudicate 
among competing values and as the basis for developing fair public policy decisions. 
Utilitarianism, in Gutmann and Thompson’s view, has some political virtues. It takes 
seriously the claims of all citizens, is concerned with the long-range consequences of 
policies, and can sometimes appropriately quantify values that help clarify policy 
choices (Ibid., p. 196). But, Gutmann and Thompson argue, utilitarianism creates 
serious problems for the three process principles of deliberation -  accountability, 
publicity and reciprocity. And, “to the extent that it does resolve conflicts, it is at the 
expense of the fundamental values of liberty and opportunity, which any reciprocal 
perspective must recognize” (Ibid., p. 173). The reasons utilitarians give for rejecting 
organ lotteries that maximize the saving of human life, for example, do not address 
the fundamental value of basic liberty. In addition, when utilitarians choose policies 
that are intended to maximize average welfare, utilitarianism “says nothing about how 
the welfare should be distributed” (Ibid., p. 193). Thus, utilitarianism neglects the 
fundamental value of basic opportunity.
The content principles of democratic deliberations should, according to 
Gutmann and Thompson, express basic values against which citizens can assess
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35 See Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 165-198 for their complete analysis of utilitarianism as a 
principle for deliberation.
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policy decisions. The most promising candidates for those principles are “the two 
values that utilitarianism neglects: liberty and opportunity” (Ibid., p. 199).
Basic liberty. The liberty principle that Gutmann and Thompson have in mind 
is what they call “the basic liberty principle.” Basic liberty “protects the physical and 
mental integrity of persons.” It assures citizens that they will “be protected from 
policies that would conscript their bodies for transplants and experiments, and their 
minds for religious and other causes” (Ibid., p. 203-204).
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish their conception of basic liberty from the 
claims of libertarians. Libertarians, in their view, rightly recognize the following 
three important points about liberty: 1) a liberty principle is essential to any mutually 
acceptable political perspective; 2) basic liberty protects the physical and mental 
integrity of persons; and 3) basic liberty does not include positive claims on society 
for everything one may need or want to pursue one’s way of life (Ibid., p. 203-204). 
But the libertarian negative concept of liberty, i.e. freedom from interference, 
overextends liberty at the expense of basic opportunity. Hence, a deliberative 
conception of basic liberty constrains liberty when reasonable opportunity claims 
challenge the unconstrained negative liberty claims of libertarians.
36 See Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 201-208 for their discussion of libertarianism and basic 
liberty.
37 Libertarians, for example, include the negative liberty of freedom from taxation without individual 
consent in their conception of basic liberty. In their view, taxation is an unjustified violation of the 
liberty of anyone who opposes taxation. Gutmann and Thompson respond as follows:
To reject any public policy that would redistribute income or wealth, libertarians must 
assume that the given distribution is just. But libertarians cannot justify this 
assumption.. .The present distribution of income and wealth in the world is the product 
of.. .many past actions that libertarians must consider unjustified coercion. Libertarians 
therefore cannot object on libertarian grounds to the use of state coercion to change this 
distribution in the direction of aiding the less advantaged. (Gutmann & Thompson,
1996, p. 206-207)
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Basic opportunity. The principle of opportunity that Gutmann and Thompson 
promote is called “the basic opportunity principle.” It obligates policy makers to 
attempt to provide all citizens with the resources they need to lead a minimally decent 
life. “Basic opportunities are those goods and services that are necessary for living a 
good life...” (Ibid., p. 217).38 An adequate education, including science education, is 
included among the basic opportunity goods that constitute a minimally decent, good 
life.39
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish the principle of basic opportunity from 
what they call “egalitarian opportunity.” Egalitarians share the moral conviction that 
“one’s life chances should not be determined by factors that are arbitrary from a 
moral point of view” (Ibid., p. 209).40 Egalitarians recognize the priority of basic 
liberty over egalitarian values, but to be free and equal, citizens must have equal 
opportunities. “Equal opportunity is intended to give each citizen, as far as possible, 
an equal chance to develop his or her natural talents and to choose among the range of 
good lives available within society” (Ibid., p. 210).
38 Gutmann and Thompson actually present two opportunity principles that, they argue, ought to 
govern the opportunities offered citizens. They are: 1) a basic opportunity principle which “obligates 
government to ensure that all citizens may secure the resources they need to live a decent life...” and 
2) a fair opportunity principle that “governs the distribution of highly valued goods that society 
legitimately takes an interest in distributing fairly among individuals... [especially] skilled jobs” 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 217). For the purposes of this dissertation I only consider the basic 
opportunity principle. A discussion of the fair opportunity principle can be found in chapter nine of 
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996.
39 Gutmann and Thompson consider “health care, education, physical security, housing, food, 
employment, or the equivalents in income [as] goods that are especially important to living a decent 
life and securing other opportunities in our society” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 217). They are 
obviously exploring a much wider range of moral disputes over public policy than the limited moral 
dispute over intelligent design and public school science education. I ignore many cogent points they 
make concerning opportunity goods other than education. For a full account of the range of their basic 
opportunity concerns, see chapters six, eight and nine in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996.
40 The conception of egalitarianism Gutmann and Thompson describe is derived from John Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, esp. p. 65-107.
The difficulty with egalitarian opportunity, according to Gutmann and 
Thompson, is that it does not adequately address problems of scarcity and imperfect 
knowledge. The claims of equal opportunity can expand without limit and 
egalitarians offer few ideas on how to determine those limits fairly. The deliberative 
principle of basic opportunity recognizes that policy makers can legitimately place 
limits on the provision of opportunity goods but only within the context of extensive 
moral deliberations. There is no immutable standard citizens can employ to 
determine the level of opportunity that ought to be offered to citizens in a deliberative 
democracy. The basic level of public education, for example, that citizens are offered 
might change over time due to economic considerations and social expectations. 
Policy decisions that limit basic opportunity goods are, from a deliberative 
perspective, justifiable if they are conditioned by moral deliberations that honor basic 
liberty and the process principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability.41
The basic liberty and basic opportunity principles suggested by Gutmann and 
Thompson are standards that citizens might mutually agree on to govern the content 
of their deliberations. With standards of basic liberty and basic opportunity, citizens 
are encouraged to make considered judgments about competing moral claims and the 
fairness of policy decisions.
This section briefly introduced a deliberative conception of democracy which 
takes into account the need for extensive moral argument when citizens morally
41 The principle of basic opportunity, then, not only shapes the content of deliberations by requiring 
that policymakers attend to minimal opportunity goods for a decent life, but the content of the principle 
itself is shaped by deliberation. In the last part of the next section of this chapter I describe how all the 
process and content principles Gutmann and Thompson suggest partially determine and are partially 
determined by deliberative moral discussion.
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disagree about public policies. It explained why democratic deliberations are 
preferable to other democratic responses to moral conflict and described how 
Gutmann and Thompson developed the political principles they argue ought to guide 
those deliberations. The next section of this chapter describes in greater detail the 
content of the principles of reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic liberty and 
basic opportunity. It also describes the type of moral reasoning and the 
characteristics of policy decisions that deliberative democracy promotes. The final 
section of this chapter briefly applies these deliberative democratic principles to the 
moral conflict in Ohio over the tenth grade model lesson plan for teaching evolution.
The Constitutional Principles of Deliberative Democracy 
Public school policymakers in a deliberative democracy are asked to justify 
public policies by giving reasons for those policies that can be accepted by citizens 
who are bound by the policies. When citizens morally disagree with the decisions of 
policymakers, they may still be able to accept those decisions as reasonable if 
mutually agreed upon principles governed the process and content of the deliberations 
that lead to the decisions. The purpose of this section is to describe in greater detail 
the principles for the process and content of public deliberations suggested by 
Gutmann and Thompson that may be mutually acceptable to all citizens and to outline 
the method of principled moral reasoning that deliberative democracy depends on and 
promotes. This section is divided into six parts. The first five parts describe the 
process principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability (Figure 1.1), and the 
content principles of basic liberty and basic opportunity. The final part describes the 
kind of political reasoning deliberative theory suggests citizens ought to engage in
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and the characteristics decisions share when they are conditioned by principled
political reasoning.
Figure 1.1: The Process Principles of Deliberative Democracy
Reciprocity 
(Mutual respect)
Compared to prudence and impartiality Two types of disagreement
Prudence Impartiality Nondeliberative Deliberative
Principles of accommodation:
Civic integrity 
consistency in speech 
consistency between speech and action 
integrity of principle 
disagreement
- acknowledgment in speech
- open-mindedness
- economy of moral
Civic magnanimity
Publicity
Four reasons fc ts for secrecy
- consent to z ty
- broaden per and Opportunity
- clarify dispi ation
- moral grow
Two types of rarely justified secrets 
Deceptive secrets 
Deep secrets
Accountability
Two challenges
Specialization
Constituency
The problem of 
appointees
(Source: Gutmann & Thompson, 1996)
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Reciprocity
At the heart of the process principle of reciprocity is the desire and capacity to 
seek fair terms of social cooperation as a valued end in itself.42 Gutmann and 
Thompson consider reciprocity to be the leading principle in a deliberative 
democracy because “it shapes the meaning of publicity and accountability and also 
influences the interpretation of liberty and opportunity” (Gutmann & Thompson,
1996, p. 52). Reciprocity asks citizens to engage in political reasoning that is 
mutually justifiable -  that is, citizens offer reasons for their actions and decisions that 
can be accepted by others “who are similarly motivated to find reasons that can be 
accepted by others” (Ibid., p. 53). Reciprocity depends on the value of mutual respect 
which requires “a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the 
persons with whom one disagrees” and recognition of others as moral agents (Ibid., p. 
79).
The principle of reciprocity has, according to Gutmann and Thompson, two 
requirements. First, it requires citizens to be motivated to find fair terms of social 
cooperation.
A deliberative perspective does not address people who reject the aim of finding 
fair terms for social cooperation; it cannot reach those who refuse to press their 
public claims in terms accessible to their fellow citizens. No moral perspective 
in politics can reach such people, except one that replicates their own 
comprehensive set of beliefs. And since that perspective would entail rejecting 
entirely the comprehensive beliefs o f their rivals, it would not help reduce, let 
alone resolve, moral disagreements. (Ibid., p. 55)
Second, reciprocity requires that when empirical claims are made in moral disputes, 
the claims should be made in terms that are “consistent with relatively reliable
42 For a thorough discussion of reciprocity in deliberative democratic theory, see Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996, p. 52-94.
methods of inquiry” (Ibid., p. 56). When citizens claim, for example, that they have 
empirical evidence that confirms the existence of a supernatural intelligence, then that 
claim, according to Gutmann and Thompson, must be able to be substantiated by 
reliable methods of inquiry “that themselves should be mutually acceptable” (Ibid., p. 
56).43 Empirical claims that rely on the authority of religious texts rather than 
mutually acceptable reliable methods of inquiry or the standards of logic fail to meet 
the requirements of reciprocity. Further, “any claim fails to respect reciprocity if it 
imposes a requirement on other citizens to adopt one’s sectarian way of life as a 
condition of gaining access to the moral understanding that is essential to judging the 
validity of one’s claims” (Ibid., p.57).
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish reciprocity from two other principles that 
often wrongly regulate the reasons citizens give to one another for policy decisions: 
prudence and impartiality. Figure 1.2 maps the differences between prudential, 
reciprocal and impartial reason-giving.
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Figure 1.2: Reciprocity Compared to Prudence and Impartiality
Prudence Reciprocity Impartiality
Justification mutually advantageous mutually acceptable universally justifiable
Motive self-interest desire to justify to others altruism
Process bargaining deliberation demonstration
Goal modus vivendi deliberative comprehensive view
agreement/
disagreement
(Source: Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 53)
43 In chapter three I assess the scientific claims of ID proponents and ID critics in terms of a 
deliberative perspective. Deliberative theory requires that when citizens make empirical claims, those 
claims must conform to the demands of reciprocity, i.e., they must conform to mutually acceptable, 
reliable methods and standards of scientific inquiry.
Prudence. Prudential reasons attempt to demonstrate that a policy is mutually 
advantageous rather than mutually acceptable. Citizens who offer prudential reasons 
are motivated by self-interest, not a desire to justify a policy to others on moral 
grounds. Prudence suggests reaching compromises through bargaining rather than 
deliberating to reach agreement. Gutmann and Thompson argue that prudential 
bargaining has a place in a deliberative democracy when no important moral values 
are at stake or when disagreements are not over values but the means to achieve them. 
But using prudence to regulate moral disagreements in a democracy has two 
pernicious consequences. First, it tolerates citizens who “try to maximize their own 
or their group’s advantage even at the expense of the well-being of other citizens” 
(Ibid., p. 58). And second, some citizens have access to far greater bargaining power 
than others, thus making it likely that the claims of less advantaged citizens will be 
ignored or minimized.
In the case of Ohio, it can be argued that Stephen Meyer’s suggested 
compromise of “teaching the controversy” is an example of a prudential response to a 
moral conflict and that it illustrates the pernicious consequences of bargaining over 
moral disputes. The fact that many citizens felt that political compromise is morally 
wrong when setting standards for scientific inquiry means that, in their view, the 
“compromise” advantaged ID proponents at the expense of mutually accepted science 
standards adopted by the larger scientific community. The “compromise” also, in the 
view of citizens who morally disagreed with it, demonstrated the lack of access they 
had to bargaining power on the state board of education -  a fact, they argued, that
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resulted from the appointment of eight members of the BOE by the governor who was 
apparently sympathetic to the claims of ID proponents.
Impartiality. Another principle that might regulate the reasons policymakers 
give for their policy decisions is the principle of impartiality. The principle of 
impartiality, like the reciprocal view, prescribes that moral reasons should be offered 
to justify public policies that are morally disputed, but it does not require those 
reasons to be mutually justifiable. The reasons are justified because they are the only 
correct moral view. Impartialists regard moral disputes as errors in moral reasoning 
that can be corrected by demonstrating the truth of a comprehensive moral view that 
“include[s] a single set of assumptions about the foundation of morality and 
understanding of human nature” (Ibid., p. 59). Gutmann and Thompson argue that a 
deliberative democracy can accommodate some of the claims of impartial moralists 
under the principle of basic liberty, but note that impartiality is unable to adequately 
address the fact that citizens in a pluralist society hold competing, reasonable 
comprehensive moral views. At worst, citizens with impartial moralist perspectives 
attempt to kill one another or treat each other with intolerance, contempt and/or 
antipathy; at best they tolerate one another. Mere toleration, though, “locks into place 
the moral divisions in society and makes collective moral progress far more difficult” 
(Ibid., p. 62-63).
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish between two types of moral 
disagreement in a deliberative democracy - nondeliberative disagreement and 
deliberative disagreement.
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Non-deliberative disagreement. When citizens are unwilling or unable to offer
reciprocal reasons -  i.e., reasons that can be accepted by others who are similarly
motivated to find fair terms of social cooperation -  for rejecting a moral argument,
they are locked in a nondeliberative disagreement. An example of nondeliberative
disagreement would be when a local public school board adopts a policy that requires
science teachers to teach the Gospel of John in the Bible as scientifically true. The
board of education would be unable to offer reciprocal reasons for the policy to their
Jewish, Moslem and atheistic, among others, constituents. The prudential
compromise adopted by the Ohio SBOE is also an example of a non-deliberative
disagreement. The reasons that the board of education gave for the compromise were
not moral reasons based on mutually accepted fair terms of social cooperation that
opponents of ID could in principle accept.
Deliberative disagreement. A deliberative disagreement, on the other hand,
“places some citizens in opposition to others who are no less committed to finding
fair terms of cooperation, and who are offering reasons that cannot be shown to
violate those terms” (Ibid., p. 78). Gutmann and Thompson regard one construal of
the abortion debate as a paradigmatic case of deliberative disagreement.
Pro-life and pro-choice advocates can agree that innocent people should not be 
killed, and that women have a basic liberty to live their own lives and control 
their own bodies. But they arrive at radically different conclusions about 
abortion because they cannot agree on whether the fetus is a full-fledged 
constitutional person, whether a woman’s right to control her body takes priority 
over any claims the dependent fetus may have, and what responsibility a woman 
has to realize the human potential of a fetus that lacks consciousness and 
sentience. The claims on both sides o f all these disagreements fall within the 
range o f what reciprocity respects. (Ibid., p. 74)44
44 See Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 73-79 for their discussion of the abortion conflict.
From the impartialist perspective, the best citizens could hope for in the 
abortion debate would be mere toleration of the opposing moral positions with the 
promise of entrenched moral divisions among citizens. A reciprocal perspective 
offers more. The value of mutual respect which “requires a favorable attitude toward, 
and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees” that grounds 
reciprocity also promotes practices of accommodation.
Gutmann and Thompson extend the principle of reciprocity to include two 
principles of accommodation that, they argue, ought to guide practical practices of 
mutual respect. The two principles are: civic integrity and civic magnanimity.
Civic integrity. Civic integrity requires citizens to affirm the moral status of 
their political claims. Citizens demonstrate civic integrity in three ways. First, civic 
integrity is shown through consistency in speech. Citizens are expected to speak 
consistently about their moral views in all venues of their lives as “a sign of political 
sincerity” (Ibid., p. 81). If, for example, intelligent design proponents say one thing 
in one setting, e.g. in books they write, and another in another setting, e.g. school 
board meetings, they would not be regarded as demonstrating civic integrity. Second, 
civic integrity is demonstrated through consistency between speech and action, i.e., 
through what citizens do as well as what they say. A public school administrator, for 
example, who claims that science classes are not teaching certain religious beliefs as 
true yet quietly allows teachers to present Biblical creationism as a true scientific 
theory is not demonstrating civic integrity. Finally, civic integrity requires what 
Gutmann and Thompson call an “integrity of principle,” which “consists in the 
acceptance of the broader implications of the principles presupposed by one’s moral
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positions” (Ibid., p. 81). If a citizen, for example, opposes the teaching of the Gospel 
of John as scientifically true in science classes, he or she should also oppose the 
teaching of atheism as scientifically true in science classes.45
Civic magnanimity. The second principle that, according to Gutmann and 
Thompson, ought to ground practical practices of mutual respect is civic 
magnanimity. Civic magnanimity requires citizens to “acknowledge the moral status 
of the positions they oppose” (Ibid., p. 82). When citizens disagree over moral issues, 
they should demonstrate respect for opposing moral views by acknowledging in 
speech the seriousness of their opponent’s claims. Too often in public policy 
disagreements, people disparage the moral views of others by belittling, ignoring or 
making fun of opposing views. Gutmann and Thompson point out that a favored way 
of “impugning the moral status of an opponent’s position” is to claim that is it 
“politically motivated,” which “is an all-purpose argument which can be used to 
discredit any position, whatever its moral merits. What all such arguments have in 
common is a refusal to give moral reasons for rejecting the position” (Ibid., p. 83).
A second way in which citizens demonstrate civic magnanimity is by 
practicing the “simple virtue of open-mindedness.” This consists of citizens 
remaining open to the possibility that they might be convinced by the moral claims of 
others and, therefore, are willing to change their minds. ’’Both the political mind and 
the political forum should be kept open to reconsideration of decisions already made 
and policies already adopted” (Ibid., p. 83). Open-mindedness does not mean that
45 Philosopher of science Robert Pennock makes this point by stating, “Science excludes appeal to 
supernatural entities as a point of method, and thus it is improper to draw directly the atheistic 
conclusion that God is ontologically unreal from evolution or any other scientific conclusion. Such 
questions are not scientific and must be left to the theologian and the philosopher” (Pennock, 1999, p. 
335-336)
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firm convictions are ruled out; rather it means that a citizen is prepared to change or 
modify a moral position “when one encounters objections that, on reflection, one 
cannot answer” (Ibid., p. 84).
Finally, practicing mutual respect through civic magnanimity asks citizens to 
seek an “economy of moral disagreement.” This means that citizens should seek 
reasons for public policies that minimize rejection of opposing views. Citizens who 
practice an economy of moral disagreement “avoid unnecessary conflict in 
characterizing the moral grounds or drawing out the policy implication of their 
positions” and search for ways in which moral views converge (Ibid., p. 85).
Gutmann and Thompson point out that this means that citizens ought to seek an 
“economy of factual disagreement” when citizens disagree about empirical claims in 
moral disputes.
The value of mutual respect and the practices of accommodation that it 
suggests require citizens to attempt to minimize the domain of their public 
disagreement through the promotion of policies that embrace values they hold in 
common. In this way, citizens maximize the areas in which they politically and 
morally agree and minimize the range of their disagreements. Practices of moral 
accommodation will not end serious moral conflict or provide a comprehensive 
common good, but they do allow citizens to “affirm that they accept significant parts 
of the substantive morality of their fellow citizens to whom they may find themselves 
deeply opposed in other respects” (Ibid., p. 89).
In summary, the principle of reciprocity asks citizens to seek fair terms of 
social cooperation that allow them to offer mutually justifiable reasons for public
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policies. It offers a deliberative alternative to prudential bargaining and the impartial 
imposition of a comprehensive moral view when citizens morally disagree about 
public policy. Reciprocity includes principles of accommodation - civic integrity and 
civic magnanimity -  that suggest how citizens ought to present the moral content of 
their political views and how they ought to regard the moral content of the views of 
others. Importantly, the principle of reciprocity and its attendant accommodating 
principles are substantive moral principles that encourage the cultivation of civic 
virtues which can lead the way to resolution of moral disputes and allow citizens to 
live together in an environment of mutual respect when they cannot resolve their 
disagreements.
Publicity
The second deliberative process principle developed by Gutmann and 
Thompson is the principle of publicity (see Figure 1.1., p. 50). Publicity requires that 
citizens give reasons for public policies in public forums and that when secrecy is 
deemed essential to the deliberative process, the reasons for the secrecy should be 
publicly deliberated. Only those policies that have been publicly justified should be 
adopted in a deliberative democracy.
Gutmann and Thompson give four reasons why publicity is essential to 
deliberative processes. First, citizens can consent to and therefore legitimize public 
policies only when they are publicly justified. Second, public reason giving offers 
citizens the chance to broaden their moral and political perspectives through listening 
to the public justifications of others. Third, public justifications help clarify the 
nature of moral disputes and allow citizens to express mutual respect for the moral
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seriousness of the moral positions of others. Fourth, and finally, if the reasons for 
policies are not openly discussed, citizens are not encouraged to change their minds 
or modify their positions. In that case, the potential for moral growth and mutual 
understanding that deliberation can foster is undermined (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996, p. 100-101).
The value of publicity, however, is not unlimited. Certain reasons for secrecy 
may be mutually justifiable to all citizens. Gutmann and Thompson explore three 
arguments for secrecy -  necessity, liberty and opportunity, and deliberation -  to 
determine the extent to which publicity might be justifiably limited.
Necessity. Arguments for the necessity for secrecy rely on the claim that 
secrecy is necessary in those cases when publicly discussing the policy would defeat 
the purpose of the policy. A paradigm case is that of the Open Market Committee of 
the Federal Reserve Board which is exempt from sunshine laws. The chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board has argued that “greater publicity would make monetary 
policy ‘suffer, and the economy along with it’” (Ibid., p. 101). Gutmann and 
Thompson point out that there are several problems with this argument. First, it 
assumes that one group of officials is able to choose the most beneficial policies.
This contradicts the reasonable view that “independent review and criticism of the 
reasoning that led to the policy may reveal alternative policies that would produce 
better results in the future” (Ibid., p. 102). Second, this argument does not take into 
account the possibility that the primary reason for the secrecy is that many citizens 
would object to the policy and attempt to change it if they knew what the policy was 
going to be. This raises questions in the case of Ohio where the proceedings of, and
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the documents developed by, the committee designing the model lesson plan were 
secret (they were not publicly discussed) until only a few weeks before the plan was 
adopted. Are the reasons for secrecy in this case dependent on the fact that there 
might have been deep objections to the lesson plan and attempts by citizens to change 
the process leading to the lesson plan and to alter its content? A third problem with 
the argument from necessity for secrecy is that secrecy does not allow citizens to 
understand the reasoning that leads to policies and to judge for themselves the merit 
of that reasoning. Fourth, and finally, citizens are prevented from judging the 
competence of elected and appointed officials if they are not allowed to hear the 
reasoning of those officials.
Despite these problems, however, cases like the Open Market Committee of 
the Federal Reserve Board or the Ohio model lesson plan committee may be 
justifiable if citizens are able to deliberate over the reasons for secret proceedings and 
policies. Holding officials publicly accountable for the secrecy itself limits the scope 
of secrecy and supports the principle of publicity. “Publicity about secrecy.. .is the 
only form in which a deliberative perspective can accept the necessity of secrets” 
(Ibid., p. 105).
Liberty and opportunity. Arguments for secrecy based on the values of liberty 
and opportunity fall, according to Gutmann and Thompson, into two categories -  
arguments for general secrets and arguments for particular secrets. General secrets 
refer to information about indeterminate groups and categories of people while 
particular secrets are primarily concerned with information associated with specific 
individuals. For an example of general secrecy, consider the case of a rural
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superintendent in Oklahoma who commented in a newspaper article that “If the state 
legislature would just leave us alone, we will go on doing what we have always done. 
We teach creationism in our science classes.” This argument for remaining quiet and 
not publicly discussing the merits of school policies shares a few assumptions in 
common with other generally secret public policies. First, it assumes that the basic 
liberty of individuals is better protected by suppressing publicity. In this case, the 
liberty of the district and teachers to teach creationism is better protected if legislative 
bodies don’t bring the topic up. Second, it assumes that the morally correct public 
policy already is in place. The superintendent assumes that teaching creationism is 
the correct moral policy. This subverts not only the principle of publicity which 
maintains that only those policies which have been publicly deliberated can be 
justifiably adopted, but also the principle of reciprocity which requires policymakers 
to offer mutually acceptable reasons for policies when there are deep moral 
disagreements.
Arguments for secrets concerning information about particular persons that 
are based on the values of liberty and opportunity usually include the claim that 
politically irrelevant information or misleading information can violate a person’s 
opportunity to be given fair and equal consideration for public service. Gutmann and 
Thompson argue that the standard for secrecy in this case should be “that only 
information relevant to the performance of one’s office should be publicized.”
46 The example of an argument from liberty and opportunity for keeping general policies secret that 
Gutmann and Thompson use is the case of abortion. Critics of publicity about abortion issues argue 
that publicity has confounded the basic liberty of women to have access to abortions. Prior to reform 
movements in the 1960’s, these people argue, abortion was quietly available at the discretion of 
individual doctors and was quietly funded for government employees and members of the military 
This was, in their view, preferable to the restrictions that are now imposed by many states and the 
federal government on women seeking abortions. See Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 107-109 for 
their discussion of this aspect of abortion issues.
However, “What otherwise might be a publicly irrelevant part of a politician’s private 
life becomes relevant when the politician uses [secrecy about] the information to gain 
political advantage” (Ibid., p. 110). An example of this would occur when people 
who believe certain portions of the Bible are scientifically true run for boards of 
education with the secret desire to overturn policies concerning the teaching of 
evolution in public schools. In this case, publicity concerning the private religious 
beliefs and religious activities of the school board candidate would be relevant to his 
or her future performance on the board of education.
Deliberation. Finally, Gutmann and Thompson note that one of the strongest 
arguments for secrecy rests on the claim that secrecy in certain cases would promote 
democratic deliberation. This claim recognizes the fact that publicity can discourage 
officials from making bold decisions or addressing controversial issues. Gutmann 
and Thompson label secrets kept for purposes of encouraging bold leadership 
deliberative secrets. Deliberative secrets, properly constrained, can “encourage 
deliberation in which officials may take more risks at the earlier stages of the 
formulation of policy, and therefore reduce the chance that a well-grounded policy 
that could later survive public scrutiny will be rejected because it is now unpopular” 
(Ibid., p. 115). To be justified, however, deliberative secrets must be allowed only in 
cases where citizens and their representatives first deliberate over the question of 
whether secrecy would promote deliberation. “A fully justified secret is in this way 
doubly deliberative” (Ibid., p. 117).
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Gutmann and Thompson argue that two types of secrets are rarely justified -  
deceptive secrets and deep secrets -  because they do not allow citizens to hold 
officials accountable for their views and actions.
Deceptive secrets. A citizen who conceals information with the purpose of 
causing others to believe something the citizen knows is false is creating a deceptive 
secret. The few times secrets like these might be justified are in the case of war or to 
capture criminals. Usually, however, citizens create deceptive secrets to shield 
themselves from the consequences of mistakes they have made or to conceal 
intentions and activities that they know would cause some policies to be scrutinized 
and criticized, perhaps even reversed if the public knew about the intentions and 
activities. Persons who create deceptive secrets are not necessarily promoting their 
own self-interest. Rather, and more insidiously, according to Gutmann and 
Thompson, they are more likely acting on principles that they believe are “higher 
causes” that justify their deceptions.
If it is true in the case of Ohio that 1) intelligent design concepts and 
references are included in the model lesson plan; 2) the persons who created those 
lesson plans purposely and secretly worked with intelligent design activists to include 
those concepts and references; and 3) the persons creating the lesson plan denied that 
ID concepts and references are in the lesson plan and that they were working with ID 
activists; then the persons who created the lesson plans are creating deceptive secrets 
and deceiving the public. They also would be likely to defend their actions, if found 
out, on the grounds that they were acting for a higher cause -  i.e., the cause of theistic 
religious belief. “High-minded” deceptive secrets like these, argue Gutmann and
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Thompson, are “insidious precisely because [they are] more apt to be effective than 
the blatantly self-interested kind. Acting on principle for what they believe to be 
higher causes perpetrators are better able to enlist the help of others in their plans” 
(Ibid., p. 119).
Deep secrets. Deep secrets refer to information that is kept entirely from the 
public; they are never acknowledged to exist and never discussed publicly. Governor 
Taft in Ohio might be said to be harboring deep secrets. His refusal to discuss the 
state board of education’s model lesson plan and the process and content of the 
deliberations that led to its development in public at any time even after very public 
pleas from the scientific community in Ohio demonstrates an unwillingness to be held 
accountable and an unwillingness to engage in serious deliberation with citizens on 
important moral disputes. Deep secrets seriously erode public trust and confidence in 
governmental leadership.
Deep secrets and deceptive secrets are particularly grave affronts to a 
deliberative democracy, Gutmann and Thompson argue, because they block 
accountability and destroy the possibility of honest deliberation on serious political 
differences.47
In summary, the second process principle suggested by Gutmann and 
Thompson for democratic deliberations is the principle of publicity. Publicity 
requires that citizens give reasons for public policies in public forums and that when
47 Gutmann and Thompson contend that deceptive secrets are so corrosive to a deliberative democracy 
that the “makers and keepers of deceptive secrets” ought to be held responsible through criminal legal 
proceedings. Punishment through criminal proceedings based on carefully constructed laws against 
political deception “should not be seen as criminalizing political differences,” rather it is “a means -- 
perhaps a necessary means -  of ensuring that serious political differences are debated in open political 
processes” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 119).
secrecy is deemed essential to the deliberative process, the reasons for the secrecy 
should be publicly deliberated. Only those policies that have been publicly justified 
should be adopted in a deliberative democracy. While there may be justified 
arguments for secrecy from the viewpoints of necessity, liberty and opportunity, and 
deliberation itself, the arguments justifying the need for that secrecy should be 
publicly debated. Deceptive and deep secrets are likely never justified.
Accountability
The third process principle suggested by Gutmann and Thompson is the 
principle of accountability (see Figure 1.1, p. 50). In a deliberative democracy 
citizens and their elected representatives are expected to give mutually justifiable 
public reasons based on mutually arrived at fair terms of social cooperation for their 
decisions to citizens who are bound by those decisions. Accountability, according to 
Gutmann and Thompson, presents two challenges -  the challenge of specialization 
and the challenge of constituency.
Specialization. The challenge of specialization occurs because some citizens 
are elected to represent other citizens in deliberations. Political representation is a 
practical response to the important fact that most citizens do not have the time needed 
to engage in serious and sustained moral argument. Representation, though, creates a 
tension between a representative and his or her constituents. A representative may 
reach conclusions after extensive research and deliberation about policy decisions that 
are at odds with the opinions of constituents, and the representative may decide that 
certain reasons not shared by his or her constituents are more important than others.
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“Should representatives use the reasons that they find compelling or those that appeal 
to constituents?” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 128).
Gutmann and Thompson argue that in a deliberative democracy, where the 
content principles of basic liberty and opportunity constrain majority will, the 
principle of accountability requires representatives to resist policies that violate these 
principles even if their constituents would not agree. By offering moral reasons 
consistent with basic liberty and basic opportunity in public forums, listening to the 
reasons of constituents and accommodating those aspects of the views of citizens that 
can be accepted from a reciprocal perspective, representatives account for their 
decisions to the public who elected them. In situations where opposing moral views 
each appeal to basic liberties and basic opportunities, each claim must be consistent 
with the principle of reciprocity and have good grounds for arguing that the liberty or 
opportunity is basic. The principle of accountability would allow a representative to 
exercise his or her best judgment in cases of deliberative disagreement, seeking 
accommodation in relevant public policies through the practice of an economy of 
moral disagreement. Finally, in situations that do not involve basic liberties or 
opportunities, the principle of accountability permits a representative to decide 
whether to defer to the opinions of a majority of constituents, to decline to follow the 
majority after sustained deliberations, and/or to engage in prudential political 
bargaining conditioned by the principle of reciprocity. In all of these cases, Gutmann 
and Thompson argue that the “reiteration of deliberation,” i.e., the ongoing process of 
deliberation between representatives and their constituents over time on various moral
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topics, as well as periodic elections offer “the best hope for the principle of 
accountability” (Ibid., p. 144).
Constituency. The second challenge presented by the principle of 
accountability is the challenge of constituency. The principle of accountability 
requires that “representatives justify their actions from a moral point of view, which 
implies that they owe an account not only to their electoral constituents but also to 
what we may call their moral constituents -  citizens in other states.. .and citizens yet 
to be bom” (Ibid., p. 144-145).48 In the case of Ohio’s model lesson plan, it is clear 
that the moral dispute has consequences that reverberate beyond the boundaries of 
Ohio. If the lesson plan withstands judicial scrutiny in the Supreme Court, and if the 
lesson plan includes concepts of and references to intelligent design, then school 
children, including future generations, across the nation could be taught ID concepts 
and shown references to ID in science classes. Following the decision on March 9, 
2004 to adopt the model lesson plan, Ohio SBOE member Debra Owens Fink 
appeared to concur with the claim that representatives have obligations to citizens 
outside their electoral boundaries. She stated, “Ohio has set a standard for the whole 
nation on how to deal with these issues” (Krauss, 2004a).
The case of Ohio, though, raises accountability issues not addressed by 
Gutmann and Thompson. Eight members of the SBOE were appointed by the 
governor. To whom are the appointees accountable? Are they accountable to the 
governor or to the citizens in the state of Ohio or the nation? Even if the oath of
48 Gutmann and Thompson include citizens of other nations and groups of disadvantaged citizens in the 
realm of moral constituents. While the argument might be made that the dispute in the United States 
over the teaching of intelligent design in public school classrooms has moral relevance for citizens in 
other nations and for disadvantaged citizens, I do not address that argument in this dissertation.
office of state board members were to mention that board members are accountable to 
the citizens of Ohio, the special relationship of board members to the governor 
complicates their allegiances -  presumably, the governor could ask any one of his 
appointees to step down for any reason. The fact that the governor refused to 
participate in public discussions of any of the moral issues surrounding the model 
lesson plan and the fact that all of his appointees voted for the lesson plan raises 
questions about his influence on board members, questions that, from a deliberative 
perspective, the governor should have answered publicly. It also underscores the 
observation of Gutmann and Thompson that the principle of accountability, just as 
deliberative democracy as a whole, “depends on the capacity of citizens and their 
representatives to take a moral point of view.” It appears that Governor Taft, and 
perhaps also his appointees, either lacked the capacity or refused to approach the 
disputes over the model lesson plan from a genuinely moral point of view.
In summary, the principle of accountability asks citizens and their elected 
representatives to give mutually justifiable public reasons based on mutually arrived 
at fair terms of social cooperation for their decisions on public policies. All citizens 
and their representatives in a deliberative democracy are required to take into account 
the basic principles of liberty and opportunity when they justify their actions, and 
they should seek to account for their decisions to all their moral constituents.
As noted earlier, the three process principles of reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability set the conditions for fair deliberations, but they do not address the 
difficult tasks of assessing the substantive content of competing moral claims and the 
fairness of policy decisions. The content principles of basic liberty and basic
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opportunity are values citizens ought to apply in deliberations that weigh competing 
moral claims and the mutual justifiability of policy decisions (see Figure 1.3). Public 
policies that are consistent with these principles are likely to be justifiable to citizens 
who cooperate in seeking fair terms of social cooperation even though they may 
continue to morally disagree with the policies.
Figure 1.3: The Content Principles of Deliberative Democracy
Basic Liberty
Purpose: 
to protect the mental and 
and physical integrity of persons
Includes some moralist and paternalist claims 
The claims must be consistent with:
1. The mental and physical integrity of persons.
2. Moral values that can be mutually accepted.
Basic Opportunity
Purpose: to help create the background circumstances that are necessary for adequate 
deliberation itself.
Requirements: The basic opportunity principle requires policymakers to provide 
citizens with an adequate level of goods that are necessary for living a decent life, and 
among those goods is an adequate science education.
• The basic opportunity principle recognizes that policy makers can 
legitimately place limits on the provision of opportunity goods (e.g., 
science education).
• Policy decisions that limit basic opportunity goods (e.g., science 
education) are justified only if they are conditioned by deliberations that 
honor basic liberty and the process principles of reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability.
(Source: Gutmann & Thompson, 1996)
Basic Liberty
At the core of the principle of basic liberty in a deliberative democracy is the 
idea of personal integrity -  basic liberty protects the physical and mental integrity of
citizens. While easy to state, delineating the boundaries of the principle of basic 
liberty is a difficult task. To gain some perspective on the scope of basic liberty, 
Gutmann and Thompson present paradigmatic cases that clearly violate personal 
integrity and then consider less clear cases. Clear cases of violations of the physical 
integrity of persons include compulsory organ donations and involuntary clinical 
trials, and clear cases of violations of the mental integrity of persons include those 
that place constraints on the religious beliefs or deepest moral convictions of citizens. 
Reasoning from these cases that are clear and asking how less clear cases are 
analogous to the clear ones, Gutmann and Thompson find that “the borders of basic 
liberty are irregular, sometimes following the lines set by libertarians, but often 
expanding or contracting its domain” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 204). 
Importantly, they argue that basic liberty includes some values that moralists and 
paternalists promote. “The challenge for deliberative democracy is to find ways to 
recognize the legitimate claims of moralism and paternalism while maintaining the 
priority of basic liberty” (Ibid., p. 231).
Gutmann and Thompson contrast their conception of basic liberty with the 
principle of liberty espoused by John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay On Liberty.49 Mill 
argued that “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” 
and that “The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which concerns merely himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute” (Ibid., p. 230, 233). From the perspective of Mill, 
the government may intervene in the liberty of a citizen only if his or her actions 
harm other people. The government may never intervene when the actions of a
49 Charles Darwin published the Origin of Species in the same year, 1859.
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citizen are merely wrong and never when the actions harm only the citizen
conducting them. Moralists, on the other hand, argue that the government may
intervene in the liberty of citizens when they think it is right or wise to do so, and
paternalists argue that intervening is justified when they think it is in the best interests
of the citizen to do so. Gutmann and Thompson argue that
An adequate principle o f basic liberty should accommodate these claims by 
recognizing that [sic] some wrongs that are not definite harms, and some 
definite harms to oneself, may be legitimately regulated by law...These claims 
deserve a place in a deliberative perspective, but if and only if (1) they are 
consistent with personal integrity; and (2) they express important moral values 
that can be mutually accepted at least as much as the alternative of Millian 
liberty. (Ibid., p. 237)
Moralism. Legal moralists argue that when a practice or action is immoral, 
citizens not only should criticize it, they should regulate it or prohibit it through 
legislation. Importantly, the ranks of moralists include not only political 
conservatives but many politically liberal citizens. Some of the actions that moralists 
seek to regulate or prohibit are: “adultery, sodomy, incest, fornication, prostitution, 
pornography, public nudity, desecration of shrines and sacred symbols, cruelty to 
animals, mistreatment of corpses, and commercial sale of bodily organs” (Ibid., p. 
249). Gutmann and Thompson argue that many people who do not in general regard 
themselves as “moralists” would agree that some moralist claims are defensible; the 
difficult task is developing criteria for identifying those moralist claims that are 
mutually justifiable from those that are not.
Moralist arguments usually include three parts. First, moralists claim that 
immoral actions are wrong even if they do not cause harm. Gutmann and Thompson 
argue that the fact that most people can agree that public nudity is wrong stems from 
a fundamental value that even “nudists of principle” cannot reasonably object to -  the
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value of human intimacy. Public nudity does not respect the value of human 
intimacy. Violation of a shared fundamental value, however, is not enough to justify 
regulation. Moralists, second, demonstrate that regulation is relevant to the purposes 
of public policy. Public nudity, for example, “commands public attention” in a way 
that not fulfilling a promise does not. Finally, moralist arguments demonstrate that 
governmental regulation or prohibition will not cause create a greater wrong than that 
which they seek to regulate or prohibit. No important harm is done, for example, 
when public nudity is regulated -  that is, the basic liberty of citizens to protect their 
personal integrity is not challenged by laws that prohibit public nudity.50
Moralist arguments offered by intelligent design proponents in the case of the 
Ohio model lesson plan can be constructed in the following way. First, it is morally 
wrong not to teach scientific criticisms of “Darwinian” theory in public school 
science classrooms. It violates the fundamental value of honesty in education. In 
defense of his appeal to “compromise” by “teaching the controversy,” Stephen Meyer 
stated
Honest education requires it .. .If students are to be required to master the case 
for Darwinian evolution (as we think they should), shouldn’t they also know 
some of the difficulties described in such scientific literature?...Shouldn’t they 
know that some scientists now question previously stock Darwinian arguments 
from embryology and homology? And shouldn’t they also know that many 
scientists now question the ability o f natural selection to create fundamentally 
new structures, organisms and body plans? Last fall 100 scientists, including 
professors from institutions such as M.I.T., Yale and Rice, published a statement 
questioning the creative power o f natural selection. Shouldn’t students know 
why? (Meyer, 2004a, p. 2-3)
Second, requiring “critical analysis” of evolution through public school policies is 
important because one of the purposes of public school policy is to ensure that 
educational materials and lessons are not censored and that students are not
50 See Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 248-254 for their discussion of moralism and public nudity.
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indoctrinated in “scientific orthodoxy.” Ohio resident Benjamin Wiker made this 
point as follows
If the Ohio Board of Education removes the critical analysis lesson plan, it will 
be misrepresenting the current scientific discussion about evolutionary theory.
The critiques addressed in the lesson plan exist in the current peer-reviewed 
scientific literature. Ohio students should have the right to learn about these 
currents o f scientific thought, free from threats of censorship by rigid defenders 
of an aging scientific orthodoxy. (Wiker, 2004, p. 3)
Third, and finally, public school policies which allow critical analysis of “Darwinian”
theory will not harm students because: 1) Constitutional law permits it; 2) federal
education policy requires it; 3) citizens want it; 4) good pedagogy requires it; and 5)
the intellectual freedom and religious freedom of students are enhanced.51
Assessing this moralist argument from a deliberative perspective requires
answering two questions: Is the argument consistent with personal integrity? and
Does it express moral values that can be mutually accepted? As noted in the first
section of this chapter, the question of whether the model lesson plan included
references to intelligent design theory and the question of whether ID is a scientific or
religious theory were deeply disputed. Yet, answers to those questions are essential
in assessing the moralist claims of ID proponents. If intelligent design is a religious
theory and if it is included in the “scientific” criticisms, then it would clearly not be
consistent with personal integrity to include the model lesson plan in tenth-grade
biology classes. If ID is a religious theory, then the lesson plan also would not be
consistent with the fundamental value of honesty in education since ID is treated as a
scientific theory in that plan. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the need for
more information about the religious status of intelligent design for public school
51 The first four reasons why the model lesson plan in Ohio would not harm students are from Meyer, 
2002a, p. 3-4. The last reason is found in Colson, 2004, p.l and Needham, 2004, p. 1.
policy purposes, and whether or not ID concepts and references are included in the 
model lesson plan.
Paternalism. The principle of basic liberty in a deliberative democracy not 
only allows some moralist claims but also some paternalistic claims. Many 
contemporary laws inhibit absolute liberty in an attempt to protect the welfare of 
citizens. Among those laws are safety laws and regulations; health regulations; 
criminal law; and general social policies such as the licensing of professionals 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 262). Legal paternalism, according to Gutmann 
and Thompson, “is the restriction by law of an individual’s liberty for his or her own 
good” (Ibid., p. 261).
Most citizens agree that paternalism towards children is justified because the 
capacity to make reasonable or rational decisions develops over time under adult 
supervision. But paternalism toward children raises an important question: Do 
parents have an exclusive right to exercise paternal authority over children? Some 
parents would argue that they have the exclusive right to educational authority over 
their children including the right to pass on their sectarian beliefs and values 
unimpeded by the state. In their view, any democracy committed to the freedom of 
individuals must recognize the absolute freedom of parents to teach their children to 
adopt the parent’s way of life.
In response to this argument, Gutmann points out in Democratic Education 
that “States that abdicate all educational authority to parents sacrifice their most 
effective and justifiable instrument for securing mutual respect among their citizens” 
(Gutmann, 1987, p. 33). If parents exercise exclusive educational authority over
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children, they are free to teach their children religious and racial intolerance which
are inimical to participating in a deliberative democracy.
The same principle that requires a state to grant adults personal and political 
freedom also commits it to assuring children an education that makes those 
freedoms both possible and meaningful in the future. A state makes choice 
possible by teaching its future citizens respect for opposing points of view and 
ways of life. It makes choice meaningful by equipping children with the 
intellectual skills necessary to evaluate ways of life different from that of their 
parents. History suggests that without state provision or regulation of education, 
children will be taught neither mutual respect among persons nor rational 
deliberation among ways of life. (Ibid., p. 30-31)
Since neither the educational authority of parents or governments can be considered
infallible, Gutmann argues that “the educational authority of parents and of polities
has to be partial to be justified” (Ibid., p. 30).52
To justify paternalism, including paternalism toward children, governments,
according to Gutmann and Thompson, should satisfy two sets of conditions. The first
set of conditions places limits on the scope of paternalism, and the second set insures
that it remains consistent with basic liberty.
To limit the scope of paternalism, policymakers should first demonstrate that
some action or practice that citizens might take is not in their own best interests and
that they would be better off if they were not allowed to do it, e.g., skipping school.
Second, policymakers must show that government has an obligation to regulate the
questionable action or practice and the citizens do not have a right to resist
52 Gutmann illustrates this point by noting the experiences of Catholic children in public schools in the 
nineteenth century.
Catholic children who attended [school] were often humiliated, sometimes whipped for 
refusing to read the King James version of the Bible. Imagine that instead of becoming 
more respectful, public schools had been abolished, and states had subsidized parents to 
send their children to the private school of their choice. Protestant parents would have 
sent their children to Protestant schools, Catholic parents to Catholic schools...The 
religious prejudices of Protestant parents would have been visited on their children, and 
the social, economic, and political effects of those prejudices would have persisted, 
probably with considerably less public protest, to this very day. (Gutmann, 1987, p. 31)
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government regulation, e.g., states are ultimately responsible for public education and 
truancy laws insure that children attend school. Third, policymakers must 
demonstrate that regulating or prohibiting the behavior in question will not cause 
more harm than is prevented, e.g., truancy laws support the formation of a literate and 
informed citizenry (Gutmann & Thompson, p. 263-264).
To insure that paternalistic laws protect basic liberty, policymakers, according 
to Gutmann and Thompson, should adhere to another set of conditions. These 
conditions are “defended on the grounds that a person’s future liberty is enhanced by 
the paternalistic restriction on his present liberty” (Ibid., p. 265). First, policymakers 
must establish that the decision a citizen would choose is impaired by lack of 
information, emotional distress, or some other important deficiency. Second, the 
least restrictive regulations ought to be adopted. And, third, the harm that the 
regulation is trying to prevent is one most people desire to avoid. These conditions 
assure citizens that even though their present choices might be limited and their 
freedom restricted, their future basic liberty is protected and, perhaps, enhanced 
(Ibid., p. 264-267).
In the case of the Ohio model lesson plan, an argument can plausibly be made 
that public high school science investigations should be restricted to naturalistic 
causal explanations for paternalistic reasons. The argument can be constructed in the 
following way. First, intelligent design allows supernatural causes in scientific 
explanations. Supernatural causal explanations necessarily imply certain sectarian
53 The word ‘sectarian’ can refer to any religious idea or system of ideas, e.g., religion in general is 
‘sectarian.’ However, ‘sectarian’ also refers to specific religious groups or sects who share religious 
convictions that are not shared by other religious groups or sects. The word ‘sectarian’ in this
religious understandings.54 Second, it is not in the best interest of children to teach 
sectarian religious views as true in science classes. To do so would violate the present 
and future mental integrity of students, i.e., it would constrain their present and future 
religious beliefs. Third, public school policymakers have an obligation to protect the 
basic liberty of all school children. Fourth, restricting scientific explanations to 
natural causes places fewer constraints on religious belief than teaching certain 
sectarian religious beliefs as true in science classes. Fifth, and finally, since most 
people would resist compulsory sectarian religious belief, and children are less able to 
understand and resist sectarian religious beliefs that are presented as true, public 
school policymakers should limit scientific explanations offered in public school 
science classes to natural causal explanations.
Assessing this paternalistic argument requires a defense of the claim that the 
supernatural causal explanations offered by intelligent design necessarily imply 
sectarian religious beliefs. It also requires, as did the moralist argument by ID 
proponents, an investigation not only into whether or not ID concepts and references 
are included in the model lesson plan, but also into the scientific status of intelligent 
design theory for public school policy purposes. Finally, it requires a defense of the 
paternalistic authority of public school policymakers over the authority of parents 
who might want sectarian religious views taught in science classes as scientific causal
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dissertation refers to religious groups who share religious views which logically exclude competing 
religious understandings.
541 argue in chapter four that the supernatural causes associated with intelligent design necessarily 
imply certain sectarian religious beliefs. The argument can also be made that other ostensibly 
scientific theories that allow supernatural causal explanation would necessarily imply other sectarian 
religious beliefs.
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explanations. In the final section of this chapter I discuss the need for further 
information about intelligent design theory.
In summary, the principle of basic liberty protects the physical and mental 
integrity of citizens. It demands that citizens begin their deliberations over the 
content of public policies by asking which policy best respects the basic liberty of 
citizens. Policies that include moralist and paternalist claims are justified if and only 
if they are consistent with personal integrity and they express moral values that can be 
mutually accepted.
Basic Opportunity
The principle of basic opportunity is the second content principle of 
deliberative democracy, and its purpose is to “help create the background 
circumstances that are necessary for adequate deliberation itself’ (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996, p. 349). The basic opportunity principle requires policymakers to 
provide citizens with an adequate level of goods that are necessary for living a decent 
life, and among those goods is an adequate education. In their discussion of the basic 
opportunity principle, Gutmann and Thompson are primarily concerned with 
economic opportunities, not educational opportunities. Since the conflict over 
intelligent design and public school science education involves education, the 
discussion which follows focuses only on how the requirements of basic opportunity 
might affect deliberations over the appropriate placement of ID in public school 
science curricula.55
551 do not address the issue of whether including intelligent design in public school science classes 
might violate the basic opportunity principle by limiting the economic opportunities of students. The 
argument could be made that students who are taught ID in the place of evolutionary theory will not be 
adequately educated in science and therefore will be unable to compete for jobs on an equal basis with
Three areas of educational opportunity are relevant to the conflict over 
intelligent design in public schools -  education in the biological sciences, education 
about religion56 and civic education. Education in the biological sciences is 
obviously relevant because an adequate education in biology is likely deemed by 
most citizens as essential to living a minimally decent life. Daily decisions, for 
example, about nutrition, health care, birth control and drugs, to name a few, often 
depend on an understanding of basic biology. Participation in deliberations about and 
voting on important social issues such as stem cell research and cloning also requires 
a basic education in the biological sciences. The relevancy of educating about religion 
may be less obvious, but no less important. The conflict between supporters of ID 
and those who argue that it does not belong in sciences classes is widely viewed as a 
religious conflict. An adequate education about religion and its importance in 
American history and in the public and private lives of citizens may foster mutual 
respect and an attitude of reciprocity among citizens thereby reducing the vitriol so 
often associated with the conflict. It is not implausible to argue that a minimally 
decent life is one in which the value of mutual respect inhibits human antipathy 
toward religious belief or anti-religious belief. The relevancy of civic education in 
the conflict over ID is apparent in the need for citizens who are willing to seek fair
other students who learned evolutionary theory. While it might be the case that students who are 
taught only intelligent design in college science classrooms are likely to have limited job possibilities 
in science fields once they leave college, it is not clear that the same would be the case for high school 
graduates.
56 The distinction between teaching religion and teaching about religion is an important one. Teaching 
religion generally refers to the inculcation of specific religious beliefs. Teaching about religion 
generally refers to the study of a variety of religious traditions with the purpose of understanding their 
effects on a range of social concerns. In 1963 the Supreme Court ruled in v. Schempp that
public schools could teach about religion when it is done “objectively as part of a secular program of 
education” (Nord & Haynes, 1998, p. 46).
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terms of social cooperation and to offer reasons for policy decisions that are 
justifiable to all citizens. Understanding the potential of a deliberative political 
perspective and the obligations it places on citizens is essential not only to the conflict 
over ID and science education, it is also essential to other moral conflicts that deeply 
divide citizens. An adequate civic education can contribute to a minimally decent life 
by reducing deep social strife.
Providing for an adequate level of public education in science, religious issues 
and civics, i.e., a level that allows citizens to live a good or decent life and to 
participate in a deliberative democracy, however, is fraught with difficulty, especially 
in the atmosphere surrounding the conflict over ID. Prior to determining and 
providing for “adequate levels” of education in these areas, a difficult task in and of 
itself, policymakers confronted with the conflict over ID are squarely faced with one 
of the primary sources of moral conflict in public life: incomplete understanding. The 
status of intelligent design as either scientific or religious theory is deeply disputed, 
yet applying the principle of basic opportunity, just as applying the principle of basic 
liberty, requires knowing what kind of theory it is. Given the conflicting views about 
the status of ID and the unwillingness of policymakers to accept expert opinion, 
policymakers committed to a deliberative political perspective and the value of 
mutual respect have an obligation to inform themselves about the detailed claims of 
intelligent design proponents and their critics and to reach a conclusion about its 
status as either scientific or religious theory for public school policy purposes. Only 
then can they weigh the claims of intelligent design against the constitutional 
principles of a deliberative democratic perspective and offer mutually acceptable
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reasons for public school policies on its appropriate placement in school curricula.
In summary, the principle of basic opportunity requires policymakers to 
provide citizens with an adequate level of goods that are necessary for living a 
minimally decent life and to participate in a deliberative democracy. The goods most 
relevant to the conflict over intelligent design are an adequate education in the 
biological sciences, an adequate education about religion and an adequate education 
in civics. Since an adequate education in these areas is dependent on determining the 
scientific and religious status of intelligent design, policymakers committed to the 
principle reciprocity and the value of mutual respect are obligated to investigate the 
claims of intelligent design and to reach conclusions about its status.
The first five parts of this section have discussed in detail the constitutional 
principles of a deliberative democracy. The final part of this section describes the 
kind of political reasoning the principles encourage and the general characteristics of 
policy decisions that result from that reasoning.
Principled Political Reasoning in a Deliberative Democracy
The case for a deliberative perspective on democratic politics arises, 
according to Gutmann and Thompson, from the inability of past conceptions of 
democracy to account for and address the persistence of moral conflict in the civic 
life of “middle democracy” in the United States. The deliberative conception of 
democracy developed by Gutmann and Thompson suggests normative principles or 
standards for moral deliberations that arise from the characteristics of moral 
arguments themselves and from the inability of other approaches to moral conflict,
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especially utilitarian approaches, to adequately protect basic liberties and 
opportunities. Importantly, the arguments that support a deliberative conception of 
democracy and its process and content principles do not begin or end with the 
assumption that we all share a common morality, i.e., a shared comprehensive set of 
valued ends. While a deliberative conception of democracy does not assume a shared 
comprehensive morality, the principles it promotes are substantive as well as 
procedural -  that is, they “presuppose and express substantive moral values” 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 349). These moral values, furthermore, are 
principles that might become part of a public morality thereby creating a partial 
conception of a common morality or common good. Thus, Gutmann and Thompson 
argue,
Theoretically, a deliberative perspective expresses as complete a conception of a 
common good as is possible within a morally pluralistic society. Recognizing 
that politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a common view on how 
citizens should publicly deliberate when they fundamentally disagree.
Practically, this perspective encourages the cultivation o f a set o f civic virtues 
that can guide citizens through the maelstroms of moral controversy in a 
pluralistic society. It can help citizens resolve moral conflict with fairness and, 
when they cannot resolve it, enables them to work together in a mode of mutual 
respect... (Ibid., p. 93-94)
Importantly, Gutmann and Thompson rely upon a method of moral reasoning 
to develop the process and content principles that is commonly employed by citizens 
when they attempt to morally justify their decisions and actions to others. They begin 
with moral arguments that present clear cases of considered judgments and reflect on 
the principles and values those judgments presuppose or express. They then apply 
those same principles and values to other cases and modify their judgments and/or the
principles giving reasons that can be accepted in principle by others.57 The principles 
they develop through this process, then, not only partially determine deliberations, the 
principles themselves are in turn partially determined by deliberative moral 
discussions about actual cases.
The set of process and content principles that emerge from this kind of moral
reasoning have three important characteristics. First, they act as standards that
constrain deliberations. This means that they are not neutral toward all conceptions
of good or moral lives. They rule out certain kind of policies and certain kinds of
reasons if the policies or reasons cannot be justified to people who seek fair terms of
social cooperation. The principles, in effect, help citizens distinguish between
justified and unjustified reasons for public policy decisions. Second, they are
provisional. All of the principles can and should be modified in light of new
information and better arguments that emerge from reiterated deliberations.
Significantly, the provisional nature of the principles suggests that “Responsible
citizens should.. .regard many of their own moral claims as provisional.” Thus,
“Even when citizens have good reason to be confident about their own moral views,
and even when those views legitimately prevail in the democratic process, citizens
should act so as to ensure that the results remain open to correction.” Gutmann and
Thompson regard this capacity for change as
...one of the important virtues of deliberative democracy. Its self-correcting 
capacity cultivates the possibility of moral progress in democratic politics. It
57 Gutmann and Thompson describe the method of reasoning they promote in the following way:
This method posits a process in which deliberators move back and for the between 
general principles and considered judgments about particular circumstances, 
successively modifying each in light of an appraisal of the other.. .the method [is].. .a 
pattern of argument that many people use when they try to justify to others in moral 
terms the positions they take and the decisions they make. (Gutmann & Thompson,
1996, p. 5)
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contains the means o f its own alteration. Deliberation proceeds through stages, 
as citizens and officials propose, respond, revise, and react.. .The promise of 
deliberative democracy depends on the political learning that reiterated 
deliberation makes possible. (Ibid., p. 356)
Third, and finally, the deliberative process and content principles encourage citizens
to seek common ground in moral disputes. The principles accommodate competing
moral views when they are mutually justifiable and allow citizens to affirm the
inherent moral worth of individuals with whom they disagree. Accommodating the
views of others through an economy of moral disagreement enhances the possibility
of reducing the range and depth of current and future moral disputes.
Public policy decisions that result from the principled political reasoning
prescribed by a deliberative political perspective also have important characteristics.
First, they are not necessarily just. Theoretically, just decisions would result if all of
the principled conditions of a deliberative democracy were met. Practically, though,
actual deliberations usually do not conform to all the principles required by a
deliberative democracy. But, as Gutmann and Thompson point out, “we can say that
the more nearly the conditions are satisfied, the more nearly justifiable are the results
likely to be” (Ibid., p. 17). Second, the policy decisions are provisional, as are the
principles that condition those policies. Public policymakers have limited
understanding, and the policies they create are merely the best that can be crafted
according to the best understanding policymakers have at any particular time (Ibid., p.
229). As a result, policy decisions are always open to revision given new or revised
moral understandings of the principles guiding deliberations or the circumstances that
policy decisions address. One of the primary aims of democratic deliberations, then,
is to reach provisional moral agreement. Finally, deliberative policy decisions are
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justifiable to all citizens who are bound by them. While policy decisions in a 
deliberative democracy may not be fully just and are provisional, they are justifiable 
to all citizens because the reasons for those decisions are conditioned by mutually 
accepted fair terms of social cooperation. Thus, even though the process and content 
principles may not be fully or perfectly realized in deliberations, the fact that citizens 
mutually agree to conduct deliberations according to those principles makes the
CO
policy decisions, however imperfect, justifiable to all."
In summary, principled political reasoning in a deliberative democracy is a 
form of moral reasoning. It begins by identifying principles and values that are 
presupposed or expressed in clear, considered moral judgments about particular 
circumstances and proceeds to develop and refine those principles and values as they 
are applied in new, more difficult circumstances. The substantive values promoted by 
the principles constitute a mutually agreed upon common view of how citizens ought 
to deliberate when they fundamentally disagree. The principles themselves are not 
morally neutral; they are provisional, and they can accommodate competing moral 
views. The policy decisions they engender are not necessarily just and are also 
provisional, but they are justifiable to all who are bound by them. An important 
virtue of principled political reasoning in democratic deliberations is that it 
encourages citizens to give a moral response to deep moral disagreements.
58 If the reasons public policymakers give for a policy are conditioned by mutually acceptable fair 
terms of social cooperation, i.e., the deliberative process and content principles, then the policy is 
justifiable even if the fair terms of cooperation were not interpreted or applied in a fully just way.
This means a policy can be justifiable even if it is not fully morally justified.
To put this point another way, it can be argued that all policy decisions are morally imperfect, 
but some are more justifiable than others. Policies are justifiable to the extent that the deliberations 
leading to them were conducted according to mutually acceptable fair terms of social cooperation.
Even if the fair terms of social cooperation are imperfectly applied or followed, the terms themselves 
offer future opportunities for improving on policies later when citizens have a better understanding.
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The third section of this chapter described in detail the constitutional 
principles of a deliberative democracy and the kind of moral reasoning and decisions 
a deliberative perspective promotes. The principle of reciprocity asks citizens to 
engage in political reasoning that is mutually justifiable -  that is, citizens are asked to 
offer reasons for their actions and decisions that can be accepted by others who are 
similarly motivated. Reciprocity depends on the value of mutual respect and 
promotes the virtues of civic integrity and civic magnanimity. The principle of 
publicity requires citizens to present reasons for public policies in public forums and, 
when secrecy is deemed essential, to publicly deliberate over the reasons for secrecy. 
Accountability asks policymakers to take responsibility for and to justify the 
consequences of public policies on all citizens, including those who continue to 
disagree with the policies. The principle of basic liberty protects the physical and 
mental integrity of citizens and accommodates some of the claims of moralists and 
paternalists. The final constitutional principle, basic opportunity, asks policymakers 
to create the background circumstances necessary for living a minimally decent life, 
and among the goods that are necessary is an adequate education. When citizens 
mutually agree to conduct their deliberations over public policy according to these 
principles, they engage in principled political reasoning that may resolve some moral 
disagreements and allow citizens to live with those that cannot be resolved on terms 
that are mutually acceptable.
The final section of this chapter briefly brings a deliberative democratic 
perspective to the conflict in Ohio over the tenth grade model lesson plan for teaching 
evolution.
Ohio: A Deliberative Perspective
This section retrospectively assesses the process and content of the public 
deliberations in Ohio over the “Critical Analysis of Evolution” model lesson plan 
according to the deliberative principles developed by Gutmann and Thompson. The 
assessment demonstrates how deliberative political reasoning takes into account the 
moral claims of persons involved in the dispute and articulates the reasons 
policymakers might give for decisions that result from that reasoning. The purpose of 
this assessment is to determine the extent to which the model lesson plan can be 
justified from a deliberative perspective and to explore how future deliberations 
might help resolve the deep moral conflicts that remain and/or reduce the range of 
moral disagreement.
The following questions are addressed in this section: What are the moral 
claims of persons involved in the dispute in Ohio? How do the principles of a 
deliberative democracy suggest policymakers reason about those claims? and What 
questions do deliberators need to answer to more fairly address the moral claims of 
citizens in future deliberations?
Since one of the primary virtues of a deliberative approach to conflict in 
politics is the fact that it considers the merits of moral claims, I begin the assessment 
by first clarifying the primary moral claims of the supporters of the model lesson plan
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and those who were against it.59 The moral claims address the following broad 
topics: political compromise in science education; critical analysis of evolutionary 
theory; and the political practices of policymakers. After identifying the moral claims 
that are made about these topics, I weigh the claims against the process and content 
principles suggested by a deliberative democratic political perspective. The first 
principle I consider is reciprocity followed by others that emerge as pertinent to the 
claims being made.60 Finally, I identify issues that policymakers ought to investigate 
to ensure that future policies are more fairly justifiable to citizens who are bound by 
those policies.
Political Compromise in Science Education
As noted earlier, the model lesson plan and the academic content standard it 
addressed were the products of a political compromise. Proponents of intelligent 
design offered the Ohio state board of education a “compromise” that included the 
following provisions:
1) Do not require students to study the scientific evidence and arguments for 
ID, “at least not yet.”
2) “Teach the controversy” about “Darwinian” evolution by teaching the 
scientific arguments for and against it.
3) “Permit, but not require, teachers to tell students about the arguments of 
scientists who advocate the competing theory of intelligent design.” 61
59 This assessment does not offer an exhaustive study of the moral claims made in the dispute in Ohio 
over the model lesson plan. It merely presents those claims that emerge from easily accessed media 
coverage found on websites that tracked the events in Ohio.
60 In the deliberative conception of democracy outlined by Gutmann and Thompson, the process and 
content principles are equally important and intimately interdependent. Thus, any investigation into 
the reciprocal nature of the reasons citizens give for their decisions will lead to discussion of the other 
pertinent principles. For their discussion of the interdependent nature of the process and content 
principle, see Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 349-357.
When I place quotes around statements in this section and do not cite those quotes, it means that the 
statements were quoted and the source was cited in the first section of this chapter. For ease of
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This proposal by ID proponents became the basis for the Ohio content standards for 
tenth grade biology and the model lesson plan.
The political compromise policymakers forged in Ohio was a prudential 
response to political disagreement. The best reasons policymakers could give to 
justify the model lesson plan are reasons that demonstrate that the policy is mutually 
advantageous. Opponents to the plan, however, remain deeply opposed to it not 
because the compromise is not mutually advantageous, they remain opposed because 
they regard it as wrong. The political bargaining that took place over the Ohio lesson 
plan did not resolve much less reduce the scope of the dispute over the plan because 
the bargaining did not address the moral claims of citizens. The merits of the claim, 
for example, that political compromise over scientific matters destroys the integrity of 
science and the scientists who engage in such compromises were not seriously 
addressed on terms that could be accepted by opponents to the plan. The model 
lesson plan, then, remains thoroughly unjustified to opponents who are still bound by 
its terms.62
Proponents offered the following reasons for accepting the compromise. The
compromise is “fair.” It allows for “unbiased teaching” of “the full range of relevant
scientific evidence” and avoids “censoring” alternative views to evolutionary theory
through “selective presentation of evidence.” In addition, the compromise promotes
“intellectual” and “academic” freedom. Teaching scientific criticisms of evolutionary
reading, I do not cite the source again. If there is a citation in this section, it means that the statement 
being cited was not included in the first section of this chapter.
62 It should be noted that the model lesson plan is ‘optional.’ Teachers in Ohio do not have to 
incorporate its contents into their own lesson plans. But, since statewide academic assessment tests are 
based on the academic content standard that the lesson plan addresses, and since this plan is considered 
to be a ‘model’ plan that addresses the content standard, it is reasonable to assume that most teachers 
will consider themselves to be bound by the requirements of the lesson plan.
theory promotes “freedom of thought,” and when those criticisms are part of an 
alternative theory to evolution, that theory “can be taught as part of a teacher’s 
academic freedom.”
Opponents to the compromise objected for the following reasons. First, 
political compromise in science education destroys the “intellectual integrity” of 
science and the professional integrity of scientists who accept political compromise. 
Science is not “fair” or “democratic” and “communicating that fact is a vital part of 
teaching what science is all about” (Krauss, 2002d, p. 3). The “nature of science” 
requires that “fully qualified peers derive consensus on scientific matters;” 
democratic voting is outside the realm of science. Second, political compromise over 
the teaching of evolution deprives children of the opportunity to receive an adequate 
science education. It teaches children that a theory that has survived “the repeated 
test of experiment[s]” conducted according to mutually accepted science standards 
adopted by the larger scientific community must, in the end, conform to narrow 
political and religious interests (Krauss & Princehouse, 2003, p. 3). Such an 
education will diminish the ability of children to “function and flourish in our modem 
technological society” (Krauss, 2002a, p. 1). Third, suggesting a compromise is 
wrong because “there is no [scientific] controversy about evolution.” Evolution is a 
“time- and evidence-tested theory that integrates the various disciplines of modem 
life science and ties the life sciences to the chemical, physical, and earth sciences;” it 
“is as central to modem biology as Newton’s laws are to physics” (Krauss, 2002d, p. 
1-2). Finally, the compromise suggested in Ohio allows the “false” and “unscientific” 
theory of intelligent design to be taught as science in public school classrooms.
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Intelligent design, opponents claim, is “scientifically untestable” and “cannot be 
invalidated through scientific means.” It is therefore wrong to include it as science in 
science classrooms.
The leading deliberative principle, the principle of reciprocity, has two 
requirements. First, citizens are asked to engage in political reasoning that is 
mutually justifiable -  that is, citizens are asked to give reasons to one another that are 
conditioned by mutually accepted fair terms of social cooperation. Second, it requires 
that when empirical claims are made, the claims should be made in terms that are 
“consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry” that are “themselves mutually 
acceptable.” Do the reasons offered for support of and opposition to political 
compromise in science education meet the requirements of reciprocity?
Fairness and intellectual freedom. The appeals by supporters of the lesson 
plan to fairness and intellectual freedom certainly appear to be reciprocal in nature. 
They are appeals to values that can be mutually accepted by all citizens.
Questions arise, however, when the claims of the opponents to the plan are 
considered. If science is inherently “unfair,” i.e., undemocratic, and requires 
adherence to methods and standards that are mutually agreed to by the larger 
scientific community but not necessarily agreed to by citizens without scientific 
expertise, then appeals to fairness and freedom of thought would not be appropriate in 
science education. Empirical claims that are conditioned by mutually accepted 
methods and standards within the larger scientific community meet the reciprocal 
demand that empirical claims must to be consistent with “reliable methods of inquiry” 
that are “themselves mutually acceptable.” Teaching children science lessons that
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violate the methods and standards set through the consensus of scientists over decades 
of scientific research would be inappropriate. It would be more appropriate to teach 
students the methods and standards of science and the body of knowledge that has 
been acquired through them. There is, after all, a difference between unfettered 
“intellectual freedom” where “freedom of thought” allows a student to “think freely” 
and inquiry that is disciplined by the norms of science. Unfettered freedom of 
thought is unlikely to lead to an adequate education in science, i.e., one that enables 
citizens to make knowledgeable decisions in their private lives and to participate 
knowledgeably in public policy decisions that concern scientific issues. In that case, 
it would be wrong to deprive students of an opportunity to receive an adequate 
education.
To the extent, then, that science is not democratic and is conducted according 
to methods and standards that are mutually agreed to by the larger community of 
scientists, the reasons offered by proponents of the lesson plan for accepting the 
compromise are not reciprocal reasons. The principle of opportunity which requires 
students to receive an adequate education constrains appeals to fairness and 
intellectual freedom.
Academic freedom. Proponents of the lesson plan also suggest that academic 
freedom is an important reason for accepting the compromise. Fully qualified, 
credentialed scientists have demonstrated that the criticisms of evolutionary theory 
suggested in the model lesson plan are valid Academic freedom allows teachers to 
teach criticisms of evolutionary theory that are based on scientific evidence offered
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by fully qualified, credentialed scientists. If teachers are not allowed to teach 
scientific evidence against evolution, their academic freedom will be violated.
This appears to be a thoroughly reciprocal claim. It promotes a value, 
academic freedom, which apparently can be accepted by all citizens.
Opponents argue, however, that the scientific evidence against evolution that 
the proponents of the lesson plan have in mind is false and part of an unscientific 
theory, intelligent design, which cannot be invalidated through scientific means. 
Academic freedom does not include the freedom to teach alternative theories in 
science classes that do not adhere to the scholarly standards of inquiry required by the 
discipline of science. Academic freedom is more restricted than the general freedom 
of citizens to “think, speak, and publish their ideas. If academic freedom knew no 
scholarly bounds, the freedom of [teachers] would be indistinguishable from these 
more general freedoms... [Teachers] must recognize a duty to observe scholarly 
standards of inquiry as a condition of their social office” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 175). 
Teachers who present false and unscientific information as credible criticisms of 
evolutionary theory step outside the boundaries of scholarly inquiry thereby calling 
into question their integrity as teachers and the integrity of science education. To 
maintain their professional integrity and the integrity of science education, teachers 
should not present demonstrably false and unscientific propositions as valid criticisms 
of evolutionary theory.
Opponents to the model lesson plan could argue that the principle of 
accountability constrains appeals to unrestricted academic freedom. The argument 
could be constructed as follows. First, the integrity of science and the professional
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integrity of teachers who teach science depends upon adhering to methods and 
standards mutually accepted by the wider scientific community that create scholarly 
boundaries for scientific inquiry. Second, teachers are held accountable for 
maintaining the scholarly boundaries of inquiry associated with the discipline of 
science through licensing regulations. Third, policies based on unrestricted academic 
freedom that require teachers and scientists to deny the methods and standards 
accepted by the wider scientific community violate the professional integrity of 
teachers and the integrity of science. Fourth, the principle of accountability protects 
the professional integrity of teachers and the integrity of science by protecting them 
from policies that require them to violate methods and standards that have been 
mutually agreed to by the wider scientific community. The principle of 
accountability, then, which requires teachers to maintain the scholarly boundaries of 
inquiry associated with the discipline of science, constrains appeals to unrestricted 
academic freedom.
The appeal to academic freedom as a reason for supporting the model lesson 
plan in Ohio crucially depends on the scientific status of the evidence offered against 
evolutionary theory and the scientific status of the alternative theory that supports the 
critical evidence. If, indeed, the evidence is fully relevant and fully scientific, i.e., it 
adheres to mutually accepted methods and standards of science; and if the alternative 
theory to which that evidence points is also thoroughly scientific; then appeals to 
academic freedom meets the requirements of accountability. The integrity of the 
teachers presenting the evidence and the integrity of science would remain fully 
intact. However, if the critical evidence is false and the theory that supports that
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evidence is unscientific, then the appeal to academic freedom is an appeal to 
unrestricted academic freedom and it fails to meet the test of accountability. The 
professional integrity of teachers and the integrity of science would be compromised.
In summary, the model lesson plan and the academic content standard it 
addressed resulted from a political compromise. An assessment of the moral claims 
of both proponents of and opponents to the political compromise suggests that 1) 
appeals to fairness and intellectual freedom are constrained by the principle of 
opportunity and 2) the principle of accountability constrains appeals to unrestricted 
academic freedom. The model plan cannot currently be justified from a reciprocal 
perspective. To meet the requirements of reciprocity, future deliberations about the 
model lesson plan must include information about the scientific status of intelligent 
design, investigation into the question of whether ID concepts and references to ID 
are contained in the lesson plan, and information about the religious status of 
intelligent design theory.
Critical Analysis o f Evolutionary Theory
The academic content standard for tenth grade biology in Ohio states: 
"Describe how scientists continue to investigate and critically analyze aspects of 
evolutionary theory." Not surprisingly, then, the model lesson plan developed to 
meet this standard is entitled “Critical Analysis of Evolution.” While the requirement 
to critically analyze evolutionary theory appears to be thoroughly reasonable 
expectation not only for evolutionary theory but all scientific theories, public 
discussions surrounding the model lesson plan in Ohio revealed deep divisions among
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citizens concerning the meaning of “critical analysis” and whether or not critical 
analysis of evolutionary theory by tenth graders is appropriate.
Proponents of critically analyzing evolutionary theory claim that evolutionary 
science censors evidence for the design of living things by imposing a “Rule” -  the 
rule of methodological naturalism63 -  that “declares design inferences invalid by 
definition.”
Instead of promoting an objective search for the truth, [the rale] abandons an 
objective approach and censors any evidence that does not support the 
predetermined conclusion...This censorship violates the rights of teachers, 
students and parents to have science education conducted without discrimination 
against various viewpoints relevant to the subject matter being taught.” (SEAO, 
2004b)
Critical analysis of evolutionary theory will stop the censorship, according to 
proponents, because it will allow students to learn the “evidence that does not support 
biological evolution (the theory of common descent)” (Ibid., p. 1). Proponents of the 
critical analysis of evolutionary theory, then, claim that censorship of “design 
inferences” violates the rights of teachers, students and parents by discriminating 
against “relevant viewpoints” and that critical analysis will overcome that censorship.
Opponents to the model lesson plan argue that the requirement to “critically 
analyze” evolutionary theory introduces ambiguous language that dishonestly 1) 
suggests that evolutionary theory is a controversial topic among scientists; 2) allows 
false criticisms based on the religious theory of intelligent design to appear as if they 
are “scientific;” 3) requires students engage in “disingenuous,” and perhaps unethical, 
debates over ideas rejected “by decades of sound science;” and 4) “sneaks” intelligent
63 ‘Methodological naturalism’ refers to the practice by scientists of assuming only natural causal 
explanations for natural phenomena. It is distinguished from ‘ontological naturalism’ which declares 
that the universe is a closed system of material causes and effects and material phenomena are all that 
exist. Ontological naturalism rules out the existence of supernatural beings, including God.
design creationism “in the back door” of science classrooms because it “cannot 
enter.. .the honest way, by submitting their ideas to critical analysis by otherwise 
disinterested scientists.”
Before assessing the extent to which the claims of supporters of and 
opponents to the “critical analysis” of evolutionary theory meet the requirements of 
reciprocity, it is important to first examine what is meant by “critical analysis.”
The concept o f ‘critical anlysi.’ There are three definitions of the concept 
‘critical analysis’ that appear relevant to this discussion -  common dictionary 
definitions of ‘critical’ and ‘analysis,’ the definition found in the model lesson plan 
and a definition offered by Gutmann and Thompson.
‘Analysis,’ according to Webster’s New World Dictionary, refers to the 
process of “separating or breaking up of any whole into its parts, especially with an 
examination of these parts to find out their nature, proportion, function, 
interrelationship, etc.” The word ‘critical’ “implies an attempt at objective judging so 
as to determine both merits and faults, but it often connotes emphasis on the faults or 
shortcomings.”64 A dictionary definition of the concept ‘critical analysis’ would 
presumably consist, then, of the union of the meanings of the separate words ‘critical’ 
and ‘analysis.’ It is precisely this type of definition that the model lesson plan adopts.
The model lesson plan defines ‘critical analysis’ as follows: “The separation 
of an intellectual idea into its constituent parts for the purpose of a careful, exact
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64 Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd college ed., s.vv. “Analysis” and 
“Critical.”
evaluation and judgment about those parts and their interrelationships in making up a 
whole. (This definition combines the definition for critical and analysis.”65
Both the dictionary definitions of ‘critical’ and ‘analysis’ and model lesson 
plan definition of ‘critical analysis’ include 1) the separation of something (in this 
case, evolutionary theory) into parts and 2) making judgments about the thing taken 
apart.
While Gutmann and Thompson do not address the concept of ‘critical 
analysis,’ it is informative to consider their description of ‘critical reasoning.’ 
Gutmann and Thompson regard the skill to reason critically as a crucial prerequisite 
for principled political reasoning about moral issues in a deliberative democracy. In 
their view, critical reasoning consists of “the ability to justify one’s own actions, to 
criticize the actions of one’s fellow citizens, and to respond to their justifications and 
criticisms” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1997, p. 65).
The first thing worth noting about Gutmann and Thompson’s definition of 
critical reasoning is that it requires making judgments about three things: one’s own 
actions, the actions of others, and the responses of others. Importantly, Gutmann and 
Thompson offer a framework of mutually agreed upon principles against which 
judgments can be made -  the process and content principles of a deliberative 
democracy. Without this mutually agreed upon framework of fair terms of social 
cooperation, the reasons for the judgments one makes cannot be justified to others. 
There is no reciprocal basis for accepting the judgments of others if you cannot agree 
on standards that identify the relevant basis for decision-making.
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65 See Appendix A, Ohio’s “Critical Analysis of Evolution” Model Lesson Plan, p. 280
Neither the dictionary definitions nor the model lesson plan definition indicate 
the relevant basis for (1) judging how to break a whole into parts (what are the 
reasons one would offer for separating evolutionary theory into ‘parts’ in one 
particular way over another?), and (2) judging the merits and faults of the parts and 
the whole (what are the reasons one would offer for the evaluations and judgments 
one makes about the “constituent parts” of evolutionary theory and evolutionary 
theory as a whole?). Unless specific, mutually accepted methods and standards for 
reasoning about the scientific worth of ideas and concepts are provided to students, 
their basis for making judgments about scientific claims and the judgments 
themselves are likely to be irrelevant to an adequate science education.
The second item worth noting about Gutmann and Thompson’s definition of 
critical reasoning is that making reciprocal claims, i.e., making claims that can be 
accepted by others who are similarly motivated to find reasons that can be accepted 
by others, is at the heart of critical reasoning.
Similarly, it can be argued that making reciprocal claims is at the heart of 
critical analysis. Critical analysis relies on the capacity of persons to make claims 
based on standards that can be accepted by others even though they may continue to 
disagree with the claims. Reciprocal claims are based on mutually agreed upon fair 
terms of cooperation. It follows that, in the case of critical analysis lesson plan, 
critical claims about evolutionary theory, to be justified, must be conditioned by 
mutually agreed upon methods and standards of scientific research.
Do the reasons offered for support of and opposition to the “critical analysis” 
of evolutionary theory meet the requirements of reciprocity?
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Censorship. Proponents of the model lesson plan assert that the practice of 
methodological naturalism, i.e., the assumption that natural causal explanations are 
sufficient for natural phenomena, censors design inferences through ruling them out 
by definition. They also claim that critical analysis of evolutionary theory will 
correct that censorship. There are several important questions raised by these claims. 
First, what are “design inferences?” Are design inferences an essential element of 
intelligent design theory? Second, if “design inferences” are ruled out by the 
assumption of methodological naturalism, what kind of causes do design inferences 
allow? Would design inferences allow supernatural causes in scientific explanations? 
Third, is it “censorship” if mutually accepted methods and standards of science 
assume supernatural causes are not needed to explain natural phenomena? Fourth, if 
methodological naturalism is a mutually accepted standard in the larger scientific 
community for scientific explanations, and critical analysis of evolutionary theory by 
tenth graders using the model lesson plan violates that standard, are students 
receiving an adequate science education? Would their basic liberty be violated?
The first two questions can only be answered through a thorough investigation 
into the claims and status of intelligent design theory. The assumption of 
methodological naturalism is a mutually accepted standard of modem science 
established by the wider scientific community over the last three centuries. If the 
critical analysis lesson presents intelligent design theory as an appropriate standard 
for criticizing evolutionary science, and if intelligent design allows supernatural 
causes in scientific explanations, then the critical analysis lesson violates the standard 
established by the scientific community. From a deliberative perspective, allowing
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supernatural causes in scientific explanation can only be justified if the reasons for
doing so can be accepted publicly by scientists who are motivated to find fair terms of
cooperation. If the model lesson suggests or requires a standard that violates
mutually agreed upon methods and standards of scientific investigation and the plan
does not explicitly state the new standard, then the principles of publicity and
accountability are violated. When the fundamental assumptions and purposes of
public policy are disguised or hidden from the public, the policy cannot be justified
from a deliberative perspective. The model lesson plan also would not meet the
requirements of reciprocity because students would be offering reasons for their
criticisms of evolutionary theory based on the standards of intelligent design theory
which are not mutually agreed to by the wider scientific community. Students would
be unable to offer reciprocally acceptable reasons to the wider scientific community
for critical claims against evolutionary theory.
The answer to the third question (does disallowing supernatural causes in
scientific explanations “censor” science?), depends on the reasons scientists give for
not considering supernatural causes in their scientific research. Importantly, scientists
and philosophers of science give a variety of reasons for the absence of supernatural
explanations in scientific explanations.
Philosopher of science Robert Pennock argues that the requirements of
scientific evidence rule out supernatural causal explanations.
Empirical testing relies fundamentally upon the lawful regularities of nature 
which science has been able to discover and sometimes codify in natural 
laws.. .Without the constraint of lawful regularity, inductive evidential inference 
cannot get off the ground. Controlled, repeatable experimentation, for 
example,...would not be possible without the methodological assumption that 
supernatural entities do not intervene to negate lawful natural regularities.
(Pennock, 1999, p. 194-195)
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In addition, hypotheses that include supernatural causes are immune from 
disconfirmation. “Any pattern (or lack of pattern) of data is compatible with the 
general hypothesis of the existence of a supernatural agent unconstrained by natural 
law” (Ibid., p. 195). Evolutionary biologist, paleontologist and zoologist Stephen Jay 
Gould argues that supernatural causes are properly associated with religious belief, 
and that religion and science are two separate, non-overlapping “magisteria.” 
“...science covers the empirical realm: what is the universe made of (fact) and why 
does it work this way(theory). The magisterium of religion extends over questions of 
ultimate meaning and moral value” (Gould, 1999, p. 6). Philosopher of science 
Michael Ruse agrees with Gould that supernatural causal explanations are religious 
explanations, and he agrees with Pennock that there are certain criteria that 
demarcates science from religion. Ruse argues that science has certain characteristics 
that set it apart from religion and that those characteristics are nicely summed up by 
Judge Overton’s 1982 ruling in McLean v. Arkansas, a federal court case which held 
that the "balanced treatment" of "creation-science" and "evolution-science" violated 
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Ruse, 1982, p. 38-45).66 
Philosopher of science Larry Laudan forcefully argues against Pennock, Gould and 
Ruse stating that
...it is probably fair to say that there is no demarcation line between science and 
non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win assent 
from a majority of philosophers...If we would stand up and be counted on the 
side of reason, we ought to drop terms like.. .’’pseudo-science” and
66 Judge Overton wrote:
.. .the essential characteristics of science are: (1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It has to be 
explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its 
conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and (5) It is falsifiable. 
(Laudan, 1982, p. 48)
“unscientific” from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only 
emotive work for us.” (Laudan, 1983, p. 338, 349)
In his view, the reason why supernatural causes are not found in, for example,
evolutionary biology is because “the existing evidence provides stronger arguments
for evolutionary theory than for Creationism” (Laudan, 1982, p. 52). Whether one
agrees with any one of these arguments for why supernatural causes are not included
in scientific explanations, the common denominator is an assumption based on past
and present evidence that natural causes are sufficient to explain natural phenomena.
From a deliberative perspective, the assumption of methodological naturalism
as a fair term of social cooperation among scientists means that the reasons scientists
give to one another for critical claims against evolutionary science are justified only if
they meet this standard. It does not mean that the standard cannot be changed. To
change the standard and allow supernatural causal explanations into scientific
explanations, defenders of the change would have to offer compelling evidence that
could be accepted by the wider scientific community. So far, it appears no one has
offered compelling evidence that supernatural causes are the best explanation for
natural phenomena. Only a thorough investigation into the scientific claims of
intelligent design can reveal if ID theory offers compelling evidence.
Does the assumption of methodological naturalism “censor” “design
inferences?” From a deliberative perspective, it does not. If an inference to a
supernatural cause was warranted by evidence, supernatural causes could be accepted
by the wider community of scientists.
The fourth and final question that arises from the claims of proponents of the
model lesson plan asks whether critical analysis of evolutionary theory by tenth
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graders using standards that include supernatural causes violates the basic liberty and 
basic opportunity of students. This question depends on whether or not critically 
analyzing evolutionary theory according to the lesson plan introduces supernatural 
causal explanations and whether those explanations necessarily imply sectarian 
religious ideas. If supernatural causal explanations necessarily imply religious ideas, 
then the basic liberty of students would be violated. In addition, if students reach 
conclusions about evolutionary biology that contradict “decades of sound science” 
and those conclusions impair the ability of students to make appropriate personal and 
civic decisions concerning science, then the basic opportunity of students would be 
violated.
Dishonesty. Opponents to the model lesson plan claim that the term “critical 
analysis” is ambiguous and dishonestly suggests that modem evolutionary theory is 
controversial among scientists, allows false criticisms to appear relevant to criticizing 
evolutionary theory, requires students to debate ideas long ago rejected by scientists 
and sneaks intelligent design into science classrooms.
Assessing these claims from a deliberative perspective requires policymakers 
to spend time investigating the following questions: 1) Is evolutionary theory in 
crisis? Are there widely recognized alternatives theories that solve problems 
evolutionary theory has not solved? 2) Does the lesson plan include false criticisms?
3) Are students required to debate ideas demonstrated to be false by the wider 
scientific community? and 4) Does the lesson plan include intelligent design concepts 
and references to ID? Without an investigation into these questions, the “Critical 
Analysis of Evolution” model lesson plan cannot be justified to all citizens who are
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bound by it terms. Clearly, the principle of accountability requires policymakers to 
take responsibility for mounting investigations into outstanding questions raised by 
the moral claims of citizens. If an investigation does not take place, not only the plan 
but the actions and decisions of policymakers cannot be justified to citizens bound by 
the plan.
In summary, ‘critical analysis’ in education requires mutually agreed upon 
standards for students that identify the relevant basis for making critical judgments. 
Scientists, including evolutionary scientists, generally assume a standard of 
methodological naturalism. Since this standard can be changed if evidence 
demonstrates to the wider scientific community that a change is warranted, then, from 
a deliberative perspective, methodological naturalism does not censor other possible 
standards. If the model lesson plan implicitly endorses the standard of intelligent 
design theory, the principles of publicity and accountability are violated. The 
principles of basic opportunity and basic liberty are also violated if the supernatural 
causes in intelligent design necessarily imply sectarian religious ideas. Since answers 
to pressing questions about the scientific and religious status of ID and the presence 
of ID in the lesson plan are still outstanding, the lesson plan cannot be justified from a 
reciprocal perspective. For the plan to be justified, the principle of accountability 
requires policymakers to engage in a thorough investigation into those questions.
The Political Practices o f Policymakers
The Ohio State Board of Education and the Ohio Department of Education 
were accused by opponents of the “Critical Analysis of Evolution” lesson plan of 
engaging in unfair political practices. Among the things they objected to were: the
selection of subcommittee members who wrote the lesson plan; lack of easy public 
access to and participation in subcommittee meetings; lack of easy public access to 
and timely availability of information about the lesson plan; and the lack of 
accountability from all levels of state government.
Opponents to the model lesson plan claimed that the chairman of the standards 
committee who appointed the seven member subcommittee in charge of writing the 
lesson plan, and who was an ID supporter, “pointedly excluded” (P. Princehouse, 
personal communication, May 6,04) a prominent Ohio biologist from the committee. 
Dr. Steve Rissing, director of the introductory biology program at Ohio State 
University and a member of the 15 member writing advisory group for all the 
standards, had indicated his interest in serving and was told by a staff person at the 
ODE that the reason he was not chosen is “because they wanted to spread the pain 
around” (S. Rissing, personal communication, May 7, 2004).67 Excluding a 
prominent biologist from the subcommittee for a frivolous reason was wrong, 
according to opponents, not only because the committee did not have a member who 
represented introductory college biology professors, but also because the committee 
did not have members with extensive expertise in evolutionary theory. It was also 
wrong to ignore the good faith efforts of Rissing and others by dismissing without 
discussion the alternative plan they developed at the request of some board members.
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67 When Rissing was given this reason why he was not chosen to serve on the subcommittee, he replied 
that he felt “blackballed.” While he had the opportunity to critique the lesson plan, he said that the 
forms he had to fill out created “institutional barriers on giving real feedback.” Instead of giving the 
reviewer an opportunity to give a substantive critique, the forms asked such questions as “Is the lesson 
plan grammatically correct?” and “Is the lesson plan easy to read?” (S. Rissing, personal 
communication, May 7, 2004).
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Opponents also claimed that easy public access to and participation in 
subcommittee meetings was thwarted by lack of announcements about the time and 
place of meetings. Subcommittee member John Neth claims that the meeting times
and locations were never advertised, and that if a citizen did attend, he or she was told
68to quietly observe and not speak at any time during the meeting. In addition, 
documents used at the meetings could not be taken home or shared with the public 
thus excluding another avenue for citizens to learn about the work of the 
subcommittee (J. Neth, personal communication, May 8, 2004).69 Opponents to the 
plan claim that the meetings of and documents created by the subcommittee were 
intentionally concealed from the scientific community. Concealing the committee’s 
efforts “especially from scientists” resulted, according to OAS’ Lynn Elfner, in a 
“fatally flawed model lesson that is riddled with errors both in pedagogy and 
scientific content.”
It was also wrong, according to opponents, for the Ohio Department of 
Education to fail to release the lesson plan for public perusal once the ODOE 
accepted it for field testing in September. The unwillingness of the ODOE to allow 
citizen perusal of the lesson plan was also apparent when it later required three 
official requests through the Freedom of Information Act and $140 before the Ohio 
Academy of Sciences could receive an official copy of the lesson plan from the Ohio 
Department of Education. By the time interested citizens had full access to the plan
68 Neth also noted that the scientific community “dropped the ball” and did not seriously track the work 
of the subcommittee until teachers who were testing the lesson plan in field tests began calling the anti- 
ID group, OCS, to complain about the presence of ID material in the plan (J. Neth, personal 
communication, May 8,2004).
69 Neth also states that when he strongly disagreed with the first draft of the lesson plan which was 
“filled with ID material,” he was “called in” by a staff member at the ODE and told to “tone down” his 
efforts to “influence the committee” (J. Neth, personal communication, May 8,2004).
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in December 2003, they were told they were too late to affect the contents of the plan 
(P. Princehouse, personal communication, May 6, 2004).
Finally, opponents to the plan claimed that educational leaders “from the 
governor on down” were not listening or responding to the scientific community. The 
lack of response of government leaders to the concerns of scientists displayed, 
according to Lawrence Krauss, “a frightening level of divergence between 
government and the scientific community” and “blatant disregard for scientific 
integrity.”
For better or worse, we live in a technological society, and almost all important 
issues of public policy have a scientific component.. .The results of scientific 
investigations should not be withheld from our children. Nor should science be 
divorced from the development of sound public policy, independent of politics. If 
science is treated as the enemy, ultimately everyone in our democracy suffers... 
(Krauss, 2004b, p. 3)
Proponents of the model lesson plan responded to the claims of opponents 
with skepticism and derision. Bob Lattimer of the pro-ID SEAO said he thought that 
since “The debate this year has been very quiet [and] not in the news.. .that’s good.” 
He added that
.. .a fair representation of intelligent-design advocates on the subgroup was not 
improper because it represented the majority opinion of Ohioans. ‘The last I 
heard, three out of seven is not a majority, so I’m not sure what the complaint 
is.. .After all, 75 percent of Ohioans in the 2002 public input phase said they 
wanted this kind of lesson.” 70
OSBOE member Debra Owens Fink regarded the complaints of opponents as 
“whiney,” and OSBOE Vice President Richard Baker felt that scientists were merely 
wasting everyone’s time because what they do is irrelevant and they don’t know
70 Scott Stephens, “How State Board Thinking Evolved on Biology Lesson,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
March 16, 2004.
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everything. “[They’re] just a bunch of paranoid, egotistical scientists afraid of people 
finding out [they] don’t know anything.”
To what extent do the reasons opponents give for their objections to the 
political practices of policymakers meet the requirements of the principle of 
reciprocity? To what extent do the reasons proponents give for discounting the 
claims of opponents meet the requirement of reciprocity?
The requests of opponents to have a prominent biology educator71 serve on the 
committee and to have his suggested alternative plan fairly considered by the SBOE 
appear to meet the demands of reciprocity. They appeal to the purpose of the 
principle of basic opportunity -  that is, to “help create the background circumstances 
that are necessary for adequate deliberation itself’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 
349). While each person ought to be given fair and equal consideration for public 
service, an argument could be made that persons with an expertise not readily 
available in the community that is relevant to specific public policies could be given 
higher priority to serve on public service committees. As long as the reasons for 
including or excluding certain citizens are publicly deliberated and are reciprocal in 
nature, giving priority to persons with expertise could be justified from a deliberative 
perspective. Similarly, the request for public discussion of the alternative lesson plan 
offered by Rissing and others is consistent with the principle of opportunity. If a 
citizen is denied service yet is still is given the chance to provide information to
71 Rissing is, arguably, the most influential undergraduate science educator in Ohio. He directs the 
largest undergraduate program in introductory biology in the state. The Introductory Biology Program 
(IBP) which he directs offers two quarter, 100 level sequences in non-major, major and honors 
biology. Within the IBP, he often teaches more introductory biology classes (generally two per year) 
than any other faculty member at Ohio State; he also manages approximately 70 graduate teachers per 
quarter. The IBP program enrolls approximately 8,500 students per year (R. Rissing, personal 
communication, May 8, 2004).
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members of the board who then publicly deliberate over the information, then the 
demands of opportunity are better fulfilled.
The reasons opponents give for objecting to the lack of easy public access to 
and participation in subcommittee meetings and for lack of easy and timely access to 
information about the contents of the lesson plan also appear to meet the requirements 
of reciprocity. The principle of publicity asks policymakers to deliberate publicly so 
that citizens, among other things, can 1) judge the competence of elected and 
appointed officials, 2) broaden their moral and political perspectives through listening 
to the public justifications of others, and 3) change their minds or modify their 
positions after hearing the views of others. When citizens are denied full and easy 
access to public meetings and timely access to information about the decisions of 
policymakers, the principle of publicity is violated and the policies created under 
those conditions cannot be justified to all who are bound by those policies.
Finally, the requirements of reciprocity appear to be met in the reasons 
opponents of the plan give for objecting to a lack of governmental leadership. Their 
reasons appeal to the principles of reciprocity, accountability and basic opportunity. 
The common interest that all citizens have in protecting our democratic way of life, in 
protecting the personal and professional integrity of persons and in providing an 
adequate education to children requires policymakers and the scientific community to 
be motivated to find mutually accepted fair terms of social cooperation. The refusal 
or inability of appointed and elected policymakers to respond to the moral claims of 
the scientific community in terms that scientists could accept not only violates the
professional integrity of scientists, but also threatens the basic opportunity of children 
to receive an adequate education in science.
The reasons proponents of the model lesson plan give for dismissing the 
claims of opponents do not meet the demands of reciprocity. Noting that it was 
“good” that the debate over the lesson plan was “very quiet” and “not in the news” 
implies that the principle of publicity was intentionally thwarted in the hope that 
citizens who were against the plan would not be aware of the work of the 
subcommittee. It also implies that policymakers were attempting to keep the work of 
the committee secret for reasons of necessity. In that case, policymakers were aware 
that many citizens would object to the policy and attempt to change it if they knew 
what the policy was going to be. From a deliberative perspective, the necessity of 
secrecy is justified only if the reasons for the secrecy are deliberated.
The reasons proponents of the plan give for a “fair representation of intelligent 
design advocates on the subgroup” were also not reasons that could be accepted by 
those opposed to the plan. Arguing that public opinion polls ought to determine 
whether or not intelligent design concepts and references should be in the model 
lesson plan violates the professional integrity of teachers who are held accountable 
for maintaining the scholarly boundaries of inquiry established by the wider scientific 
community. The methods and standards of science are not decided democratically; 
they are arrived at through the consensus of scientists over centuries of scientific 
investigations. To justify the alteration of the methods and standards of science 
mutually accepted by the wider scientific community, ID advocates must present 
evidence that warrants the acceptance of new methods and standards.
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Finally, the derisive reasons two OBOE members give for discounting the 
moral claims of opponents to the plan obviously do not meet the requirements of 
reciprocity. In fact, appeals to “whininess,” paranoia, and egoism signal a rejection 
of the aim of finding fair terms for social cooperation. In that case, citizens are 
locked in non-deliberative disagreement where political power prevails over moral 
argument and public policies cannot be justified to all citizens who are bound by 
those policies. It also signals that proponents of the model lesson plan may perceive 
more to be at stake in the conflict over the plan than they are publicly revealing. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, when cherished values are perceived to be at stake in 
moral conflicts, deliberations over the merits of moral claims often descend into 
“communicating by sound bite, competing by character assassination, and resolving 
political conflicts through self-seeking bargaining” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996,
p. 12).
In summary, opponents of the “Critical Analysis of Evolution” lesson plan 
objected to the political practices of policymakers and their appointees as they 
deliberated over and wrote the model lesson plan. An assessment from a deliberative 
perspective of their moral claims and the responses of others to those claims suggests, 
first, that the reasons opponents gave for their objections meet the demands of 
reciprocity. The principles of publicity, accountability, basic liberty and basic 
opportunity were properly appealed to in their objections. Second, proponents of the 
lesson plan and public school policymakers in Ohio did not address the merits of the 
moral claims of opponents, and their reasons for not doing so did not meet the 
requirements of reciprocity. The principles of publicity and accountability were
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violated by the reasons they gave. In fact, proponents of the lesson plan and some 
policymakers appear to reject altogether the aim of finding mutually acceptable fair 
terms of social cooperation. Third, and finally, the conflict in Ohio is currently 
characterized by non-deliberative disagreement and a possible failure to fully address 
all of the perceived stakes in the conflict over the model lesson plan.
The final section of this chapter retrospectively assessed the process and 
content of the public deliberations in Ohio over the “Critical Analysis of Evolution” 
in terms of the deliberative principles developed by Gutmann and Thompson. I 
identified the primary moral claims of the proponents of and opponents to the lesson 
plan found in three topics in the dispute: political compromise in science education; 
critical analysis of evolutionary theory; and the political practices of policymakers. I 
then weighed those claims against the process and content principles suggested by a 
deliberative democratic political perspective. The assessment suggested eight general 
conclusions about the conflict in Ohio: 1) appeals to fairness and intellectual freedom 
in science education are constrained by the principle of opportunity; 2) the principle 
of accountability constrains appeals to unrestricted academic freedom; 3) critical 
analysis requires mutually agreed upon standards that identify the relevant basis for 
making critical judgments; 4) the political practices of policymakers in Ohio cannot 
be justified from a deliberative perspective; 5) proponents of the lesson plan may not 
be revealing in public deliberations the primary moral values they perceive to be at 
stake; 6) the model plan cannot currently be justified from a deliberative perspective; 
7) the conflict in Ohio is currently characterized by non-deliberative disagreement;
and 8) to justify the model lesson plan from a deliberative perspective, policymakers 
in future deliberations must address and reach consensus on answers to the three 
pivotal questions that remain deeply disputed in the conflict.
Conclusion to Chapter Two 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide evidence that citizen 
disagreements over the placement of intelligent design in public school science 
classrooms are rooted in moral disagreements and to introduce a theoretical political 
framework, a deliberative democratic perspective, which encourages citizens to seek 
fair terms of social cooperation when attempting to resolve moral disputes. I 
suggested that when public school policy makers adopt a deliberative perspective and 
conduct public deliberations over school policy according to the process and content 
principles a deliberative perspective promotes, school policies are more likely to be 
justified to all citizens who are bound by those policies. I also suggested that a 
deliberative perspective could help identify those areas of disagreement which might 
be resolvable and help citizens live in mutual respect when they continue to 
fundamentally disagree.
The conflict in Ohio ended in nondeliberative disagreement. Proponents of 
the plan -  including citizen activists, politicians, and policymakers -  were unable or 
unwilling to address the moral claims of opponents and to offer reciprocal reasons for 
rejecting the claims. In deliberative theory, nondeliberative disagreements are 
contrasted with deliberative disagreements where all citizens are committed to finding 
fair terms of cooperation and all are offering reasons that cannot be shown to violate 
those terms, yet they continue to disagree. What does a deliberative perspective have
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to say about how to proceed when citizens nondeliberatively disagree or 
deliberatively disagree? How can you resolve any disagreements or live in mutual 
respect with persons who prefer “power politics” and refuse to seek mutually 
accepted fair terms of social cooperation?
Interestingly, Gutmann and Thompson state that
When a disagreement is not deliberative...citizens do not have any obligations 
of mutual respect toward their opponents. In a deliberative disagreement, 
citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to 
the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions.
We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and 
believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally 
robust democratic life. (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 3)
In Gutmann and Thompson’s view, then, citizens are to “act differently” toward their
opponents when they disagree (Ibid., p. 79). In one case, nondeliberative
disagreement, citizens do not need to fulfill the obligations of mutual respect which
include “accommodate[ing] the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest
extent possible.” In the other case, deliberative disagreement, citizens are to fulfill all
the obligations of mutual respect included in the accommodation principles -  civic
integrity and civic magnanimity.
It appears, then, that when citizens are locked in a non-deliberative
disagreement in a deliberative democracy, there is no possibility of resolving some
areas of disagreement and of living together in mutual respect.
I reject that view, and it is not clear that Gutmann and Thompson would fully
embrace the consequences of completely discarding the obligations of mutual respect
when citizens non-deliberatively disagree. If the dispositions required by civic
integrity (consistency in speech, consistency between speech and action, and the
integrity of principle) do not need to be fulfilled, public policies are guaranteed to be
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forged only through the power politics of self-interest. And, if the dispositions
required by civic magnanimity (acknowledging in speech the moral views of others,
open-mindedness, and seeking convergence through an economy of moral
disagreement) do not need to be fulfilled, individual and collective moral growth will
never occur. Indeed, if the virtue of mutual respect which “requires a favorable
attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one
disagrees” is considered unnecessary toward persons with whom one
nondeliberatively disagrees, it is difficult to imagine how a society can remain civil,
much less peaceful.
The virtue of mutual respect and the dispositions it promotes are, as Gutmann
and Thompson rightly point out, indicative of “an excellence of character.”
It is the character of individuals who are morally committed, self-reflective 
about their commitments, discerning of the difference between respectable and 
merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the possibility of changing 
their minds or modifying their positions some time in the future if they confront 
unanswerable objections to their present point of view. (Ibid., p.79-80)
As a fundamental virtue associated with “excellent character,” it hardly seems likely 
that persons who demonstrate mutual respect towards others would embrace it in one 
instance and discard it in another.
In fact, I argue that mutual respect is a fundamental virtue that, once embraced 
and integrated into one’s character, must be maintained toward others even when 
there is nondeliberative disagreement. That does not mean that abhorrent views such 
as legalizing discrimination against persons based on race or sex or legalizing the 
practice of eugenics deserve respect, rather the person who expresses that view 
deserves respect as a human being with dignity and worth in spite of his or her
abhorrent views. When an attitude of mutual respect is maintained toward persons 
with whom one nondeliberatively disagrees, the possibility remains open for one’s 
opponent to discover the value of seeking mutually agreed on fair terms of social 
cooperation and to learn how to integrate them in one’s disagreements with others. 
The possibility of identifying areas of disagreement which might be resolvable and of 
living in mutual respect in the future also remains open. If one’s opponent continues 
to refuse to seek mutually acceptable fair terms of social cooperation, the person who 
maintains an attitude of mutual respect can justify his or her actions to others who are 
also committed to finding reciprocal reasons for public policies.
In my view, when citizens end in deliberative disagreement, they should 
continue to reason together and accommodate the moral claims of their opponents to 
the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions.
And, when citizens end in nondeliberative disagreement, the persons who are willing 
seek reciprocal reasons for policies should continue to reason together and 
accommodate the reasonable moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest 
extent possible in spite of their unwillingness or inability to reason reciprocally.
In the case of Ohio, the possibility of identifying areas of disagreement which 
might be resolvable and of living in mutual respect in the future depends upon 
citizens who are uncertain or who disagree with the lesson plan maintaining a 
reciprocal attitude and the virtue of mutual respect. Mutual respect demands that 
policymakers take the scientific claims of ID seriously and investigate those claims to 
determine their scientific merit. It also demands that the religious claims of 
intelligent design theorists be taken seriously and investigated to determine whether
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or not ID is a religious theory for the purposes of public school policy. Importantly, 
mutual respect and the principle of accountability require policymakers to make 
judgments about the scientific and religious claims of ID consistent with the 
principles of basic liberty and opportunity. As noted earlier, the principle of 
accountability requires representatives to resist policies that violate these principles 
even if their constituents would not agree. An investigation of the scientific and 
religious claims of ID not only would yield judgments about its scientific and 
religious status for public school policy purposes, but also areas of possible 
agreement that could resolve some aspects of the dispute thereby reducing the range 
of citizen disagreement and contributing to the possibility of living together with
79some measure of mutual respect.
The next chapter, chapter three, examines in detail the scientific claims of 
intelligent design theory and some of the critical responses of evolutionary theorists 
to those claims. It intends to answer, from a deliberative perspective, the question: 
Should intelligent design be treated as scientific theory in public schools? Chapter 
four, in turn, addresses the question: Should intelligent design be treated as a religious 
theory in public schools? These questions are important to answer not only because 
they are central to the dispute in Ohio, but also because they bear on any future state 
or local school board deliberations that consider placing intelligent design in science 
curricula as a scientific alternative to evolutionary theory. Since national proponents
72 In my view, there is a difference between the mutual respect offered toward a person one 
deliberatively disagrees with and the mutual respect offered toward those one nondeliberatively 
disagrees with. In the case of deliberative disagreement, the mutual respect is extended not only 
toward the dignity and worth of the person making the claim, but also toward the claim itself. In the 
case on nondeliberative disagreement, mutual respect is extended only toward the dignity and worth of 
the person making the claim.
of ID are likely to promote Ohio’s lesson plan as a template for public school policies 
around the nation, chapter four also investigates the extent to which ID concepts and 
references are contained in the model lesson plan “Critical Analysis of Evolution.” 
The chapters which follow are the result of my own investigations. I am not 
an expert in evolutionary science or religious studies. I do, however, have experience 
as a public school policymaker, and I am committed to reaching judgments about the 
scientific and religious status of intelligent design on the basis of mutually acceptable 
fair terms of social cooperation. The reasons for the conclusions I reach about the 
scientific and religious status of ID for public school policy purposes are conditioned 
by the principles promoted by a deliberative political perspective.
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CHAPTER III
INTELLIGENT DESIGN (ID) THEORISTS AND THEIR SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS
Contemporary intelligent design theory is the recent creation of a group of 
evangelical orthodox73 Christians of varying denominations who are also credentialed 
academics. They are all associated with The Center for Science & Culture (formally 
known as The Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture or CRSC), a subsidiary 
of the Discovery Institute which is a privately funded74 conservative Christian think 
tank and political action group located in Seattle, Washington. Until its recent 
removal, the main web page for The Center for Science & Culture (CSC) featured a 
paragraph at the bottom of the page indicating its mission: “to challenge materialism 
on specifically scientific grounds...[by] pioneer[ing] alternative scientific theories 
and research methods that recognize the reality of design and the need for intelligent 
agency to explain it. This new research program [is] called ‘design theory’...” 
“Design theory,” according to the CSC, “recognizefs] mind, as well as matter, as a
73 Orthodox’ interpretations of Christian doctrine conform to the early creeds and confessions of the 
Christian faith. ‘Evangelical’ interpretations focus on the New Testament, especially the Gospels, and 
emphasize the salvation of humankind by faith in the atonement of Jesus. Many design proponents 
also identify with ‘Reformed’ theological interpretations of Christian doctrine. Reformed 
interpretations refer to Protestant doctrine, especially the . .doctrine of inerrancy of the Word of God, 
and ultimate authority of Scripture over the Church, rather than Church leaders, i.e., it is self-evident 
that following God means following God’s Word rather than following the words of men” (Tony 
Warren, “What is Reformed Christianity?” Available at 
http://members.aol.com/twarrenlO/articles/reformed.html. Accessed 2/5/04.).
74 The Discovery Institute is funded in part by three Christian foundations whose history and mission 
statements indicate their support for orthodox evangelical and reformed Christian activities. The 
foundations are: The Stewardship Foundation, The Maclellan Foundation and Howard F. Ahmanson’s 
Fieldstead & Company. For more information on funding for the Center for Science and Culture and 
for the Discovery Institute, see Forrest & Gross, 2994, p. 264-267.
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causal influence in the world” and promises “to reverse some of materialism’s 
destructive cultural consequences.”75
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the scientific claims of intelligent 
design theorists and the critical responses of evolutionary theorists to determine 
whether intelligent design should be treated as a scientific theory by public schools. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Sections one introduces the principal 
advocates of contemporary design theory and their publications. Section two details 
seven primary scientific claims of intelligent design theorists. Section three 
summarizes some of the numerous critical responses of evolutionary theorists to those 
claims and the rebuttals of ID theorists to their critics. Finally, in section four I 
consider the question, from a deliberative perspective, of whether or not intelligent 
design theory ought to be considered a scientific theory for public school policy 
purposes.
75 ‘Materialism,’ ‘naturalism’ and ‘physicalism’ are, according to design theorists, equivalent terms 
that refer to the view that the universe is a closed system of material causes and effects and that 
material or physical phenomena are all that exist. They do not distinguish between ‘methodological 
naturalism’ and ‘ontological naturalism.” In their view, methodological naturalism entails ontological 
naturalism.
The entire paragraph that was recently removed from the CSC website states:
Design Theory: A New Science for a New Century 
Materialistic thinking dominated Western culture during the 20th century in large part because 
of the authority of science. The Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture seeks, 
therefore, to challenge materialism on specifically scientific grounds. Yet Center Fellows do 
more than critique theories that have materialistic implications. They have also pioneered 
alternative scientific theories and research methods that recognize the reality of design and the 
need for intelligent agency to explain it. This new research program - called "design theory" - 
is based upon recent developments in the information sciences and many new evidences of 
design. Design theory promises to revitalize many long-stagnant disciplines by recognizing 
mind, as well as matter, as a causal influence in the world. It also promises, by implication, to 
promote a more holistic view of reality and humanity, thus helping to reverse some of 
materialism's destructive cultural consequences (Available at http://www.discoverv.org/crsc/. 
Accessed September 18, 2002.)
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The Principal Texts and Primary Advocates of Contemporary Design Theory 
Intelligent design theorists have written secondary school texts for use in 
schools, general texts for a public readership, theological texts for Christians, 
scholarly texts for university academics and legal texts for public policy makers and 
the legal community.76 Most have been published by InterVarsity Press, "the book- 
publishing division of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, a student movement active 
on campus at hundreds of universities.. .and a member movement of the International
77Fellowship of Evangelical Students.” Since a certain amount of academic respect 
and credibility accrues to texts published by mainstream publishers for academics, i.e. 
those that are not primarily associated with religious issues, ID theorists now attempt 
to have their more scholarly books published elsewhere. The following summary of 
major texts reflects the work they have published or have in print through spring of 
2004.
Three contemporary texts for use in schools have been published by design 
theorists to introduce intelligent design to students. The first is a high school biology 
text
76 Importantly, written texts are not the only materials ID theorists have created for students, the 
general public and religious organizations. Videos, DVDs, slide shows, and classroom curriculum 
guides promoting design theory are available at many websites funded and operated by non-profit 
Christian interest groups. Most are available through Access Research Network or ARN 
(http://www.arn.org) which is a primary clearinghouse for all news and information concerning the 
activities of design theorists and for the purchase of promotional materials, articles and books related 
to intelligent design. It provides links to many other websites including the International Society for 
Complexity, Information and Design (ISCED) which is directed by its founder, William Dembski 
(http://www.iscid.org); the Intelligent Design Undergraduate Research Center which promotes student 
study of and writing about ID theory (Dembski is chief editor) (http://www. idurc .org); and Real 
Science for Kids which advocates teaching primary school children ID theory and provides materials 
for classroom use http://www.realscience-4-kids.org/.
77 This information is provided in every book published by InterVarsity Press on the page that informs 
the reader of the book's publishing history. For example, see the publisher's page in Dembski's 
Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology. Downers Grove, EL; InterVarsity Press, 
1998.
Of Pandas and People: The Central Question o f Biological Origins. Published in 
1989 and written by Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon, this text introduces high 
schoolers to the most recent arguments design theorists use against evolution and for 
intelligent design as scientific explanation.78 The second is Defeating Darwinism by 
Opening Minds. Authored by Phillip Johnson and published in 1997, this book is 
written for students in their "late teens -  high-school juniors and seniors and 
beginning college undergraduates, along with the parents and teachers of such young 
people." The purpose of the book is to "protect [young people] against the 
indoctrination in naturalism that so often accompanies [public] education.
Textbooks.. .assume the wrong answer to the most important question we face: Is 
there a God who created us and cares about what we do? Young people need to be 
prepared for the indoctrination..." (Johnson, 1997, p. 9-10). The third book is What's 
Darwin Got to Do with It?: a Friendly Conversation about Evolution by Robert C. 
Newman, John L. Wiester and Jonathan and Janet Moneymaker. It was published in 
2000, and its cartoon design and simple presentation appeal directly to young 
adolescents. The purpose of this book is to question the power of evolutionary theory 
to explain the origin of biological complexity and to suggest a supernatural 
intelligence is required to account for the origin of complex organisms. It attempts to
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78 The historical roots of "intelligent design theory" lie in ancient arguments from design for the 
existence of God that were extended by Christian natural theologians in the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and nineteenth century to arguments from design for the Christian God's divine creation of life on 
earth. It is also a direct descendant of the "creation science" movement in the United States during the 
twentieth century. While creation scientists straightforwardly based their claims on the literal truth of 
Genesis in the Bible and not on arguments from design, they are related to design theorists in, among 
other things, promoting the inclusion of supernatural causation in scientific explanation. See John 
Hick,1964; Loren Eisley,1958; Ernan McMullin, 1985; Ronald Numbers,1991; and, Robert T. 
Pennock, 1999.
accomplish this purpose by teaching students about the structure of simple arguments 
and selective strategies for defeating the logic of those arguments.
Most of the books about intelligent design that are written for the general 
public and for religious organizations are authored by Philip Johnson. Johnson is a 
Senior Advisor at the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture (CSC) and 
a professor emeritus of law, having taught for over thirty years at the University of 
California, Berkeley. Johnson apparently became interested in re-evaluating 
Christian challenges to the theory of evolution and Christian attempts to have 
"creation science" taught in public school science classrooms following his 
conversion to Christianity when he was 38 years old (Forrest, 2001, p.6). He is 
widely regarded as the progenitor and chief proponent of the basic philosophical 
foundations of intelligent design theory and as the primary architect of the legal and 
political strategies of design proponents. Johnson, an evangelical Presbyterian 
(Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 7), regards Christian theology as the "queen of the 
sciences" and argues that Christian theology should be the source of general 
principles for governing all rational activity (Johnson, 1995, p. 104-105). A prolific 
writer, Johnson has written numerous articles and books on a variety of subjects 
surrounding intelligent design theory. In addition to Defeating Darwinism, his books 
include Darwin On Trial (1991), Reason In the Balance: The Case Against 
Naturalism in Science, Law & Education (1995), Objections Sustained (1997), The 
Wedge o f Truth: Splitting the Foundations o f Naturalism (2000) and The Right 
Questions: Truth, Meaning & Public Debate (2002). He also instituted a weekly 
internet column, The Weekly Wedge Update, which informs readers of the progress
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being made on design theorists' strategic plan for garnering public acceptance of 
intelligent design theory and public demand for its inclusion in the curriculum of 
public school science classrooms.79
Three other people figure prominently in the intelligent design movement and 
their texts are written largely for the academic community. Michael Behe, Senior 
Fellow at the CSC, a professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University and a Catholic, 
is the author of Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (1996). 
He is responsible for the phrase "irreducibly complex" which, he argues, refers to 
biological systems that would cease to function if one of its interacting parts were 
removed. According to Behe, irreducibly complex systems are incapable of 
originating through gradual evolutionary processes.
Jonathan Wells, Senior Fellow at the CSC with Ph.D.'s in divinity and 
molecular biology and a Unification Church minister, is the author of Icons o f 
Evolution: Why Much o f What We Teach About Evolution is Wrong (2000). Wells 
notes in a Unification Church sermon that “Father’s words, my studies, and my 
prayers convinced me that I should devote my life to destroying Darwinism" (Wells, 
n.d.). Wells’ primary claim is that the use of certain "icons" of evolution -  e.g., the 
study of finches in the Galapagos Islands, vertebrate limb homology, and Haeckel's 
embryos — in science education classes systematically misinforms students about the 
strength of evidence for evolution.
Finally, William Dembski, also a Senior Fellow at the CSC and assistant 
research professor in the conceptual foundations of science at Baylor University's
79 Johnson retired in April 2002 from writing this column due to ill health. It is now called "The 
Wedge Update" and has had various authors since Johnson’s departure. It can be accessed at 
http://www.arn.org.
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Institute for Faith and Learning, is the author of four books on intelligent design: 
Design Inference: Eliminating chance Through Small Probabilities (1998); Intelligent 
Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology (1999); No Free Lunch: Why 
Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased Without Intelligence (2002); and The 
Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design 
(2004). He also has edited and contributed to a range of other volumes including 
Mere Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design (1998); Sex and Character 
(1998); Unapologetic Apologetics:Meeting the Challenges o f Theological Studies
(2001); How Blind is the Watchmaker?: Nature’s Design and the Limits o f 
Naturalistic Science (2001); Signs o f Intelligence: Understanding Intelligent Design
(2001); Are We Spiritual Machines?: Ray Kurzweil vs. The Critics o f Strong AI
(2002); Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (2004); What Darwin Didn’t Know 
(2004); and Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwin Unconvincing 
(2004). Dembski holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Chicago, a 
Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago and a M.Div. from 
Princeton Theological Seminary. He notes in No Free Lunch that "as an associate 
research professor with no teaching responsibilities" in Baylor's Institute for Faith and 
Learning, he devotes his time to developing the substantive arguments that support 
the scientific claims of intelligent design in the hope of "bring[ing] intelligent design 
into the academic mainstream” (Dembski, 2002a, p. xxiii).80 Dembski is a self­
80 Dembski was initially hired by Baylor in late 1999 as a director of a newly created "think tank" 
focused on science and religion, The Michael Polanyi Center. He was removed from that position 
following a year of protest by Baylor faculty over the existence of the Center and the actions of 
Dembski as a director. See "Baylor demotes director of Polanyi Center," Waco News at 
http://www.accesswaco.com/auto/feed/news... 2000/10/19/972011133.23516.7215.0112.html 
(accessed 3/22/01); "Polanyi Center's Future is Unclear: Director's removal arises from email," Baylor 
Lariat at http://www.bavlor.edu/Lariat/Archives/2000/20001024/art-front02.html (accessed 2/2/04);
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identified “evangelical mathematician” (Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 53) and 
"singularist” who thinks "Christianity makes exclusive truth claims that are binding 
on the world at large" (Ibid., p. 50).
The final four influential texts of the contemporary design movement are 
written for public policymakers and the legal community; these publications present 
the political and legal arguments of design theorists for including intelligent design in 
public school biology curricula. Three are authored by David DeWolf, Stephen 
Meyer and Mark DeForrest. Those texts include two booklets published in 1999 by 
The Foundation for Thought and Ethics: Teaching the Controversy: Darwinism, 
Design and the Public School Science Curriculum and Intelligent Design in Public 
School Science Curricula: A legal Guidebook. The third text is a Utah Law Review 
article published in 2000 entitled Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, Or 
Religion, Or Speech? DeWolf is a Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute’s CSC 
where he also leads teacher training and is a professor at Gonzaga University Law 
School; Stephen Meyer is a Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute and the Director 
of and a Senior Fellow at the CSC; and, Mark DeForrest is an instructor at Central 
Washington University. The fourth text written for public policymakers and the legal 
community is Law, Darwinism, and Public Education: The Establishment Clause and 
the Challenge o f Intelligent Design (2003) by Francis J. Beckwith. Beckwith is 
associate director of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, an associate
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Glenn Morton "Before Dembski becomes a martyr" at
http://www.ca.vin.edu/archive/asa/200010/0200.html (accessed 3/22/01). To see Dembski's statements 
about his removal, see http://inia.cls.org/~welsberr/ae/dembski wa/metanews 20001020 wad.txtt 
(accessed 3/22/01).
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professor of Church-State Studies at Baylor University, and a fellow at the Discovery
O 1
Institute’s Center for Science and Culture.
Scientific Claims
The scientific claims of design theorists can be summarized into seven central 
propositions. While ID theorists indicate that their theory is important to all the 
sciences, arts and humanities, the focus of their published texts is on the cause of the 
origin of complex biological organisms. Therefore, the defense of these seven claims 
by design theorists constitutes the central scientific arguments for including design 
theory in public school biology classrooms. It is important to note that mathematician 
and philosopher William Dembski is the primary architect of intelligent design's 
central scientific claims even though he has no educational degrees in biology . The 
only scientific claim among their central propositions that is authored by a scientist is 
the first — Behe's claim that “Darwinism” is unable to account for "irreducible 
complexity." However, even that claim is significantly altered by Dembski.
Claim #1: “Darwinism” is unable to account for the “irreducible complexity” of 
biological systems.
Irreducibly complex systems are defined by Michael Behe in Darwin's Black 
Box as systems that cannot function if one small part of the system is removed;
81 In September 2003 twenty nine members of the J.M. Dawson family signed a letter requesting 
Beckwith’s removal as associate director of the Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies at Baylor 
University. The letter stated that Beckwith promotes church-state ideas contrary to the strong stand for 
separation advocated by J.M. Dawson. Baylor administrators refused to remove Beckwith citing the 
need to promote a climate of intellectual freedom by allowing a diversity of views to be represented at 
the various institutes associated with the university. For more information see 
http://www.ethicsdaily.com/article detail.cfm?AID=3125 (accessed 2/5/04).
82 Intelligent design theorists refer to modern evolutionary theory as “Darwinism.” Phillip Johnson 
argues that adding an “ism” to a word indicates an ideology. By referring to modern evolutionary 
theory as “Darwinism,” ID theorists promote Johnson’s view that evolutionary theory is a pervasive 
cultural ideology (Phillip Johnson, 1997, p. 125; also 2000, p. 65).
130
function is attained only when all components of the system integrate simultaneously 
in one place. A bacterial flagellum is, according to Behe, an example of an 
irreducibly complex system. He argues that a bacterial flagellum "cannot be 
produced directly by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because 
any precursor to [a bacterial flagellum] that is missing a part is by definition 
nonfunctional...Since natural selection can only choose systems that are already 
working," evolutionary explanations cannot explain the origin of the bacterial 
flagellum. According to Behe, a biological system that cannot be produced gradually 
by evolutionary processes has "to arise as an integrated unit, in one fell swoop"
(Behe, 1996, p. 39).
William Dembski in No Free Lunch significantly alters Behe's general 
definition of irreducible complexity to expand the scope and range of the objects and
0-5
systems that would meet its requirements. Dembski defines irreducible complexity 
in the following way:
A system performing a given basic function is irreducibly complex if it includes 
a set of well-matched, mutually interacting, nonarbitrarily individuated parts 
such that each part in the set is indispensable to maintaining the system's basic, 
and therefore original, function. The set of these indispensable parts is known 
as the irreducible core of the system. (Dembski, 2002a, p. 285, italics in 
original)
In addition to expanding the scope and range of Behe's definition, Dembski adds two 
auxiliary conditions that create what he calls an "effective invariant," i.e., an 
insurmountable obstacle or "vise" which "rule out any substantial simplification of an 
irreducibly complex system" thus preventing evolutionary processes "from exploiting
83 Appendix C contains a glossary of intelligent design terms found in this chapter.
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the functional intermediates [they] would need to account for the [origin of the] 
system." Those auxiliary conditions are:
1) Numerous and Diverse Parts. If the irreducible core of an irreducibly 
complex system consists of one or only a few parts, there may be no insuperable 
obstacle to the Darwinian mechanism explaining how that system arose in one 
fell swoop. But as the number of indispensable will-fitted, mutually interacting, 
nonarbitrarily individuated parts increases in number and diversity, there is no 
possibility of the Darwinian mechanism achieving that system in one fell swoop.
2) Minimal Complexity and Function. Given an irreducibly complex system 
with numerous and diverse parts in its core, the Darwinian mechanism must 
produce it gradually. But if the system needs to operate at a certain minimal 
level of function before it can be of any use to the organism and if to achieve 
that level of function it requires a certain minimal level of complexity already 
possessed by the irreducible core, the Darwinian mechanism has no functional 
intermediates to exploit. (Ibid., p. 286-287)
Dembski further describes an irreducibly complex system as a "discrete 
combinatorial object," i.e., an object that is composed of building blocks that must 
converge in one location and be configured simultaneously in a particular 
arrangement to form the object (Ibid., p. 290). In other words, biological phenomena 
which conform to Dembski's definition of irreducible complexity and meet his two 
auxiliary conditions are considered to be discrete combinatorial objects (DCO's) that 
must be integrated in their particular form all at once in one location in order to 
establish and maintain their function. Since "Darwinism,” according to design 
theorists, allows only for the gradual formation of complex biological phenomena, it 
is unable to explain the appearance of irreducibly complex discrete combinatorial 
objects.
Dembski states in a recent article that to refute this claim, Darwinists must 
propose and then demonstrate “detailed, testable, step-by-step proposals for how 
[Darwinian mechanisms] could actually produce irreducibly complex biochemical
systems.” Since “the scientific literature shows a complete absence” of this “causal
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specificity,” Dembski agrees with cell biologist Franklin Harold who said “there are 
presently not detailed Darwinian accounts of the evolution of any biochemical or 
cellular system, only a variety of wishful speculations” (Dembski, 2004a, p. 26).
Claim #2: Intelligent causes are empirically detectable, and these causes are 
necessary to explain irreducibly complex biological structures.
When intelligent agents act, Dembski argues,84 they leave behind a 
characteristic trademark or signature, “specified complexity,” which renders 
intelligent causes empirically detectable. The irreducible complexity of certain 
biological objects is a special case of "specified complexity," and specified 
complexity is the "key to detecting [intelligent] design"(Dembski, 2002a, p. 116).
In the language of design theory, an object exhibits specified complexity if it 
is contingent (not the outcome of any deterministic natural law), sufficiently complex 
(its probability of natural actualization is less than the probability bound of 10'150),85 
and specified (exhibits a distinctive pattern that is detachable from the particular 
object itself). For example, a long sequence of randomly strewn Scrabble pieces is 
complex without being specified, and a short sequence spelling the word "the" is 
specified without being complex, but a sequence corresponding to a Shakespearean 
sonnet is both complex and specified; thus, a Shakespearean sonnet exhibits specified
84 The remaining scientific claims are entirely the result of Dembski's theorizing.
85 Dembski notes that complexity and probability are correlative notions so that higher complexity 
corresponds to smaller probability. The question of how complex an object must be in order to 
implicate intelligent cause, then, is reformulated probabilistically into: How small does a probability 
have to be so that in the presence of a specification it reliably implicates design? (Dembski, 2002a, p. 
18-19). Dembski states that the answer to this question depends on the “probabilistic resources” that 
comprise the number of relevant ways an event might occur. After taking into account the number of 
elementary particles in the observable universe, the duration of the observable universe until heat death 
or collapse, and the Planck time which determine the probabilistic resources available in the 
observable universe, Dembski concludes that anything that demonstrates a probability less than the 
universal probability bound (UPB) of 10'150 reliably indicates intelligent design. For a demonstration 
of how Dembski reaches this conclusion see Dembski, 2002a, sections 1.5 and 2.8.
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complexity and therefore had an intelligent cause (an intelligent being, Shakespeare, 
created the sonnet). The presence, then, of the specified complexity within the sonnet 
allows us to empirically detect the presence of an intelligent cause for the origin of 
the sonnet.
Intelligent design theory extrapolates from detecting intelligently caused 
human artifacts to detecting intelligently caused physical systems. If specified 
complexity is a reliable marker of intelligent agency in the origin of human artifacts, 
it is also a reliable marker of intelligent agency in the origin of physical systems. Just 
as intelligent causes are necessary to explain the origin of Shakespeare's sonnet, 
intelligent causes are necessary to explain the specified complexity exhibited by 
physical systems.
Claim #3: The “complexity-specifwation criterion empirically determines when an 
inference to design is warranted.
Specified complexity is detected by employing a "rigorous" criterion -  the 
complexity-specification criterion (Dembski, 2002a, p. 6). Dembski claims that when 
the complexity specification criterion empirically detects the presence of specified 
complexity, an inference to design is warranted. The criterion, also known as ‘the 
explanatory filter,’ is an algorithm or fixed procedure that determines which type of 
causal explanation is appropriate given a certain event or thing that needs to be 
explained (see Figure 2.1). In his 1998 book, The Design Inference, Dembski argues 
that there are
...three competing modes of explanation. These are regularity, chance, and 
design. To attribute an event to a regularity is to say that the event will (almost) 
always happen. To attribute an event to chance is to say that probabilities 
characterize the occurrence of the event, but are also compatible with some
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other event happening. To attribute an event to design is to say that it cannot 
reasonably be referred to either regularity or chance. (Dembski, 1998, p. 36)
Figure 2.1:Dembski’s Explanatory filter
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In his later book, No Free Lunch, Dembski argues that the criterion results 
from applying statistical probability theory to what Dembski characterizes as the 
“general scheme” for recognizing intelligent agency -- choosing, ruling out and 
specifying. If it can be established that the object is contingent ("chosen," i.e., not 
the outcome of any deterministic natural law), complex ("ruling out" chance 
circumstances, i.e., its probability of natural actualization is less than 10'150), and 
specified (exhibits a distinctive pattern that is detachable from the particular object 
itself), then an inference to intelligent causes is warranted. Conceptually, the 
criterion consists of a flow-chart with three decision nodes that correspond with the 
three parts of specified complexity and, as noted before, is also known as Dembski's 
Explanatory Filter (Dembski, 2002a, p. 12). Thus, the "general scheme for 
recognizing intelligent agency is but a thinly disguised form of the complexity- 
specification criterion” (Ibid., p. 30).
In practice, discovering whether a particular biotic system exhibits specified 
complexity and therefore is a discrete combinatorial object requires two steps: 
showing that the system is specified and calculating its probability (Ibid., p. 289). 
Dembski argues that "specification is never a problem" when it comes to biotic 
systems because they are always functional. "In virtue of their function, [biotic] 
systems embody patterns that are objectively given and can be identified 
independently of the systems that embody them” (Ibid., p. 148.; see also Dembski, 
2004a, p, 28). Hence, they are specified in the relevant sense.
Calculating its probability is another matter. Determining whether a biotic 
system is intelligently caused and therefore is a discrete combinatorial object (DCO)
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requires that one calculate the probability of the building blocks that compose the 
object randomly converging on a location and integrating "in one fell swoop" or "all 
at once" by chance into the arrangement that forms the complete object. 
Consequently, three probabilities figure into the equation: Porig = the probability of 
originating the building blocks for that object; Piocai = the probability of locating the 
building clocks in one place once they are given; and PCOnfig = the probability of 
configuring the building blocks once they are given and in one place. The probability 
that a given object is intelligently caused, then, equals the product of these three 
probabilities: Pdco = Pong x Piocai x PCOnfig- If Pdco < 10'150, then an inference to design
o z :
is warranted.
In No Free Lunch Dembski applies his probability calculations to a bacterial
flagellum to determine if it is a discrete combinatorial object and therefore
intelligently caused. He describes the probability of a flagellum evolving by chance
as equivalent to the probability of baking a cake “entirely by chance.”
First there is the P0ng, the probability that the ingredients (i.e., building blocks) 
for your cake will arise by chance and show up at your supermarket. Next there 
is Piocai, the probability that by going through a supermarket and randomly 
picking items off the shelf, you just happen to select the right ingredients for 
your cake and put them in your shopping cart. Finally there is Pconfig, the 
probability that randomly configuring the ingredients in your shopping cart -  
even if they are the right ones for your cake -  will produce the desired cake.
(Dembski, 2002a, p. 291)
Since the result of the probability calculations for baking a cake “by chance” falls 
below the universal probability bound, he predicts that the probability that the
86 In a January 2004 article entitled “Irreducible Complexity Revisited,” Dembski refines his formula 
for calculating the probability of the “chance” formation of irreducibly complex (IC) biological 
systems. He identifies seven “daunting probabilistic hurdles” that chance “Darwinian” evolutionary 
processes must overcome to create an IC system. Those are: availability, synchronization, localization, 
interfering cross-reactions, interface compatibility, order of assembly and configuration. Dembski’s 
rational for his new formula and the formula itself can be found in Dembski, 2004a, p. 30-39.
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flagellum assembles itself through random processes and randomly attaches to a 
bacterial cell will be even smaller because of the number of proteins that constitute 
the building blocks of a flagellum. Not surprisingly, his calculations demonstrate that 
the probability of “the chance formation” of a bacterial flagellum is so small that an
87intelligent cause for the flagellum can be reliably inferred (Ibid., p. 290-302).
The statistical justification of the inference to intelligent design from applying
the specified-complexity criterion to highly complex biotic systems is, according to
Dembski, "so compelling as to demand assent” (Dembski, 1999, p. 149). And once
we understand the pivotal significance of the criterion in warranting the inference to
design, several things follow immediately:
(l)Intelligent agency is logically prior to natural causation and cannot be 
reduced to it (2) Intelligent agency is fully capable of making itself known 
against the backdrop of natural causes (3) Any science that systematically 
ignores design is incomplete and defective (4) Methodological naturalism, the 
view that science must confine itself solely to natural causes, far from assisting 
scientific inquiry, actually stifles it (5) The scientific picture of the world 
championed since the Enlightenment is not just wrong but massively wrong.
Indeed entire fields of inquiry, especially in the human sciences, will need to be 
rethought from the ground up in terms of intelligent design. (Ibid., p. 223-224)
Claim #4: Intelligent design theory is a theory o f information.
Information theory was first formulated by Claude Shannon in a 1948 paper 
entitled “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Shannon, a mathematical 
engineer at Bell Telephone Laboratories in the 1940’s, was interested in the efficient
87 Indeed, Dembski predicts that if origination, localization and configuration probabilities were 
calculated on biological systems at all levels of "complexity and organization," we would find "save at 
the lowest level for the very simplest building blocks (i.e., amino acids and nucleotide bases), these 
probabilities will be extremely small and regularly fall below the universal probability bound of K)150” 
(Dembski, 2002a, p. 302). Intelligent design, then, "offers one obvious prediction, namely, that nature 
should he chock-full of specified complexity” (Ibid., p. 362). This prediction, however, is at odds with 
Dembski's contention that a bacterium without a flagellum does not exhibit specified complexity while 
one with a flagellum does (Ibid., p.331). Certainly, if "even the simplest cell requires vast amounts of 
specified complexity," then a bacterium without a flagellum would also require it (Ibid., p. 329).
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transmission of electronic signals across communication channels. He noted that if 
information is viewed as the actualization of one out of two simple alternatives, (e.g., 
“yes” or “no”), multiplied many times (e.g., answering “yes” or “no” in the game 
Twenty Questions), then Boolean two-digit binary algebra could be employed to 
mathematically determine 1) the rate at which information is produced at a source, 2) 
the average amount of information in a message and 3) the capacity of a
O Q
communications channel for handling information.
Dembski notes that despite the importance of the transmission of signals 
across communication channels in modem communications, Shannon’s fundamental 
concept of information and its mathematical formulation can be separated from the 
science of communications and applied to the theory of intelligent design. The 
fundamental intuition underlying information is, according to Dembski, contingency 
-  that is, “the actualization of one [contingent] possibility to the exclusion of 
others.. .For there to be information, there must be a multiplicity of distinct 
[contingent] possibilities, any one of which might happen. When one of these 
possibilities does happen and the others are ruled out, information becomes 
actualized.” Since “the principal characteristic of intelligent causation is directed
88Three aspects of Shannon’s treatment of information are worth noting. First, the view that 
information is conveyed by the instantiation of one of two (or more) alternatives corresponds to the 
view that information arises from a reduction in uncertainty. For example, prior to a coin toss, we are 
uncertain whether the coin will land on “heads” or “tails.” After the coin is tossed, we not only gain 
information about how the coin lands, we also have a reduction in our uncertainty about the results of 
the toss. Second, “Shannon information” excludes redundancy. A coin toss that uses a coin with two 
heads has a predictable outcome and conveys little information to observers. Also, a book consisting 
only of the letter “S” repeated 500,000 times contains lots of redundancy and little Shannon 
information. Third, and finally, the binary digits, 1 and 0, which Shannon referred to as ‘bits’ continue 
to express the fundamental units of information in modem communications. For more information 
about Shannon and his work see Tomas D. Schneider’s website at http://www.lecb.ncifcrf.gov/~toms/; 
the Lucent Technologies/Bell Labs webpage http://www.lucent.com/minds/infotheorv/docs/historv.pdf 
and Gell-Mann, 1994, p. 37, 223. For more information about how Shannon information relates to 
design theory see articles in the archives of the www.arn.org website.
contingency, or what we call choice,” Dembski argues, intelligent design theory can 
be formulated as a theory of information (Dembski, 2001a, p. 554, 565).
As noted earlier, the complexity-specification criterion in design theory claims 
that if a phenomena is contingent ("chosen," i.e., not the outcome of any deterministic 
natural law), complex ("ruling out" chance circumstances, i.e., its probability of 
natural actualization is less than 10'150), and specified (exhibits a distinctive pattern 
that is detachable from the particular object itself), then specified complexity is 
detected and an inference to design is warranted. Since contingency signals the 
presence of information, and contingency is an essential element in the complexity- 
specification criterion, it follows, according to Dembski, that the complexity- 
specified criterion not only detects specified complexity, it also detects complex 
specified information or CSI. "To infer design by means of the complexity- 
specification criterion is equivalent to detecting complex specified information (CSI). 
All the elements in the complexity-specification criterion that lead us to infer design 
find their counterpart in the detection of complex specified information.. .It follows 
that the complexity-specification criterion attributes design if and only if it detects 
CSI.” Intelligent design, then, according to Dembski, is a theory of information and 
the central problem of biology for design theorists is the origin of complex specified 
information (Dembski, 2002a, p. 145, 149).
Two factors appear to motivate Dembski's reframing of design theory into a 
theory of information. The first is indicated by Dembski in Intelligent Design.
".. .intelligent design can be formulated as a scientific theory having empirical 
consequences and devoid of religious commitments. Intelligent design can be
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unpacked as a theory of information.. .Intelligent design thereby becomes a theory for 
detecting and measuring information, explaining its origin and tracing its flow” 
(Dembski, 1999, p. 17-18). Thus, by presenting design theory as a theory of 
information, Dembski hopes to divest the theory of any religious commitments.89
Second, reframing design theory within information theory allows Dembski to 
test mathematically the power of evolutionary algorithms to produce novel 
information. Evolutionary biologists rely on the cumulative power of natural 
selection over vast expanses of geologic time to explain the origin of novelty in biotic 
systems and often describe that power as "algorithmic." The purpose of Dembski's 
book No Free Lunch is to mathematically assess the cumulative power of
evolutionary algorithms to determine if they are capable of generating the complex 
specified information exhibited in irreducibly complex physical systems (Dembski, 
2002a, p. xix).
Claim #5 :Intelligent design is the sole source o f complex specified information..
In chapters three and four of No Free Lunch, Dembski presents mathematical 
arguments that he claims demonstrates that natural causes and evolutionary 
algorithms are in principle incapable of explaining the origin of complex specified 
information. The arguments rely not only on Dembski’s universal probability bound
89 Dembski’s claim in Intelligent Design that formulating ID as a theory of information divests it of 
any religious commitments contradicts his claim in Signs of Intelligence that “.. .intelligent design is 
just the Logos theology of John's Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory” (Dembski & 
Kushiner, 2001, p. 192). In fact, it contradicts many statements by design proponents that 
“information” is merely another name for the divine Logos in the Christian Gospel of John. Nancy 
Pearcy, for example, states ‘The great confrontation in science today is between those who say life can 
be explained without recourse to...intelligence, and those who say life embodies information -  the 
Word [Logos] -  and must be explained as the product of an intelligent agent” (Johnson, 2002, p. 16). 
Philip Johnson writes “Only the Word [the divine Logos found in John 1:1] creates...That is why no 
natural mechanism has been discovered for the creation of new complex genetic information. No such 
mechanism exists” (Johnson, 2000, p. 153).
(UPB) but also on what Dembski refers to as the universal complexity bound (UCB). 
As noted earlier (footnote 13), probability and complexity are correlative notions -  
that is, lower probability corresponds to higher complexity. Dembski argues that his 
UPB of less than 10'150 corresponds to 500 bits of specified information. The 
universal complexity bound (UCB) for CSI, then, is equivalent to 500 bits of 
information. This means, according to Dembski, that when an object contains more 
than 500 bits of information and is specified, an inference to intelligent design is 
warranted (Dembski, 2002a, p. 156).90
Natural causes, according to Dembski, are characterized by necessity (natural 
laws), chance (randomness) or a combination of the two (nondeterministic natural 
laws). Since natural laws (represented mathematically by nonstochastic functions) 
are deterministic, he argues, they generate highly probable events that “cannot yield 
contingency, and without contingency there can be no information” (Ibid., p. 155). 
Chance, or randomness (represented mathematically by random sampling from a 
probability distribution), according to Dembski, can generate contingency but not 
sufficient complexity (500 bits of information). Finally, nondeterministic natural 
laws (represented mathematically by stochastic processes) can mathematically be 
reduced, according to Dembski, to a necessary (deterministic) nonstochastic function 
and to a random function (contingent). Since neither nonstochastic functions nor 
random functions can generate the contingency and complexity required for CSI, it 
follows that a combination of natural laws and chance cannot generate CSI (Ibid., p. 
150-159).91 “Since chance, necessity, and their combination characterize natural
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^It should be noted that Dembski’s UCB is strictly a Shannon measure.
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causes, it now follows that natural causes are incapable of generating CSI” (Ibid., p. 
159).
Dembski argues that natural causes cannot generate CSI because they are 
subject to a “Law of Conservation of Information” which he claims to formulate for 
the first time. He argues that it is the “elusive fourth law of thermodynamics” (Ibid., 
p. 159-173). This law, however, is “highly abstract,” and is therefore, according to 
Dembski, not very helpful in attempting to understand whether a specific natural 
cause can generate CSI. Since natural selection is the specific natural cause for 
biological complexity proposed by Darwin, and since evolutionary algorithms express 
the mathematical power of natural selection, Dembski next investigates evolutionary 
algorithms to find if they can generate CSI.
Dembski applies the “No Free Lunch” mathematical theorems developed by
09David Wolpert and William Macready in 1996 to evolutionary algorithms to track
91The reduction of stochastic processes (representing nondeterministic natural laws and therefore the 
combination of “chance and necessity”) into a random and deterministic component is, according to 
Dembski “mathematically legitimate and involves no loss of generality” (Dembski, 2002a, p. 175-176, 
n. 48). Indeed, according to Dembski, “stochastic processes and random functions are mathematically 
equivalent” (Ibid., p. 158).
92 Evolutionary algorithms refer to computerized simulations of evolutionary processes which claim to 
show that genetic systems gain information through evolution. Dembski cites the work of Thomas D. 
Schneider and argues that the No Free Lunch Theorems demonstrate that Schneider is wrong. 
Schneider responds that Dembski “misunderstood the No Free Lunch Theorems.” His response can be 
accessed at http://www.lecb.ncifcrf.gov/-toms/paper/ev/.
Schneider is a Research Biologist in the Laboratory of Experimental and Computational 
Biology, National Cancer Institute. He received his Ph.D. in 1984 from the University of Colorado, 
Department of Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology. An abstract of a paper on his “Ev 
Program” states:
How do genetic systems gain information by evolutionary processes? Answering this 
question precisely requires a robust, quantitative measure of information. Fortunately, 
fifty years ago Claude Shannon defined information as a decrease in the uncertainty of a 
receiver. For molecular systems, uncertainty is closely related to entropy and hence has 
clear connections to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. These aspects of information 
theory have allowed the development of a straightforward and practical method of 
measuring information in genetic control systems. Here this method is used to observe 
information gain in the binding sites for an artificial "protein' in a computer simulation
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the success the algorithms have in creating CSI. These theorems are “bookkeeping” 
tools that determine how well evolutionary algorithms “optimize fitness functions 
over a phase space” (Ibid., 212).93 After applying these theorems and, after 
reviewing possible objections to his mathematical analysis, Dembski concludes "all 
the specified complexity we get out of an evolutionary algorithm has first to be put 
into its construction and into the information that guides the algorithm. Evolutionary 
algorithms...merely harness already existing specified complexity” (Ibid. p. 207).94 
The No Free Lunch theorems demonstrate, according to Dembski, that natural 
selection is subject to the Law of Conservation of Information as formulated by 
Dembski. "This conclusion implies that naturalistic explanations are incomplete and 
that design constitutes a legitimate and fundamental mode of scientific explanation” 
(Ibid., xiii).
The inability of natural algorithmic processes to produce complex specified 
information (CSI) coupled with the statistical justification of inferring design from
of evolution. The simulation begins with zero information and, as in naturally occurring 
genetic systems, the information measured in the fully evolved binding sites is close to 
that needed to locate the sites in the genome. The transition is rapid, demonstrating that 
information gain can occur by punctuated equilibrium (Schneider, 2001).
93 David Wolpert has criticized Dembski’s application of the No Free Lunch Theorems to biological 
evolution. Wolpert states that Dembski’s “arguments are fatally informal and imprecise” because “the 
values of the factors arising in the NFL theorems are never properly specified in his analysis.” In 
addition, “there is a marked elision of the formal details of the biological processes under 
consideration” including co-evolutionary processes. Importantly, he continues, the “NFL results do 
not hold in co-evolution” (Wolpert, 2002, p. 2-3).
Dembski now claims that the No Free Lunch Theorems were merely used to create a No Free 
Lunch principle that states “if you have some naturalistic process whose output exhibits specified 
complexity, then that process was front-loaded with specified complexity” (Dembski, 2004, p. 257). 
Needless to say, Dembski is backpedaling from his statement in his book No Free Lunch that “The No 
Free Lunch theorems show that for evolutionary algorithms to output CSI they had first to receive a 
prior input of CSI” (Dembski, 2002, p. 223).
94In his discussion of evolutionary algorithms, Dembski fails to distinguish between the information 
and complexity measures associated with Shannon information theory (statistical probability measures) 
and the information and complexity measures associated with Chaitin-Kolmogorov-Solomonoff 
algorithmic information theory (measures of the length and compressibility of computer programs).
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the specified-complexity criterion leads Dembski to conclude that intelligence is the 
sole source of specified complexity — "information.. .can never be entirely mind- 
independent or concept free” (Ibid., p. 137). Importantly, this means human 
intelligence, because it is located in a physical body that exhibits specified 
complexity, cannot be explained by reference to purely natural causes. ".. .intelligent 
agency, even when conditioned by a physical system that embodies it, cannot be 
reduced to natural causes without remainder...specified complexity is precisely the 
remainder that remains unaccounted for” (Ibid. xiv).
Claim #6: An unembodied intelligence abiotically infuses exogenous information into 
the physical world to create complex biological phenomena.
Attributing the complex specified information (CSI) exhibited by biotic 
systems to intelligence results in, according to Dembski, the following general 
conclusions: 1) specified complexity originates outside any physical system — i.e., it 
is exogenous information; 2) the source of the exogenous information is unembodied 
(Dembski, 2002a., p. 333); 3) specified complexity or CSI is infused into the physical 
world abiotically (Ibid. p.321); 4) the unembodied designer "impart[s] information 
into the universe without inputting any energy at all" (Ibid., p. 336);95 and, 5) the
95 If the unembodied designer imparted energy, Dembski argues, it would be moving physical 
particles; something natural causes are fully capable of doing. So, the unembodied designer must 
infuse information without imparting energy. In order to impart information without imparting energy, 
the world must be indeterminate, and Dembski believes the "best place to locate indeterminism" is 
quantum theory. The indeterminacy of the world as described by quantum theory "means that an 
unembodied designer can substantively affect the structure of the physical world by imparting 
information without imparting energy” (Dembski, 2002a, p. 335-336).
The conclusion that quantum theory describes an indeterminate universe, however, differs 
radically from the emerging consensus among quantum physicists that quantum mechanics describes a 
completely deterministic universe. According to physicists such as Stephen Hawking, "the state 
function of quantum mechanics does not characterize a probability distribution -  we only interpret it 
as a probability distribution from our limited vantage. Instead, the state function describes an 
ensemble of universes...in which all possible histories or worlds consistent with quantum mechanics 
get lived out” (Ibid., p. 337). In Dembski's view, the "historical priority of probabilities in the
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information is "word-like" — that is, the designer imparts information persuasively to 
a receptive medium (Ibid., p. 343). Thus, a reconceptualization of biology in 
information-theoretic terms (where “information” is the central unifying concept in 
the biological sciences) poses the abiotic infusion of "word-like" exogenous 
information by an unembodied supernatural designer into a nondeterministic universe 
that is open to novel information as the greatest mystery confronting modem biology 
(Ibid., p. 321).
The picture of the universe that emerges from the information-theoretic 
foundations of intelligent design reveals the universe as an "information processing 
system that is responsive to novel information” (Ibid., p. 335). It is a universe in 
which "we do not understand how an unembodied designer imparts specified 
complexity.. .but we can know that such a designer imparts specified complexity..” 
(Ibid., p. 343, italics in original).
Claim #7: Intelligent design offers a rigorous scientific research agenda for the life 
sciences.
In No Free Lunch Dembski outlines fifteen problems that can be pursued as 
part of a research program. They are:
1. Detectability Problem -  Is an object designed?
2. Functionality Problem -  What is a designed object’s function?
3. Transmission Problem -  What is the causal history of a designed object?
4. Construction Problem -  How was a designed object constructed?
5. Reverse-Engineering Problem -  In the absence of a reasonably detailed causal 
history, how could the object have come about?
6. Constraints Problem -  What are the constraints within which the designed object 
functions optimally?
formulation of quantum mechanics suggests to me a conceptual and ontic priority: quantum mechanics 
is fundamentally a probabilistic theory describing an indeterministic world, and only with considerable 
finagling can it be interpreted as a completely deterministic theory” (Ibid., p. 339).
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7. Perturbation Problem -  How has the original design been modified and what 
factors have modified it? This requires an account of both the natural and 
intelligent causes that have modified the object over its causal history
8. Variability Problem -  What degree of perturbation allows continued functioning? 
Alternatively, what is the range of variability within which the designed object 
functions and outside of which it breaks down?
9. Restoration Problem -  Once perturbed, how can the original design be 
recovered? Art restorers, textual critics, and archeologists know all about this.
10. Optimality Problem -  In what sense is the designed object optimal?
11. Separation of Causes Problem -  How does one tease apart the effects of 
intelligent causes from natural causes, both of which could have affected the 
object in question?
12. Ethical Problem -  Is the design morally right?
13. Aesthetic Problem -  Is the design beautiful?
14. Intentionality Problem -  What was the intention of the designer in producing a 
given designed object?
15. Identity Problem -  Who or what is the designer?
(Dembski, 2002a, p. 312-313.)
Dembski acknowledges that the last four questions are not scientific questions 
(Ibid., p. 313) but notes that they do arise within the framework of an ID research 
program. Importantly, he says, the unembodied intelligence associated with 
intelligent design is compatible with pantheism, panentheism, Stoicism, 
Neoplatonism, deism, and theism. Obviously, it is incompatible with naturalism 
(Ibid., p. 334). So, intelligent design is "not the study of intelligent causes per se but 
of informational pathways induced by intelligent causes...Intelligent design is 
theologically minimalist. It detects intelligence without speculating about the nature 
of the intelligence” (Dembski, 1999, p. 107). Dembski argues that the ethical and 
metaphysical questions raised by ID, particularly the ontological status of the 
designer, should be addressed by philosophers and theologians.
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In his 2004 book The Design Revolution Dembski offers further suggestions 
for a design theoretic biological research program.96 The ten research themes he 
suggests in this book incorporate or reconceptualize the fifteen research problems 
offered in No Free Lunch. The most important new twist to the design research 
program in his latest book is a focus on the themes of “methodological engineering, ” 
technological evolution, and steganography. Methodological engineering is, 
according to Dembski, a fundamental regulative principle for understanding 
biological systems. It requires that biotic systems be understood as engineering 
systems and in engineering terms. Technological evolution notes the parallel between 
the “Theory of Inventive Problem Solving,” or TRIZ, and the evolution of living 
systems. Technologies, according to TRIZ, can emerge suddenly from major 
conceptual, inventive leaps or, by contrast, be modified by trial and error.
Visualizing biological systems as engineering systems subject to technological 
evolution could lead to new breakthroughs in intelligent design theory, according to
Q7Dembski. The final new area of research suggested by Dembski is called 
steganography. Steganography emerges from the field of digital data embedding 
technologies. It seeks “efficient (i.e., high data rate) and robust (i.e., insensitive to 
common distortions) algorithms that can embed a high volume of hidden message bits 
within a cover message without their presence being detected” (Dembski, 2004c, p.
316). Steganalysis, on the other hand, seeks statistical tests that detect the presence of 
hidden messages in cover messages. Intelligent design research into steganalysis
96 These suggestions were first outlined by Dembski in a October 2002 paper entitled “Becoming a 
Disciplined Science: Prospects, Pitfalls, and a Reality Check for ID.”
97 It also leads to a new conception of the intelligent designer as “intelligent engineer.”
would focus on constructing statistical tests to detect the presence of hidden messages 
in biological systems that would act as hidden operating manuals for the growth and 
development of those systems. Dembski’s suspicion is “that biological systems do 
steganography much better than we.. .not because natural selection is so clever, but 
because the designer of these systems is so adept at steganography” (Ibid., p. 316-
317). The dense, multi-layered embedding of information in physical systems is a 
prediction of ID, according to Dembski, and the detection of “second-order” 
steganography through steganalysis would provide “decisive confirmation for ID” 
(Ibid., p. 317).
In addition to the new research themes, Dembski’s 2004 book presents five 
practical suggestions for turning ID into a disciplined science. (1) Compose a 
Catalog o f Fundamental Facts that would contain a catalog of irreducibly complex 
biological objects and processes. The catalog would be something like the star cluster 
catalogs found in astrophysics and would mention nothing about intelligent design or 
naturalism. (2) Compose a Catalog Correcting Misinformation that would expose 
examples of faulty evidence and faulty reasoning given in evolutionary explanations 
for biological complexity. It would “unmask” and help defeat the “anti-design 
bigotry” prevalent in biology. (3) Create a Network o f Researchers and Resources to 
concentrate and coordinate research efforts and to more efficiently and effectively 
utilize resources. This will eventually lead to the possibility of “setting the 
intellectual agenda for academic departments and even whole academic institutions.” 
(4) Begin Building a Design Curriculum that would include writing basic biology 
texts for high schoolers and college undergraduates and research monographs for
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professors and graduate students. It would also require the development of CD 
ROMs, videos, DVD’s, computer animation, 3-leaming websites, etc. And, (5) 
develop Objective Measures o f Progress to determine if ID is advancing as a science. 
The measures would gauge progress in areas such as intellectual vitality, intellectual 
standards, attracting talent and whether ID has “exited the ghetto” of marginalization 
from mainstream science (Dembski, 2004c, p. 318-325).
Critical Responses to the Scientific Claims of Intelligent Design 
Critical responses to the claims of ID theory abound. Critiques have been 
written by distinguished evolutionary scientists, philosophers of science, 
mathematicians, physicists and theologians. The purpose of this section is not to 
offer new critical analyses of the claims of ID. Rather, the purpose is to examine 
some of the reasons critics give for denying the claims of ID theorists and to examine 
the reasons ID theorists give in rebuttal to critics to prepare to determine in the next 
section, from a deliberative perspective, whether intelligent design should be treated 
as a scientific theory by public schools.
Since the number of topics addressed by critics is quite large and are often 
quite technical in nature, and since cataloguing the scores of critical responses on all 
the issues raised by the claims of ID is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I have 
chosen to address a few of the more accessible ones. The topics that I address in this 
section are: irreducible complexity, discrete combinatorial objects, causal specificity, 
the complexity specification criterion, and science by definition. While many critical 
responses on the topics of probability theory,98 information theory99 and evolutionary
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98 See Rosenhouse, 2002; Shallit, 2002; and Wolpert, 2002.
algorithms,100 for example, are excluded, the general content and tenor of the critical 
responses on the excluded topics as well as the rebuttals of ID theorists, especially 
those of Dembski, can be gleaned from the topics I do address.
Irreducible complexity (IC).101
In “The Flagellum Unspun,” Brown University cell biologist Ken Miller 
critiques Behe’s claim that the bacterial flagellum exhibits the property called 
“irreducible complexity.” He begins by noting that all living cells are filled with 
complex structures whose detailed evolutionary history remains unknown to 
scientists. That does not mean, of course, that science will never understand the 
evolutionary origins of those structures. In fact, Miller claims, recent studies on the 
genes and proteins associated with the flagellum “have now established that the entire 
premise by which this molecular machine has been advanced as an argument against 
evolution is wrong -  the bacterial flagellum is not irreducibly complex” (Miller 
2003a, p. 5).
When Behe asserts that the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex, he 
means that a minimum number of proteins must come together all at once in “one fell 
swoop” to create the function of motility. The logic of irreducible complexity argues, 
according to Miller, that the approximately thirty individual protein components that
99 See Edis, 2001; Roche, 2001; and Forrest & Gross, 2004, p. 138-140.
100 See Schneider, 2001.
101 An irreducibly complex biotic system is, according to design theory, a case of specified complexity. 
In addition, specified complexity signals the presence of complex specified information (CSI). It 
follows that anything that is irreducibly complex exhibits specified complexity and contains CSI. It 
also follows that if specified complexity and CSI depend upon the existence of irreducibly complex 
systems and if irreducibly complex systems are demonstrated not to exist, then examples of specified 
complexity and CSI are also demonstrated not to exist. Hence, critical responses that address the 
notion of irreducible complexity also indirectly address the notions of specified complexity and CSI.
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contribute to bacterial motility have no function until they come together. Recent 
studies have demonstrated, however, that a specialized protein secretory system know 
as the type III secretory system (TTSS) has proteins that “are directly homologous to
109the proteins in the basal portion of the bacterial flagellum” (Ibid., p. 5). Because of 
these homologies, researchers have argued that the flagellum should be regarded as a 
type III secretory system.103 This research has shown, then, “that a smaller sebset of 
the full complement of proteins in the flagellum makes up the functional 
transmembrane portion of the TTSS...the TTSS is indeed fully-functional, even 
though it is missing most of the parts of the flagellum” (Ibid., p. 5-6). This 
conclusion is hardly surprising, states Miller, because evolutionary process are 
opportunistic -  they mix and match proteins to produce new and novel functions.
Arguments, then, from the irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum 
for the intelligent design of molecular machines fail to provide evidence that 
evolutionary processes are unable to produce biological complexity. Instead of 
evidence, Miller argues, ID theorists only offer a chain of reasoning far removed from 
experimental evidence. That chain of reasoning proceeds as follows:
1. Observation: The cell contains Biochemical Machines in which the loss of a 
single component may abolish function.
Definition: Such machines are therefore said to be “irreducibly complex.”
2. Assertion: Any irreducibly complex structure that is missing a part is by 
definition non-functional, leaving natural selection with nothing to select for.
102 Homology refers to “the similarity of biological features in different species or groups because of 
their descent from a common ancestor. Homologous features may include those found in 
development, structure, and morphology, although similarity on the genetic level probably provides a 
more reliable estimate of common descent” (Strickberger, 2000, p. 644).
103 Miller refers to the research of Heuck (Heuck, 1998), McNab (McNab, 1999), and Aizawa (Aizawa, 
2001, p. 163).
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3. Conclusion: Therefore, irreducible complex structures could not have been 
produced by natural selection.
4. Secondary Conclusion: Therefore, such structures must have been produced 
by another mechanism. Since the only credible alternate mechanism is 
intelligent design, the very existence of such structures must be evidence of 
intelligent design.
(Miller, 2003b, p. 11; emphasis in original)
Miller states that since the assertion of non-functionality in the second statement is
demonstrably false, “both the conclusions are falsified” (Ibid., p. 12). Consequently,
“the claim of ‘irreducible complexity’ is scientifically meaningless” (Ibid., p. 13).
In short, Miller concludes, the scientific community rejects intelligent design
arguments because not only the scientific claims but the reasoning “of the intelligent
design movement are contradicted time and time again by the scientific evidence”
(Miller, 20031, p. 12).
In reply to Miller’s argument Behe notes that through “tendentious reasoning”
Miller is creating his own definition of irreducible complexity to “wage a PR battle.”
The evident purpose of Miller and others is to make the concept of IC so brittle 
that it easily crumbles. However, they are building a straw man. I never wrote 
that individual parts of an IC system couldn’t be used for any other 
purpose.. .Quite the opposite, I clearly wrote in Darwin’s Black Box that even if 
the individual parts had their own functions, that still does not account for the 
irreducible complexity of the system... [I wrote] ‘The reason why a separate 
function for the individual parts does not solve the problem of IC is because IC 
is concerned with the function of the system.. .The system can have its own 
function, different from any of the parts. Any individual function of a part does 
not explain the separate function of the system.’” (Behe, 2004, p. 1-2)
Anyone looking at a drawing of a flagellum, Behe states, immediately sees its
design. “Since the flagellum is such an embarrassment to the Darwinian project,
Miller tries to distract attention from its manifest design by pointing out that parts of
the structure can have functions other than propulsion.” But, Behe argues, Miller
doesn’t show how natural selection can produce a flagellum.
.. .he doesn’t cite experiments showing that such a thing is possible; he doesn’t 
give a theoretical model. He just points to the greater-than-expected complexity 
of the flagellum (which Darwinists did not predict or expect) and declares that 
Darwinian processes could produce it. This is clearly not a fellow who wants to 
look into the topic too closely.” (Ibid., p. 3)
Since the function of a pump has nothing to do with the function of a rotary 
propulsion device, Behe argues, the existence of the pump proteins doesn’t address at 
all the question of how the rotary propulsion function could be developed by 
Darwinian means. Consequently, “The irreducible complexity of the flagellum 
remains unaltered and unexplained by any unintelligent process, despite Darwinian 
smoke-blowing and obscurantism.” According to Behe, the only way “Darwinists” 
can demonstrate that their theory can account for irreducible complexity is to do so 
“by relevant experiments and detailed model building -  not by wordplay and sleight- 
of-hand” (Ibid., p. 3-4).
In summary, the reasons Miller gives for rejecting the concept of irreducible 
complexity are: 1) just because science cannot currently explain the evolutionary 
origin of cellular systems does not mean they will not be explained through future 
research; 2) current studies in fact demonstrate that the bacterial flagellum is not 
irreducibly complex; 3) the reasoning of design theorists is contradicted by scientific 
evidence; and 4) the scientific community rejects the concept of irreducible 
complexity and the reasoning that leads to it because it is “contradicted time and time 
again by the scientific evidence.” The reasons Behe gives for rejecting Miller’s 
criticisms are: 1) Miller is creating a definition of IC that Behe in fact does not 
subscribe to for “PR” purposes; 2) Miller is distracting attention away from the 
design of the flagellum by pointing out the functionality of parts of a functioning 
system; 3) pointing out the functionality of parts of a system does not explain how the
153
154
functioning system was constructed; 4) Darwinists like Miller engage in “tendentious
reasoning,’’ “smoke-blowing,” “obscurantism,” “wordplay,” and “sleight-of-hand”
tactics; they do not offer “relevant experiments and detailed model building.”
Discrete combinatorial object.
Howard Van Till, emeritus professor of physics and astronomy at Calvin
College, regards Dembski’s characterization of the bacterial flagellum as a discrete
combinatorial object as “a totally unrealistic caricature of how the flagellum is
actualized and an approach that totally ignores the role of the bacterial genome in
coding for all of the structures and functions that contribute to the nature of E. coli”
(Van Till, 2002, p. 23).
...no biologist has ever taken the bacterial flagellum to be a discrete 
combinatorial object that self-assembled in the manner described by Dembski. 
Dembski has not defeated any actual biological proposition. He has slain 
nothing more than an imaginary dragon -  a fictitious adversary that Dembski 
himself has fabricated from a tall stack of rhetorical straw (Ibid., p. 18; italics in 
original)
Ken Miller agrees. No one in the scientific community has ever found 
evidence that the flagellum or any other complex biotic system has ever evolved or 
originated in the manner described by Dembski. “Dembski, therefore, has 
constructed a classic ‘straw man’ and blown it away...” (Miller, 2003a, p. 9).104
Dembski replies that regardless of Van Till’s and Miller’s objections, a 
bacterial flagellum is a discrete combinatorial object. The fact that no biologist has 
ever taken that view is “beside the point” because “that’s what it is.” “The bacterial
104 Mathematician David Rosenhouse has this to say about the probabilistic computations Dembski 
performs in No Free Lunch to demonstrate that a bacterial flagellum is a discrete combinatorial object: 
“The text soon becomes a dazzling congeries of binomial coefficients, perturbation probabilities, and 
sundry mathematical notation, all in the service of a computation that may as well have been written in 
Klingon for all the connection it has to reality. Modeling the formation of complex structures via a 
three-part process of atomization, convergence, and assembly is terribly unrealistic” (Rosenhouse, 
2002).
flagellum is indeed a discrete combinatorial object, and the self-assembly that I 
describe is the one we are left with and can compute on the basis of what we know” 
(Dembski, 2002d, p. 9). In his view, the only reason biologists refuse to give 
credence to his description is because they think that only an “indirect” Darwinian 
pathway could have produced a flagellum. But, as Behe has demonstrated through 
the discovery of irreducible complexity, indirect Darwinian pathways are not 
“causally specific” and therefore Darwinian explanations are “wishful thinking.” 
“Design theorists are closing off possible mechanistic routes for biological evolution. 
Van Till’s biologists, by contrast, handwave at mere conceptual possibilities” (Ibid., 
p. 9).
In summary, the reasons Van Till and Miller give for rejecting the claim that 
complex biological systems are discrete combinatorial objects are: 1) it is a caricature 
Dembski has fabricated from “rhetorical straw” and 2) it ignores the role of the 
genome in coding for all the structures and functions of a bacterial cell. The reasons 
Dembski gives for rejecting Van Till’s criticisms are 1) the opinions of biologists are 
beside the point; 2) the flagellum is a DCO and configures the way it does because 
“that is what it is;” 3) ID is “closing o ff’ evolutionary pathways; and 4) Darwinians 
“handwave” at mere conceptual possibilities.
Causal specificity.
Van Till notes that Dembski requires that evolutionary explanations for 
biological complexity must be “causally specific.” “Causal specificity,” in Dembski’s 
view, “means specifying a [natural] cause sufficient to account for the effect in 
question.. .Lack of causal specificity leaves one without the means to judge whether a
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transformation can or cannot be effected” (Van Till, 2002, p. 8). Full causal 
specificity is, according to Van Till, the goal of all scientific explanations, but it is 
very difficult to achieve not only in the historical sciences but others as well. If, in 
the absence of full causal specificity, we were to allow “the possibility of occasional 
form-conferring interventions by an unembodied intelligent agent” a serious problem 
occurs -  highly plausible explanations for certain structures and processes that are 
only partially understood would be removed from further consideration and replaced 
by an inference to design simply because they are not “causally specific.” That, in 
Van Tills view, is unacceptable because it would impede scientific research (Ibid., p. 
8).
University of Rochester biologist H. Allen Orr finds the requirement of causal 
specificity “more than a little annoying.” Since Behe’s assertion that the bacterial 
flagellum “turned out to be dead wrong,” the argument has now shifted to “historical 
concreteness.” Dembski calls his requirement “causal specificity”
[b]ut this is a category mistake of the first magnitude. His point has nothing to 
do with causation. It’s got to do with historical narrative. Which gene begat 
which protein in which order? Dembski’s bait and switch here is transparent 
and puerile...The causal specificity argument is also an exercise in nerve.. .It is 
the height of hypocrisy for Dembski to complain that Darwinism lacks causal 
specificity when his own theory lacks any specificity, including one atom of 
historical concreteness. Dembski may not have much of an argument, but 
you’ve got to admit he’s got chutzpah. (Orr, 2002, p. 7-8)
Dembski responds to Van Till’s concerns by asserting that the argument that 
evolutionary explanations are credible even though historical pathways can never be 
completely reconstructed is “an argument from ignorance.” Darwinian evolutionary 
pathways will always have an “absence of evidence.” “The only way to test whether 
material mechanisms are capable of driving biological evolution is by placing it in
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competition with something like intelligent design.” Unfortunately, according to 
Dembski, Van Till’s “naturalism” prevents him from considering ID (Dembski 
2002d).
In Dembski’s view, Orr proclaimed Behe “dead wrong” not because “Orr 
provided detailed, testable, causally specific instances of the Darwinian mechanism 
producing irreducible complexity, but because he can imagine a Darwinian scenario 
that gives rise to IC. Orr’s criterion for possibility is conceivability.” Orr’s 
substitution of the “weaker demand” of “historical narrative” for causal specificity 
means
Darwinism degenerates into fictive reconstructions with little, if any. hold on 
reality. The subtext of Orr’s review, though unintended, is that Darwinism is 
not a solution to the problem of biological complexity but an exercise in 
delusion by which evolutionary biologists convince themselves that they’ve 
solved the problem when in fact we [sic] haven’t. (Dembski, 2002b, p. 2)
Furthermore, according to Dembski, causal specificity is a problem for
Darwinism because it is a theory about process; it is not a problem for intelligent
design because ID “is not a theory about process but about creative innovation.” As a
process theory, Darwinism is committed to finding a series of steps that gradually
transforms one biological organism into another. As a theory about creative
innovation, intelligent design is concerned with creative acts.
Creative innovation can occur in a process, but even then it is a process where 
each step constitutes an individual creative act (a micro-innovation, as it were).
In our experience with intelligences, creative innovation is a unifying conceptual 
act that ties together disparate elements into a purposeful whole. The act can 
occur over time in a process or it can occur in one fell swoop. But in either case, 
creative innovation is not reducible to a causal chain where one step “causes” 
the next.. .intelligences are free. In the act of creation they violate expectations.
They create as they choose to create...And there’s no way to have predicted 
these creative innovations. Consequently, causal specificity applies secondarily,
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not primarily, to creative innovation and therefore to intelligent design.
(Dembski, 2002c, p. 15)105
The “bottom line,” according to Dembski, is that “Darwinism has a burden of proof 
that intelligent design does not have” (Ibid., p. 15).
Importantly, Dembski notes that although Darwinists aren’t convinced they 
need to provide all the causal details, “skeptical outsiders do, and those outsiders 
constitute the bulk of the American population (hence Kansas, Ohio, Cobb County, 
etc.)” Despite the century-and-a-half Darwinism has had “to prove itself’ and despite 
having “all the research moneys you could want,” Dembski argues, Darwinists cannot 
explain the origin of biological complexity. In his view, the intelligent design 
movement is new, with few researchers and no government funding, but “that will 
change. Interest is mounting. And George W. is after all my neighbor” (Ibid., p. 14, 
16).
In summary, the reasons Van Till and Orr give for rejecting the demand for 
“causal specificity” include: 1) the demand for causally specificity is inappropriate 
for the historical sciences; 2) scientific research would be impaired by removing 
highly plausible scientific explanations that are only partially understood from further 
consideration because they are not “causally specific;” 3) the call for causal 
specificity is a category mistake; it is not about causation, rather it calls for “historical
105 On the topic of the predictive power of ID, Dembski notes elsewhere
To require prediction fundamentally misconstrues design...Innovation, the emergence of true 
novelty, eschews predictability. Designers are inventors. We cannot predict what an inventor 
would do short of becoming that inventor. Intelligent design offers a radically different 
problematic for science than a mechanistic science wedded solely to undirected natural 
causes. Yes, intelligent design concedes predictability. But this represents no concession to 
Darwinism, for which the minimal predictive power that it has can readily be assimilated to a 
design-theoretic framework (Dembski, 200If, p. 8).
concreteness;” and 4) the demand is hypocritical; intelligent design is entirely lacking 
in causal or historical specificity.
The reasons Dembski gives for denying the criticisms of Van Till and Orr are: 
1) the absence of evidence (causal specificity) in evolutionary explanations renders 
Darwinism an argument from ignorance; 2) Darwinian historical narratives are fictive 
reconstructions and an exercises in delusion; 3) Darwinism and intelligent design 
have differing burdens of proof; 4) Darwinism is a theory of process and therefore 
must demonstrate causal specificity; 5) intelligent design is a theory of creative 
innovation which cannot be reduced to a causal chain or required to predict creative 
innovations; and 6) even if Darwinists don’t accept the burden of causal specificity, 
the American public does. Dembski also implies that the intelligent design 
movement might be able to gain the support of his neighbor, the President of the 
United States, George W. Bush.
The Complexity Specification Criterion (“The Explanatory Filter”)
In response to Dembski’s tripartite causal scheme of necessity, chance or 
design, critic Howard Van Till asks “Are there really only three possible modes of 
explanation for the set of all events? How can this be? The answer is: By definition” 
(Van Till, 1999, p. 668). This strategy is similar, Van Till argues, to declaring that all 
objects are colored yellow, purple or brown, where ‘brown’ is defined to be ‘neither 
yellow nor purple.’ Importantly, in Van Till’s view, Dembski could have used the 
word ‘muffnordled’ instead of the label ‘design.’ Why didn’t he use muffnordled? 
Van Till argues that Dembski chose design because he intends it to take on a specific 
operative meaning. Just as the word brown has a prior meaning, design also has prior
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meaning. Since Dembski states that “in practice, to infer design is typically to end up
with an intelligent agent,” Van Till argues that Dembski’s choice of design for the
“catchall remainder category was clearly not arbitrary for Dembski but was intended
to convey a judgment regarding the character of most events in that category,” i.e.,
they were designed by an intelligent agent (Ibid., p. 668-669). . .could it be that
this category label is intended to convey a more substantial meaning that could
further another agenda, such as that of the “Intelligent Design” movement?” (Ibid., p.
670). Given Dembski’s close association with members of the ID movement, the
legitimacy and adequacy of Dembski’s tripartite causal scheme is, in Van Till’s view,
questionable. Until Dembski and the ID movement in general “are willing to place
[their] theological and philosophical cards on the table so that [their] foundational
presuppositions may be opened to public scrutiny and evaluation,” and until they
“explain with candor exactly what they think it means to be ‘intelligently designed,”’
Dembski’s tripartite causal scheme, Van Till argues, is unconvincing (Ibid., p. 675).
In a review of Dembski’s No Free Lunch Van Till also finds Dembski’s
statement that a bacterium without a flagellum “does not exhibit an instance of
specified complexity” (Dembski, 2002a, p. 331) while a bacterium with a flagellum
does unbelievable.
Suppose.. .the flagellum comprises 2% of the whole [flagellum].. .If, as 
Dembski claims to have demonstrated, the flagellum is intelligently designed 
(even though the rest of the bacterium is not) then are we to conclude that the 
other 98%...could have come to be actualized without the aid of a designer?
Does it not seem odd that the flagellar 2% needed supplementary designer- 
action while the other 98% did not? (Van Till, 2002, p. 19-20)
Many critics have responded to Dembski’s characterization of natural 
selection as equivalent to the probability of baking a cake “entirely by chance” or
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“randomly” with deep concern. Barbara Forrest and Paul Gross, for example, note 
that “[Natural] selection is the very opposite o f chance”
Selection, a metaphor Darwin himself used to mean the environmental 
preservation of an individual genotype, is determined by environment, by 
environmental opportunities and constraints in each generation, and therefore by 
how, and how often, the environment changes, either by its own laws or because 
the population relocates.. .The selecting environmental pressures are in effect 
“regularities,” that is, temporary, local laws o f nature, which have a discernible, 
determinative effect on which phenotypes reproduce and pass their genes to 
their offspring.. .Regardless of which genotypes are preserved by their 
environment or why, the fact remains that immediately subsequent to the 
variations, the determinative factors of an organism’s environment begin to 
operate as nonrandom elements in the process of natural selection. (Forrest &
Gross, 2004, p. 129; italics in original)
Dembski, in their view, “knows better” than to promote the idea that natural selection 
requires biotic phenomena to assemble themselves “purely spontaneously, by 
‘chance,’ at random.” To actively encourage “the scientifically naive to confuse 
chance and randomness with [natural selection]” is, in the view of Forrest and Gross, 
“dishonest” (Ibid., 128 -130).
Dembski responds to criticisms of his tripartite causal scheme by stating that 
the choices of regularity (or necessity), chance and design “faithfully represents our 
ordinary human practice of sorting through events” (Dembski, 1998, p. 47).
Scientists who practice forensic science, cryptography and archeology, for example, 
usually approach problems in their fields by, first, determining if an object or event is 
the result of natural law or, second, the result of chance. If both of those causes can 
be ruled out, then these scientists infer design. Necessity, chance and design, 
Dembski asserts, are the only logically possible causes for any event or object; they 
represent a “mutually exclusive and exhaustive class” of possible causes (Dembski, 
2002d, p. 6). And, contrary to suggestion by Van Till that the choice of the word 
‘design’ was motivated by Dembski’s religious beliefs or the beliefs of other design
theorists, intelligent design has nothing to say about the characteristics or identity of 
the designer. “Intelligent design does not try to get into the mind of a designer or 
speculate about the characteristics of a designer...[While] one may be able to infer 
something about what a designer is like from the designed objects that a designer 
produces[,].. .the identity and characteristics of a designer lie outside the scope of 
intelligent design” (Dembski, 2004b, p. 7).
Furthermore, Dembski claims, Van Till “attributes an argument to me that I
never made.. .1 argue that the bacterial flagellum is designed because it exhibits
specified complexity. But such an argument says nothing about the design or absence
of it in the rest of the bacterium” (Dembski, 2002d, p. 10). Dembski admits that Van
Till’s question concerning the design of 2% of a bacteria with a flagellum while 98%
is not designed is odd, but “the oddness here is of Van Till’s own doing, attributing to
me a position that I don’t hold and for which I never argued” (Ibid., p. 10).
Finally, in reply to the charge that he has misrepresented the evolutionary
mechanism of natural selection by failing to account for the joint action of chance and
necessity, Dembski points out that that “is not correct.”
I approach chance and necessity as a probabilist for whom necessity is a species 
of chance in which probabilities collapse to zero and one. Chance as I 
characterize it thus includes necessity, chance (as it is ordinarily used), and their 
combination.. .Suffice it to say, there is no easy refutation o f the Explanatory 
Filter. (Dembski, 2002a, p. 15)
In summary, the reasons critics give for objecting to the complexity 
specification criterion (or explanatory filter) are: 1) the criterion is unconvincing 
because it is created “by definition;” 2) the criterion is suspect because of the prior 
meaning of design and Dembski’s association with the intelligent design movement; 
3) Dembski does not reveal “with candor” his foundational presuppositions for public
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scrutiny and evaluation; 4) his claim concerning the lack of design of a bacterium and 
the design of a flagellum is simply unbelievable; 5) Dembski dishonestly promotes a 
false understanding of natural selection by characterizing it as purely spontaneous 
‘chance’.
The reasons Dembski gives to rebut his critics include: 1) the criterion 
represents ordinary human reasoning about the causes of events; 2) the tripartite 
causal scheme is a mutually exclusive and exhaustive class of possible causes; 3) 
questions concerning the identity and characteristics of the designer are outside the 
scope of intelligent design; 4) Dembski never argued that a bacterium did not exhibit 
specified complexity; 5) necessity is a species of chance; chance includes necessity as 
well as necessity and chance working together.
Science b y  D efinition
Critics of intelligent design are uniformly critical of the practice by ID 
theorists of “science by definition.” Intelligent design proponents, according to 
critics, define scientific terms in idiosyncratic ways that are not accepted by the larger 
scientific community, and they assume in their definitions the very things they are 
claiming to set out to ‘prove.’ In addition, with each rebuttal to critical reviews, ID 
theorists, especially Dembski, attempt to create a logical moat around their claims by 
slightly modifying their definitions to meet the objections.
Howard Van Till, for example, notes that Dembski treats the term ‘biological 
function’ as a detachable pattern that is somehow independent of the organism being 
studied. “For Dembski, biological function is one of the qualities of a complex 
organism that only intelligent intervention could produce.” In biology, Van Till
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argues, biological function is understood completely differently. “For biology, on the 
other hand, biological function plays nearly the opposite role. It is the very capacity 
of an organism that gives it the ability to respond to its environment in the manner 
described by a fitness function, a phenomenon that lies at the heart of evolutionary 
dynamics” (Van Till, 2002, p. 24). Van Till notes that Dembski also employs the 
term ‘complexity’ differently than biologists. For Dembski, the ‘complexity’ is a 
property of the “means by which it became actualized” -  that is, he judges complexity 
on the basis of the probability of its coming to be actualized ‘by chance.’ For 
biologists, ‘complexity’ refers to a property or quality of a biotic system. Van Till 
argues that these are not the only terms Dembski and other ID theorists endow with 
unorthodox meanings. In fact, the rhetorical case for ID “relies on a web of words 
that have been assigned extraordinarily unusual meanings.” Dembski is therefore 
guilty, in Van Till’s view, of the practice of equivocation which Dembski himself 
defines as “the deliberate confusing of two senses of a term, using the sense that’s 
convenient to one’s agenda” (Ibid., p. 24-25).
Critic Ken Miller accuses Dembski of “a ’ reasoning. Dembski’s 
“method” is to “ assume what he is trying to prove. He “assume) s] the absence of an
evolutionary pathway leading to [an] object, followed by a calculation ‘proving’ the 
impossibility of spontaneous assembly” (Miller, 2003a, p. 9; italics in original). This 
“method,” Miller argues, is “scientifically insupportable.”
Robert Pennock agrees with Miller. When Dembski asserts 1) that complex 
biological systems cannot in principle originate from purposeless material processes, 
2) that intelligent agency is required to explain their origination and 3) that biological
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change has occurred only within strict limits, “he is not giving us the conclusions of
[ID] scientific research, if such could be found.. .he is starting with his conclusions
already in place” (Pennock, 2000, p. 17).
Barbara Forrest and Paul Gross note that the constant “tinkering” with and
“hedging” of definitions and arguments by Dembski and other ID theorists has
created what they call “the ID critic’s treadmill.” Once technical critiques by
respected scholars appear, ID proponents respond with rebuttals that release “torrents
of words on the peripherals of major critiques, or add new arguments to their old ones
without addressing fully the identified problems of the original. Then they refer to an
obscure, or even better, a still-forthcoming book or article by one of them in which
the full answer is supposedly already given or is about to appear.” Significantly,
however, they have not published yet “in the appropriate place: the scientific
journals” (Forrest & Gross, 2004, p. 115-116). This is largely because, Forrest and
Gross maintain, Dembski and other ID proponents have no empirical evidence for the
intelligent design of biological systems. They have only abstract “logical,
mathematical [and] statistical” definitions that are hedged and qualified with each
new article or book they publish (Ibid., p. 122).
Unsurprisingly, ID proponents respond their critics by leveling the very same
accusations. In a recent paper, William Dembski asserts that evolutionary theory
defines science “as the study of material processes that, by logical necessity,
disqualify design and that, again by logical necessity, ensure that some materialistic
account o f  evolution  m ust be true” (Dembski, 2004d, p. 21). Furthermore,
Our critics have, in effect, adopted a zero-concession policy toward intelligent 
design. According to this policy, absolutely nothing is to be conceded to 
intelligent design and its proponents. It is therefore futile to hope for
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concessions from critics.. .Substantive objections are bypassed. Irrelevancies 
are stressed. Tables are turned. Misrepresentations abound. One’s competence 
and expertise are belittled. The [ID theorist] comes back, reframes the 
argument, clarifies key points, attempts to answer objections, and encounters the 
same treatment. The problem is not with the argument but with the context of 
discourse in which the argument is made. The solution, therefore, is to change 
the context o f discourse. (Ibid., p. 9)
How are ID theorists supposed to change the context of discourse? By 
“controlling] the terms of engagement.” Remarkably, Dembski does not deny the 
objections of critics who accuse him of assigning unorthodox, unusual meanings to 
terms and using the sense that’s convenient for his agenda. In fact, he claims the best 
way to change the context of discourse is “by developing our own vocabulary and 
ideas that set the agenda for the debate over biological origins” (Ibid., p. 28). He 
points out that the terms irreducible complexity, specified complexity, design 
inference, explanatory filter, and empirical detectability of design have become 
concepts and phrases that “the other side now spends an enormous amount of time 
discussing...” (Ibid., p. 29). In their replies to critics, Dembski urges proponents of 
ID to express the meaning of these terms with “clarity and consistency” and to “stay 
on topic” and “always return to the main point at issue, which is that material 
mechanisms lack the creative capacity to bring about the complexity and diversity of 
living forms and that intelligent design is helping to elucidate this central issue in 
biology” (Ibid., p. 25).
Dembski argues that the last thing ID proponents ought to do is “get bogged 
down in a war of words with people who are sold out to the old [naturalistic] way of 
thinking” (Ibid., p. 7). In one of Thomas Schneider’s critical responses to ID theory, 
for example, Schneider “engaged in hair-splitting that could only look ridiculous to 
outsider [sic] observers...This hair-splitting made it into my book and made for
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amusing reading, though not at my expense” (Ibid., p. 13). Schneider and other
evolutionary scientists are not, in Dembski’s view, going to change their minds
because they are wedded to “a failing paradigm” and “suffer from.. .misconceptions,
blindspots, and prejudices.. .This, in turn, limits their usefulness as conversation
partners” (Ibid., p. 7). The questions of whether “design theorists have published
their ideas in the right places [and] whether the scientific community is accepting
intelligent design in sufficient numbers to render it credible” are, according to
Dembski, “peripheral issues” (Ibid., p. 22).
So, our job is not to try to justify to such critics why intelligent design has a 
right to exist, but rather to justify to the outsiders listening in on our debate why 
intelligent design has more going for it than the hardcore critics are willing to 
concede. The proper answer to the critics’ zero-concession policy is therefore a 
there-might-be-something-to-it-after-all policy. In other words, it is enough to 
indicate to nonpartisans listening to the debate that there’s more going on here 
than meets the eye. Often it suffices to plant in the minds of nonpartisans a 
reasonable doubt suggesting that the critic’s blanket dismissal of intelligent 
design is less than credible. (Ibid., p. 11, italics in original)
Who are the outside, nonpartisans listening in on the debate? They are the
“unwashed masses” (Ibid., p. 15) of “the undecided middle” of America who regard
“evolution [as] an implausible and controversy-riven theory of biological origins, one
that gives comfort to atheists and undermines religious faith” (Ibid., p. 29). In
Dembski’s view, the most effective approach to critical reviews is “to respond to
those that are troublesome to the undecided middle.. .In line with our there-might-be-
something-to-it-after-all policy, it’s usually enough to indicate that there’s more to the
story than the other side lets on” (Ibid., p. 25). In addition, it is important “to appeal
to the undecided middle’s sense of fairness and justice, especially its tendency to root
for the underdog and its predilection for freedom of expression” (Ibid., p. 26).
This sits especially well with young people, who thrive on rebelling against the 
status quo and don’t like it when an authoritarian elite tells them what they must 
think and believe. And these young people are the scientists o f tomorrow.
(Ibid., p. 35-36)
In summary, the reasons critics give for objecting to the practice of “science 
by definition” include: 1) it is a deliberate attempt to promote one’s agenda through 
definition alone; 2) ID definitions are scientifically insupportable; 3) the definitions 
do not represent conclusions of scientific research; rather they represent presupposed 
conclusions; 4) ID definitions have not been subjected to peer review in scientific 
journals; and 5) the definitions of ID theorists are merely abstractions lacking 
empirical support.
The reasons Dembski gives to rebut the objections of critics include; 1) 
evolutionary theory rules out design theory by definition; 2) since evolutionary 
scientists assume naturalism, design theorists have no other option but to develop 
their own vocabulary; 3) evolutionary scientists engage in hair-splitting and will not 
change their minds under any circumstances; 4) the issues of peer review and 
acceptance by the wider scientific community are peripheral issues; 5) the issues that 
concern the undecided middle of America are the issues ID theorists should address; 
6) appeals to fairness, justice and freedom of expression are most effective with the 
undecided middle of America; and 7) young people don’t like it when an 
authoritarian elite tell them what to think and believe.
This section outlined some of the critical responses of evolutionary theorists 
to the scientific claims of ID and some of the rebuttals of ID theorists to their critics. 
The scientific claims of intelligent design depend crucially on, among other things,
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the concepts of irreducible complexity, discrete combinatorial objects, causal 
specificity, and the complexity specification criterion. Critics who have examined 
these concepts and the claim that they support an “inference to design” by an 
unembodied intelligent designer who abiotically infuses information into physical 
systems have universally rejected them for the following general reasons:
• Studies that present scientific evidence for the existence of irreducible 
complexity in biological systems and for the claim that physical systems are 
discrete combinatorial objects have not been published in peer reviewed 
scientific journals.
• Current published studies in scientific journals demonstrate that the bacterial 
flagellum is not irreducibly complex and is therefore not a discrete 
combinatorial object as defined by ID theorists.
• Causal specificity is not a standard that is mutually agreed upon by the 
scientific community for evolutionary science. Accepting that standard would 
destroy the possibility for fruitful scientific research on issues that are only 
partially understood.
• Studies that present scientific evidence for the viability of the complexity 
specification criterion have not been published in peer reviewed scientific 
journals. The criterion promotes a definition of natural selection not accepted 
by the scientific community.
• The definitions of terms by intelligent design theorists are not recognized or 
accepted by the scientific community.
• The foundational assumptions and presuppositions of ID theory are not 
presented candidly for public evaluation.
Michael Behe, William Dembski and other proponents of intelligent design 
reject the objections offered by critics of ID for the following general reasons.
• Evolutionary theory rules out an inference to design by definition. Critics 
create their own definitions of ID terms that ID theorists do not subscribe to.
• Intelligent design has its own vocabulary because it does not assume or 
presuppose naturalism.
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• Peer review and acceptance by biologists who presuppose naturalism are 
irrelevant to ID.
• Evolutionary theory has a burden of proof that differs from ID. Design 
theory is not required to predict creative innovations.
• The American public expects causal specificity from evolutionary theory. 
The issues the American public is concerned with are the issues ID should 
address.
• Appeals to the democratic political principles of fairness, justice and 
freedom of expression as well as appeals to political figures are effective 
with the public, especially young people who don’t like to be told what to 
think by scientists.
• The identity and characteristics of the unembodied designer are outside the 
scope of intelligent design.
The reasons design theorists and their critics give for and against the scientific 
claims of intelligent design are important to public school policymakers because it is 
on the basis of these reasons that policymakers must make a decision about whether 
or not it is appropriate to include ID in science classes. In short, policymakers must 
determine whether intelligent design is a scientific theory for public school policy 
purposes based on the reasons ID theorists and evolutionary scientists give for and 
against the scientific claims of ID. In the next section I consider whether, from a 
deliberative perspective, ID ought to be included in public education science curricula 
as a scientific alternative to evolutionary theory.
A Deliberative Perspective on the Scientific Claims of Intelligent Design 
Public school policymakers make decisions about science education curricula 
that are collectively binding on all students. To the extent that it is, therefore, 
possible the decisions of policymakers should be justifiable to everyone bound by 
them. As I argued earlier, a deliberative democratic perspective which promotes
principled political decision-making on the basis of the principles of reciprocity, 
publicity, accountability, basic liberty and basic opportunity is more likely to result in 
policies which are justifiable to all citizens bound by those policies. The decision, 
then, about whether or not intelligent design ought to be considered a scientific theory 
for public school policy purposes is more likely to justifiable if the reasons for that 
decision are conditioned by the principles promoted by a deliberative perspective.
hi this section I consider whether intelligent design, from a deliberative 
perspective, should be treated as a scientific theory by public schools. The section is 
divided into two parts. First, I weigh the general reasons critics and proponents of ID 
have for objecting to or supporting the scientific claims of ID against the principles in 
deliberative democratic theory. And, second, I argue that those principles suggest 
that intelligent design theory should not be treated as a scientific theory in public 
schools. I also argue, however, that the religious status of design theory must be 
investigated to reach a more completely justified conclusion.
D elibera tin g  O ver the R eason s o f  C ritics  an d P roponen ts
The general reasons critics and proponents offer in objection to and support of 
the scientific claims of intelligent design arise from three related basic concerns.
First, each side is concerned with who establishes the methods and standards of 
scientific research. In the view of critics, the nature of science demands that fully 
qualified peers derive consensus on the methods and standards of science. In the 
view of proponents of ID, it is appropriate to take into consideration the opinions of 
the American public and to appeal to political figures when setting the methods and 
standards of science and to disregard the opinions of scientists who practice
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methodological naturalism. Second, each side is concerned with the assumption of 
methodological naturalism. In the view of critics of ID, methodological naturalism is 
a reasonable, mutually acceptable methodology that results from centuries of 
evidential and experimental support. In the view of ID proponents, methodological 
naturalism dogmatically and unfairly rules out design inferences and the evidence that 
supports those inferences. Third, and finally, each side is concerned with the 
legitimacy of scientific explanations that include supernatural causes.106 In the view 
of critics, appeals to a supernatural cause in design theory is inconsistent with 
disciplined scientific research and raises questions about the religious content of 
intelligent design theory. In the view of proponents of ID, it is perfectly reasonable to 
infer design by an unembodied intelligent designer. The fact that the identity and 
characteristics of the unembodied designer are, according to design theorists, outside 
the scope of intelligent design means that an inference to design is a fully scientific 
inference.
Do the reasons given by critics and proponents of ID that are associated with 
these concerns meet the demands of reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic 
liberty and basic opportunity? To answer this question I begin with the leading 
deliberative principle -  reciprocity -  and then consider the others. As noted earlier, 
the principle of reciprocity has two requirements. First, citizens are asked to engage 
in reasoning that is mutually justifiable -  that is, citizens are asked to give reasons to 
one another that are conditioned by mutually accepted fair terms of social 
cooperation. Second, it requires that when empirical claims are made, the claims
106 See footnote six in chapter four for design theorist William Dembski’s argument against using the 
term ‘supernatural’ when referring to intelligent causes and for my defense of the use of the term 
‘supernatural.’
should be made in terms that are consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry 
that are themselves mutually acceptable. Hence, assessing the empirical or scientific 
claims of intelligent design in terms of the demands of the process and content 
principles of deliberative theory is essential to determining if public school policies 
based on those claims can be justified to all citizens who are bound by those policies.
Establishing the methods and standards o f science. In the view of critics of 
ID, the nature of science demands that fully qualified peers derive consensus on the 
methods and standards of science. From a deliberative perspective, it appears that the 
practice by scientists of reaching consensus on scientific matters generally meets the 
demand of reciprocity. Reaching a consensus means that scientists offer reasons to 
one another in terms that others can accept to reach general agreement on questions of 
importance to science, including what counts as acceptable methods and standards of 
research. Importantly, however, the principle of reciprocity does not include 
language that excludes citizens who are not “fully qualified peers.” How do critics of 
ID justify excluding general public opinions from deliberations over the normative 
methods and standards of the discipline of science?
Critics of intelligent design argue that the practice of science is not a 
democratic process. Laurence Krauss notes, “All ideas are not treated equally. Only 
those that have satisfied the test of experiment or can be tested by experiment have 
any [scientific] currency” (Krauss, 2002b, p. 2). Ideas and practices based on 
personal opinions and desires, religious beliefs or other biases are not accepted as 
‘scientific’ simply because they do not result from publicly accessible, communally
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evaluated procedures and practices that are publicly defended in mutually recognized 
scientific venues.
In addition, critics argue, methods and standards suggested by the public have 
no evidential or experimental support just as the definitions of science and scientific 
terms proposed by ID theorists do not. Teaching students methods and standards of 
science determined entirely by public opinion and political leaders would mislead 
students about the nature and explanatory reach of science and would inhibit their 
ability as citizens to make informed choices about the merit of scientific claims that 
impact their private lives and social policy. Pursuing projects in science according to 
“majority vote” would reduce science, according to ED critic and philosopher of 
science Philip Kitcher, to a “vulgar democracy.”
Only a moment’s reflection is needed to see that the most likely consequence of 
holding inquiry to the standard of vulgar democracy [majority vote] would be a 
tyranny of the ignorant, a state in which projects with epistemic significance 
would often be dismissed, perceptions of short-term benefits would dominate, 
and resources would be likely to be channeled toward a few “hot topics.’”
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 117)
The basic opportunity of students to receive an adequate education in science would 
be impossible to achieve, according to critics, if all ideas were treated as equal in 
science.
Critics of the scientific claims of ID justify the exclusion of general public 
opinions from deliberations over the normative methods and standards of science 
based on reasons that are consistent with the basic opportunity principle. In addition, 
their reasons appear to meet the demands of publicity and accountability since the 
deliberations of the scientific community on scientific matters include all qualified 
peers who make communal decisions on practices and procedures in public venues.
From a deliberative perspective, then, the reasons critic give for objecting to the 
scientific claims of ID are generally consistent with the principles of reciprocity, 
publicity, accountability and basic opportunity.
According to the reasons the proponents of ID give for their scientific claims, 
it is appropriate to take into consideration the opinions of the American public and to 
appeal to political leaders when setting the methods and standards of science and to 
disregard the opinions of scientists who promote methodological naturalism. In their 
view, it is a matter of fairness, justice and freedom of thought to allow citizens and 
politicians to set standards for scientific inquiry in science education.
The values of fairness, justice and freedom of thought appear to reflect 
mutually accepted fair terms of social cooperation, but the exclusion of the majority 
of practicing scientists from deliberations over methods and standards that are 
appropriate for science and science education simply because they practice 
methodological naturalism reveals a troubling lack of regard for the principle of 
reciprocity. It is troubling not only because it signals an unwillingness to pursue the 
claims of ID on terms that are acceptable to practicing scientists, it also suggests that 
intelligent design proponents are disguising their true motivations beneath a veneer of 
patriotic appeals. When William Dembski indicates that “most people” find the 
theory of evolution an “implausible” theory that comforts “atheists and undermines 
religious faith” and indicates that those same people should on the grounds of 
fairness, justice and freedom of thought determine the methods and standards of 
science and science education, he is disguising a religious agenda beneath false 
appeals to moral principles. It suggests that the moral claims of ID proponents in
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Ohio, for example, are not genuine moral appeals, but carefully calculated rhetoric 
designed to play on the scientific ignorance and religious fears of Americans.
Appealing to the opinions of the majority of Americans and to political 
leaders when setting the methods and standards of science superficially appears to be 
consistent with the principles of publicity and accountability. Openly calling for 
public opinion in public meetings and holding scientists accountable to the opinions 
of the American public appear to meet these process principles. To the extent, 
however, that the arguments of fairness, justice and freedom of thought disguise a 
religious agenda, ID proponents are creating deceptive secrets and violating the 
principle of publicity. They are concealing the religious agenda of intelligent design 
while making others believe the conflict over ID is a conflict over fairness. 
Accountability requires policymakers to resist policies that violate basic liberty and 
basic opportunity even if the majority of their constituents find the claims of ID 
appealing. If intelligent design is a religious theory in the garb of science, public 
policies that permit ID to be taught in public schools violate the basic liberty of 
students by constraining their present and future religious beliefs. Public school 
policymakers would violate the principle of accountability if they promoted school 
policies which entailed sectarian religious belief.
Methodological Naturalism. In the view of critics of ID, methodological 
naturalism is a reasonable, mutually acceptable methodology that is tempered by 
centuries of evidential and experimental support. Assuming that natural causes are 
sufficient to explain natural phenomena is justified simply because that assumption is 
supported by past and present evidence. As a method of inquiry, methodological
naturalism assures scientists that hypotheses are accessible to the demands of 
empirical testing. Importantly, the assumption is always open to change if 
compelling evidence is offered in appropriate scientific venues and that evidence has 
been reviewed by the wider community of fully qualified peers who reach a 
consensus on the merits of the conclusion.
The worry that the wider scientific community willfully and dogmatically 
excludes certain views, including supernatural causal explanation, is unjustified, 
according to critics of the scientific claims of ID. Dogmatism results from the 
authoritarian imposition of a single point of view that is impervious to the claims of 
others. The communal and public practice of peer review, the provisional nature of 
scientific knowledge and the requirement that theories be revised if new evidence 
warrants revision protect science from intolerant ideological stances and assures an 
appropriate amount of genuine intellectual tolerance. This view is supported by many 
philosophers of science who note that the larger community of scientists is able to 
establish and maintain through inclusive methodology and practices an objectivity
107that minimizes ideological prejudice.
The reasons ID critics give for the assumption of methodological naturalism 
appear to meet the demands of reciprocity. Scientists offer evidence, based on 
mutually agreed on standards, for the adequacy of methodological naturalism. The 
principles of publicity and accountability also appear to be met through the public 
practice of peer review and the understanding that the conclusions of science are 
provisional. The principles of basic liberty and opportunity also do not appear to be 
violated by the practice of methodological naturalism.
107 For an example in the social sciences, see Longino, 1993 and Harding, 1993.
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ID proponents contend that methodological naturalism dogmatically and 
unfairly rules out design inferences and the evidence that supports those inferences.
In their view, scientists have adopted a “philosophy of naturalism” which, they assert, 
entails ontological naturalism thereby negating through definition the possibility of 
ever finding evidence for design by an intelligent designer. Since science promotes a 
philosophy of naturalism, the central objective of science education, ID proponents 
argue, is to instill a naturalistic way of thinking which tells children that the natural 
world is all that exists or ever will exist.
In response to what they view as an unfair ruling out of design inferences by 
the wider scientific community, ID proponents are developing their own “science of 
origins” founded on the theory of intelligent design which includes methods and 
standards that allow for supernatural causes in scientific explanations. They are 
attracting sympathetic scientists, philosophers, political activists and university 
students who are developing their own set of mutually agreed upon standards of 
evidence, definitions of terms, research agenda, journals, websites, books, 
conferences, etc. In addition, they have launched a political effort called the Wedge 
Strategy108 to gain public acceptance and support for intelligent design that includes 
efforts to persuade state and local school boards that ID is a genuine scientific 
alternative to the theory of evolution.
Do the reasons ID proponents give for rejecting methodological naturalism 
meet the demands of reciprocity? The assertion that methodological naturalism 
necessarily entails ontological naturalism, thereby ruling out design inferences by 
definition is not supported by evidence or argument. The fact that scientists leave
108 See Forrest & Gross, 2004.
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open the possibility for supernatural causal explanations in science if compelling 
evidence warrants such explanations contradicts the claims of dogmatism. And, the 
fact that many scientists embrace supernatural causes in their religious belief 
contradicts the claim that practicing a naturalistic methodology in science rules out 
supernatural causal explanations in other areas of one’s life. The unwillingness of ID 
proponents to offer reasons for objecting to methodological naturalism based on 
mutually agreed upon rules of evidence and argument accepted by the wider scientific 
community does not meet the demands of reciprocity. In addition, the decision of ID 
theorists to create their own “science of origins” apart from the wider community of 
scientists signals a complete rejection of the principle of reciprocity itself. While 
design proponents might argue that they offer reasons for the methods and standards 
of origins science that are accepted by others in their group, they are refusing to press 
their public claims in broader scientific venues and school board rooms in terms that 
are acceptable to the wider scientific community.
By refusing to offer reasons in public forums for their objections to the 
practice of methodological naturalism that are based on mutually agreed upon 
standards of evidence and logic that are accepted by the wider community of 
scientists, ID proponents not only violate the principle of reciprocity, they also violate 
the principle of accountability. Accountability requires citizens to take responsibility 
for the consequences of their actions and decisions on all citizens. If ID proponents 
fail to support their claims in terms that are accessible to the community of scientists, 
then ID proponents are failing to address the claims of those who would be
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significantly affected by the inclusion of ID in the discipline of science and in science 
classrooms.
Supernatural Causal Explanation. Critics of the scientific claims of ID argue 
that appeals to supernatural causes are inconsistent with disciplined scientific research 
and raise questions about the religious content of intelligent design theory. 
Unembodied supernatural agents are by definition outside of or beyond the natural 
world and are therefore not constrained by the natural world. Among the many 
reasons that ID critics have for questioning the legitimacy of supernatural causes in 
scientific explanations is the argument that science is a discipline that requires 
hypotheses to be tested through controlled experimentation that holds certain 
variables constant as others are manipulated.109 Since scientists have no control over 
supernatural entities or forces, critics of ID argue, they cannot be scientifically tested. 
In fact, according to ID critics, all empirical investigation would be suspect if 
supernatural causes could be appealed to when a difficult scientific question arose. 
While it is logically possible that a supernatural agent created biological complexity, 
the evidence of science so far, critics contend, overwhelmingly supports the theory of 
evolution.
Importantly, critics of ID are suspicious of the appeal of ID theorists to a 
supernatural cause for biological phenomena. Not only is the reduction of possible 
causes for biological complexity to necessity, chance and design suspect because of 
the associations of ‘design’ with Christian arguments from design for the existence of 
God, but also because orthodox evangelical Christians are ID’s most ardent 
supporters. The lack a candor identified by ID critic Van Till concerning the
109 See Pennock, 1999, p. 289-294.
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foundational presuppositions of ID proponents renders, in the eyes of critics, appeals 
to supernatural causes by ID proponents into appeals to sectarian religious belief.
The reasons critics give for questioning the legitimacy of supernatural causal 
explanations appear to meet the requirements of the principle of reciprocity. To the 
extent that mutually agreed upon methods and standards of science require 
manipulation of variables in scientific experiments, and to the extent that the results 
of research overwhelmingly supports evolutionary theory, questioning the legitimacy 
of appeals to supernatural causes is consistent with reciprocity. Suspicions about the 
religious status of intelligent design also meet the demands of reciprocity. If 
intelligent design is a sectarian religious theory, then questions about violations of 
other deliberative principles become paramount.
Proponents of intelligent design contend it is perfectly legitimate to infer 
design by an unembodied intelligent designer. They reason that since the identity and 
characteristics of the unembodied designer are outside the scope of intelligent design 
and since their evidence supports the inference, an inference to design is a fully 
scientific inference.
The reasons ID proponents give for appealing to the agency of an unembodied 
supernatural designer continue to violate the demands of reciprocity. As noted 
earlier, the methods and standards for origins science developed by ID proponents 
were not arrived by through a consensus of fully qualified peers in the wider scientific 
community. Consequently, any conclusions ID theorists reach concerning the agency 
of a supernatural unembodied intelligent designer in the origin of biological 
complexity are not justifiable to the wider scientific community. In addition,
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claiming that the identity and characteristics of the unembodied designer are outside 
the scope of intelligent design appears to violate the principle of accountability. 
Supernatural causes are most commonly associated with religious belief, and if it is 
the case, as Dembski has often stated, that “the implications of intelligent design for 
religious belief are profound,” then the question of who the unembodied designer is 
become paramount (Dembski, 2003b, p. 10). The principle of accountability requires 
public school policymakers to resist any policies that violate the basic liberty of 
students. Public school science classes that claim science is able to empirically detect 
a supernatural being which is commonly associated with sectarian faith would raise 
serious questions about the basic liberty of students to resist compulsory sectarian 
religious belief.
The Scientific Status o f ID for the Purposes o f Public School Policy
The reasons ID critics give for objecting to the scientific claims of ID appear 
to meet the demands of the process and content principles of a deliberative 
democracy. In contrast, the reasons ID proponents give in support of their scientific 
claims and in rebuttal to the criticisms of critics appear to be completely unjustifiable 
from a deliberative perspective. Consequently, it is an unavoidable conclusion that it 
would be inappropriate, from a deliberative perspective, to include intelligent design 
in public school science classrooms as a scientific alternative to evolutionary theory.
Importantly, state and local school board members usually lack expertise in 
the academic disciplines that constitute the substantive content of public education.
As political representatives of the communities in which they live, they share 
authority over the education of local children with parents who also usually lack
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expertise in most of the academic disciplines found in public education. Public 
school policymakers, therefore, rely on educational and academic experts to 
formulate content standards that meet the scholarly boundaries of the disciplines 
found in school curricula. When experts and those who are perceived as experts 
disagree, and when parents and the general public also disagree over the content of 
academic standards, I have argued that principled political decision-making based on 
the process and content principles found in deliberative democratic theory offers the 
best chance of formulating policies that are justifiable to all who are bound by those 
policies. I have also argued that a deliberative perspective can help identify those 
areas of disagreement which might be resolvable and help citizens live on terms that 
all can respect when fundamental disagreements persist.
Determining the scientific status of intelligent design theory from the 
perspective of a philosopher of science or a practicing scientist would be 
inappropriate for policymakers given their lack of expertise in philosophy or science. 
Policymakers are, without extensive education, unable to determine if intelligent 
design qualifies as “science” based on the standards of philosophy or practicing 
scientists. But, as political representatives who must make political decisions about 
the scientific status of intelligent design for public school policy purposes, a 
deliberative perspective offers an appropriate basis for decision-making. If the 
reasons policymakers give for excluding intelligent design from public school science 
classrooms as a scientific theory meet the requirements of reciprocity, publicity, 
accountability, basic liberty and basic opportunity, policymakers are justified in
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declaring that intelligent design is not a scientific theory for public school policy 
purposes.
The complete rejection of the principle of reciprocity by intelligent design 
proponents, the development of a conception of science that allows public opinion 
and politicians to determine the scholarly boundaries of scientific inquiry, the refusal 
of ID proponents to candidly discuss the fundamental presuppositions of ID theory 
and the suspicion that intelligent design proponents are disguising a religious agenda 
beneath false appeals to moral principles provide justifiable reasons for policymakers 
to exclude intelligent design as a scientific theory from public school classrooms. 
However, their reasons would be more fully justified if they continued to pursue the 
obligations of mutual respect discussed in chapter two.
The view of mutual respect that I promote requires policymakers to take 
seriously not only the scientific claims of intelligent design theorists, but also their 
religious claims. When ID proponents claim that determining the identity and 
characteristics of the unembodied supernatural intelligent agent is outside the scope 
of intelligent design, policymakers are obligated to investigate that claim despite the 
fact that ID proponents reject the principle of reciprocity. The purpose behind such 
an investigation is not only to determine if ID theory is a religious theory for public 
school policy purposes, it is also to find of areas of possible agreement among 
citizens. Finding areas of agreement would allow policymakers to accommodate 
some of the claims of ID advocates thereby reducing the range of citizen 
disagreement and contributing to the possibility of living together in some measure of 
mutual respect. The next chapter, chapter four, therefore investigates the claim by
intelligent design proponents that determining the characteristics and identity of the 
unembodied intelligent designer is beyond the scope of ID.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RELIGIOUS CONTENT OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN
Intelligent design (ID) theory asserts that the cause of the origin of complex 
biological systems is best explained by the agency of an intelligent, unembodied 
designer who abiotically infuses110 information into physical systems. Design 
theorists justify this assertion through two general claims. First, they claim to have a 
rigorous criterion, the “specified-complexity criterion” (also known as the 
“explanatory filter”) that empirically detects the presence of complex specified 
information in complex biological systems thus warranting an inference to design by 
an intelligent agent. Second, they claim to demonstrate mathematically that natural 
causes are in principle incapable of creating biological complexity. Since, according 
to design theorists, embodied intelligent agents are limited to natural causal processes 
and since intelligent design theory demonstrates that natural causal processes are 
incapable of creating biological complexity, the intelligent designer empirically 
identified through the specified-complexity criterion must therefore be unembodied 
and act through the non-physical causal process of abiotic infusion.111
Importantly, intelligent design theory purports to have nothing to say about 
the characteristics or identity of the unembodied intelligent designer. “Intelligent
ll0As noted in chapter one, footnote 4, abiotic infusion is the causal mechanism an intelligent designer 
employs to create complex biological phenomena. Since ‘abiotic’ means outside any physical, living 
organism and since ’infusion’ means “the direct introduction of novel information from outside the 
biological system,” abiotic infusion, for design theorists, refers to a process that does not “move 
[physical] particles” or “impart energy” to create complexity. Rather, it is “word-like” process that 
“persuasively” creates complex physical systems (William Dembski, 2002, p. 321-343).
111 See William Dembski, 2002a, p. xiv; chapters three and four; and p.320-343.
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design does not try to get into the mind of a designer or speculate about the 
characteristics of a designer.. .[While] one may be able to infer something about what 
a designer is like from the designed objects that a designer produces[,].. .the identity 
and characteristics of a designer lie outside the scope of intelligent design” (Dembski, 
2004b, p. 7). Design theorists confidently note that the unembodied intelligent 
designer detected through their “specified complexity criterion” and mathematical 
formulas is compatible with a variety of religious and philosophical traditions 
including Stoicism, Platonism, Neoplatonism, pantheism, Buddhism, Hinduism, New 
Age religions, Jungian beliefs, parapsychology, vitalism, deism, panentheism, 
agnosticism and the three widely practiced monotheistic traditions of Islam, Judaism 
and Christianity (Dembski, 2002a, p. 334; 2003a, p. 12-13). Design theorists, 
however, also confidently note that the designer identified by ID is not compatible 
with theistic evolution -  i.e., the view that theistic religious convictions about God are 
compatible with and can even be enriched by modem evolutionary ideas (Dembski & 
Richards, 2001, p. 228) In fact, William Dembski, arguably the most influential 
intelligent design theoretician, considers theistic evolution to be design theory’s 
“most implacable foe” (Dembski, 2002d, p. 1).
Given the statement by design theorists that the characteristics and identity of 
the intelligent designer responsible for biological complexity cannot be determined by 
intelligent design theory, the question arises: Why is intelligent design theory 
compatible with some religious perspectives and not others? Why is intelligent 
design, for example, compatible with parapsychology and not Jewish, Islamic,
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Catholic and Protestant religious convictions that view God and evolutionary science 
in harmonious relationship?
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the religious content of intelligent 
design theory and to analyze, from a deliberative political perspective, the
consequences the religious content of ID has for public school policy. The “religious
112content” of intelligent design theory refers to religious ideas, including sectarian 
religious ideas, which constitute the essential meaning of the theory. I argue that the 
reason why intelligent design is compatible with some religious perspectives and 
rules out others is because sectarian religious ideas constitute the essential meaning of 
the theory -  that is, intelligent design is not only a religious idea, it is a sectarian 
religious idea that logically excludes other religious convictions.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In section one I argue that the 
concept of an unembodied intelligent designer who abiotically infuses information 
into physical systems to create and guide living organisms is a religious idea so 
central to traditional religious belief that this concept alone establishes ID as a 
religious theory. In section two I argue that the idea in intelligent design theory that 
natural causes cannot in principle be the cause of the origin of complex biological 
systems and the idea that the agency of an unembodied designer is empirically 
detectable are sectarian religious ideas associated with certain sectarian religious 
groups. I also argue that the texts of design theorists clearly identify the designing 
agent found through the specified-complexity criterion thereby confirming that ID is 
a sectarian religious theory. In the final section I examine the consequences the
112 As noted in footnote 48 in chapter two, the word ‘sectarian’ in this dissertation refers to religious 
groups who share religious views which logically exclude competing religious understandings.
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religious content of ID has for the process and content of democratic public school 
policy deliberations.
Before proceeding, it is important to note two essential assumptions I make in 
this chapter. First, this chapter ignores the logical and empirical problems 
surrounding the “specified-complexity criterion” and the problematic mathematical 
formulations that ostensibly demonstrate the inability of natural causes to create 
biological complexity that were discussed in chapter three. In fact, for the purposes 
of this chapter, the claims of intelligent design are granted -  that is, for the purposes 
of this chapter, it is assumed that design theory can reliably empirically detect the 
intelligent design of complex biological organisms and that the mathematical 
formulations of design theory clearly demonstrate that natural causes are in principle 
incapable of creating biological complexity. Since design theorists readily engage in 
theological arguments once they feel they have demonstrated the validity of their 
claims, granting the claims of ID theory allows the religious content of intelligent 
design theory to clearly emerge.
Second, as noted above, the “religious content” of intelligent design theory 
refers to religious ideas which constitute the essential meaning of the theory. Legal 
scholars argue that it is the religious content, not the religious implications, of 
intelligent design that are relevant to whether it should be considered a religion for 
First Amendment purposes. Jay D. Wexler, for example, points out “ .. .all types of 
government action and messages have [implications for religious belief], such as the 
message that war is justified, that the free market is appropriate, or even that all men 
and women are created equal” (Wexler, 2003, p. 819). David K. Dewolf, et. al., state
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“The content of a scientific theory, and not its implications, determines its legal status 
in public school science classrooms...incidental harmonies with religious practices 
and beliefs do not disqualify secular concepts under the First Amendment” (Dewolf, 
1999, p, 16). If ‘implications’ refer merely to incidental effects or “incidental 
harmonies” that intelligent design might have with some religious beliefs, then it is 
clear that defining something as religious theory simply because of those incidental 
effects on religion would be inappropriate. If, however, ‘implications’ refer to a 
stronger, logical relationship where the relationship between scientific theory and 
religious belief is logical necessity, e.g. if the implications of intelligent design means 
that certain religious beliefs are ruled out through logical necessity, then the 
implications of intelligent design are fundamental to determining its sectarian 
religious content. In this chapter, I argue that the sectarian religious content of 
intelligent design includes the logically necessary religious implications of ID. In 
other words, I argue that the religious implications of ID that are logically necessary 
are among the sectarian religious ideas that constitute the essential meaning or
11Tcontent of intelligent design theory.
Religious Content
Once design theorists are granted the claim that the specified complexity 
criterion empirically detects the actions of an intelligent unembodied designer who
113It is worth noting that ID proponent and legal theorist Francis Beckwith argued in a 1991 book The 
Mormon Concept of God that, based on the “logical implications of the argument from design,” the 
“God of Mormon finite theism.. .is fundamentally irrational.” He and co-author Stephen Parrish claim 
“that if the argument from design is valid, then it[s logical implications] will lead us eventually to the 
God of classical theism” (Beckwith & Parrish, 1991, p. 81,103). Beckwith and Parrish’s book 
underscore the relevance and importance of logical necessity in theological reasoning, no less than in 
scientific, philosophical or legal reasoning. Dembski defines logical necessity as “the logic of 
entailment. Once A is given, anything logically entailed by A must be accepted as well” (Dembski, 
1999, p. 201).
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abiotically creates and guides life, it is difficult to reconcile design theory with the 
statement that “the.. .characteristics of a designer lie outside the scope of intelligent 
design.” After all, the designer is deemed to be an “intelligent,” “unembodied,” 
“designer/creator” who creates and guides114 all life through supernatural (“abiotic”) 
means.115 In fact, the designer described by design theory not only exhibits specific 
characteristics, those characteristics are regarded by most persons -  philosophers, 
theologians, scientists, lawyers, judges and design theorists alike -  to comprise the 
core idea of religious belief in theistic religious traditions. The core religious idea 
common to traditional theistic religious beliefs is that an unembodied intelligent 
designer created and guides life through supernatural means.
Boston Law School professor Jay D. Wexler, for example, argues in “Darwin, 
Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public 
Schools” that “the idea that a designer created the universe in an intelligent fashion is 
such a central aspect of traditional [theistic] religions that it itself should be 
considered an inherently religious idea...” Wexler notes that a simple exercise
114As Michael Behe notes, “[The] theory of intelligent design.. .holds implicitly that there is a designer 
capable of planning and executing the phenomenal intricacies of life on earth” (Behe, 2001, p. 100).
ID proponents propose intelligently “guided” abiotic infusion as the only causal mechanism capable of 
creating biological complexity. “Blind,” “unguided” natural processes are, according to ID, incapable 
of producing complex biological systems.
I15Dembski argues that people should “forget about the term supernatural.” Equating ‘unembodied’ 
and ‘abiotic infusion” with ‘supernatural’ is, he argues, “the wrong contrast. The proper contrast is 
between undirected natural causes on the one had and intelligent causes on the other. Intelligent 
causes can work with natural causes and help them to accomplish things that undirected natural causes 
cannot.. .Whether an intelligent cause operates within or outside nature is a separate question from 
whether an intelligent cause has acted within nature” (Dembski, 2004c, p. 189; see also Dembski, 
2001b, p. 223; italics in original). However, Dembski also states “An unembodied intelligence retains 
no physical entity through which the intelligence is expressed.. .Thus by an unembodied intelligence or 
designer I mean an intelligence whose mode of operation cannot be confined to a physical entity 
located within spacetime” (Dembski, 2002a, p. 333-334). By any reasonable construal, non-physical 
entities outside of space time that employ non-physical means outside of spacetime to create physical 
systems are supernatural (“superphysical”) entities that employ supernatural (“superphysical”) means 
of creation. In this chapter, therefore, unembodied intelligent designers are considered to be 
supernatural entities and abiotic infusion is considered to be a supernatural means of creation.
demonstrates the centrality of the belief in an intelligent designer to traditional 
theistic religious beliefs. First, ask whether a person who does not believe a 
supernatural intelligent designer created the universe and mankind would be 
considered, by a reasonable person, to be a believing Jew, Muslim, or Christian even 
though he attended religious services. Next, consider a Christian who said she 
believed that an intelligent supernatural designer created the universe, but she also did 
not believe in going to church. Which person would most reasonable people consider 
to be a true believer? “It is hard to imagine that most reasonable people would say 
that [the first] person was a true believer” in one of the major theistic religious 
traditions,” but “most reasonable people.. .would probably be willing to call the latter 
person a true believer.” That is because, argues Wexler, “the idea that the universe 
was created by a designer is the central animating idea of the major theistic Western 
religious traditions” (Wexler, 2003 p. 817).
Wexler points out that not only religious history and common sense support 
the view that belief in a supernatural creator of life is the essence of religious belief, 
language from United States Supreme Court decisions also support that view. 
Throughout the Court’s history, Wexler argues, Supreme Court decisions have 
referred to belief in a “Creator” or “Supreme Being” who created humanity as 
constituting the essence of religious belief.116 As recently as Edwards v. Aguillard, a 
decision that found Louisiana’s 1982 “Creationism Act” unconstitutional, the Court 
stated that “the preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was clearly to 
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind. ” The
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ll6Wexler cites Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,342 (1890) and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 
(1952).
court later stated unequivocally that creation science “embodies the religious belief 
that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation o f humankind' (Ibid, p. 
818; italics in original).
A sampling of philosophers, theologians and scientists who have written 
recently about intelligent design agree that the substantive content of traditional 
Western religious belief consists of the idea that an intelligent supernatural designer 
created and guides the universe. Philosopher Alvin Plantinga, for example, states 
“[A] Christian (naturally) believes that there is such a person as God, and believes 
that God has created and sustains the world” (Pennock, 2001, p. 206). Theologian 
John Haught notes in God After Darwin “The notion that God creates the world is, of 
course, central to the faith of millions” (Haught, 2000, p. 37). Cell biologist and 
practicing Catholic Ken Miller writes “ ...the three great Western religion share a core 
of belief.. .first.. .Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all believe in a genuine, personal 
God who created the universe.. .Second, we exist as the direct result of God’s 
will...Third, God has revealed himself to us” (Miller, 1999, p. 222; see also p. 249). 
Howard van Till, professor emeritus of physics and astronomy at Calvin College, 
notes that “historic Christian theology sees the existence of the universe to be 
radically dependent on God’s creative action at all times.. .In the context of a theistic 
worldview, the evidence of divine creative action is both obvious and undeniable...” 
(Pennock, 2001, p. 491)
In addition to the informed opinions of participants in the debates surrounding 
ID, the texts of intelligent design theorists themselves support the view that belief in 
an intelligent designer who supematurally creates and guides life is the essence of
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traditional Western religious belief. William Dembski notes that “Historically in the 
West, design has principally been connected with Judeo-Christian theism. The God of 
Judaism and Christianity is said to introduce design into the world by intervening in 
its causal structure” (Pennock, 2001, p. 642). “Theism (whether Christian Jewish, or 
Muslim),” Dembski states, “holds that God by wisdom created the world. The origin 
of the world and its subsequent ordering thus results from the designing activity of an 
intelligent agent -  God” (Dembski, 2003a, p. 9). “Christians,” in particular, points 
out Dembski, “accept that God by wisdom created the world and that therefore God is 
a designer and the world is designed” (Dembski, 1999, p. 17). In Dembski’s latest 
work, he states again “.. .the God of Christianity is a designer. To be sure, 
Christianity’s God is not merely a designer. But he is at least a designer” (Dembski, 
2004c, p. 176). Nancy Pearcey, a Center for Science and Culture Senior Fellow and 
design proponent, agrees. Pearcey states that in the Christian tradition “Design, 
especially as it relates to God creating the world, lies at the heart of all that Christians 
believe” (Pearcy, 2001, p. 50). Phillip Johnson, a legal scholar and a founder of the 
intelligent design movement, adds that not only Christians, but also “observant Jews” 
agree on “the most fundamental issue -  the reality of God as our true Creator” 
(Johnson, 1997, p. 92). “In the broadest sense,” Johnson notes, Christians and Jews 
are “creationists” who “believe that the world (and especially mankind) was designed, 
and exists for a purose” (Johnson 1993, p. 115, italics in original). Importantly, he 
says, “ .. .the vast majority of Americans are theists, which means they believe.. .that 
we were created by God, a supernatural being who cares about what we do and has a 
purpose for our lives...” (Johnson, 1995, p. 7). Finally, ID proponent Francis
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Beckwith, an associate professor of Church-State Studies at Baylor University, states 
“Classical theism.. .is the theism that is believed by most churches and religious 
bodies in the West.. .[including] Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.. .The God of 
traditional theism can be described as personal and disembodied [and] the creator and 
sustainer of all contingent existence...” (Beckwith, 1991, p. 7).
In spite of their claim to the contrary, ID theory does describe the basic 
characteristics of the designer identified through the specified-complexity criterion of 
ID, and close inspection of those characteristics clearly reveals the religious content 
of intelligent design theory. As noted above, the “religious content” of intelligent 
design theory refers to religious ideas that constitute the essential meaning of the 
theory. In the case of traditional Western religions, the essential content of traditional 
religion consists of the idea that an intelligent, supernatural designer created and 
guides life -  that is, the meaning of the idea that an intelligent supernatural designer 
created and guides life is religious.117 Since the content of the animating idea of 
intelligent design theory is identical to the content of the central animating idea of 
traditional religions, ID is undeniably a traditional religious idea. The “religious 
content” of intelligent design theory consists of its assertion of the religious idea that 
an intelligent supernatural designer created and guides life -  that is, the meaning of 
the idea of intelligent design is religious. Intelligent design is, therefore, a religious 
theory.
117 According to Webster’s New World Dictionary, the word “content” refers to the “essential 
meaning” or “substance” of something. The substantive content of an idea or a discrete system of 
ideas, then, constitutes the meaning of that idea or system of ideas. Since the substantive content of 
Western religious traditions consists of the idea that an intelligent, supernatural designer created life, 
that idea is a religious idea. Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd college 
ed., s.v. “Content.”
Sectarian Religious Content 
Just as granting the claim of ID theorists that an intelligent, supernatural 
designer creates biological complexity clarifies the religious content of intelligent 
design theory, granting the claims that natural causes are in principle incapable of 
creating biological complexity and that the agency of the supernatural designer is 
empirically detectable clarifies the sectarian religious content of ID. “Sectarian 
religious content” refers to religious ideas in design theory that logically exclude 
competing religious understandings. As noted earlier, logically necessary religious 
ideas implied by intelligent design that exclude other religious understandings are 
included in the sectarian religious content of intelligent design theory.
This section is divided into three parts. First, I present the reasons design 
theorists give in their texts for ruling out religious views that allow natural causes to 
create biological complexity. I argue that the reasons they give are religious reasons 
that necessarily exclude competing religious convictions, and they demonstrate that 
the idea in ID theory that natural causes cannot in principle create complex organisms 
is a sectarian religious idea. Second, I examine the religious concept of theistic 
realism that design theorists consider to be the defining concept in intelligent design 
theory. I argue that the idea in intelligent design that the agency of the supernatural 
designer is empirically detectable is a sectarian idea resulting from the religious 
literalism inherent in theistic realism. Finally, I argue that the texts of design 
theorists clearly identify the designing agent found through the specified-complexity 
criterion. The intelligent designer is the Christian God described in the Gospel of
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John as understood by orthodox evangelical118 Christians who read the Bible literally.
I conclude that the sectarian content of intelligent design clearly indicates that 
intelligent design theory is a sectarian religious theory.
Natural Causes Are In Principle Incapable o f Creating Biological Complexity
Modem evolutionary research and theory rely on scientific methodologies that 
assume natural causes can explain the origin of complex biological systems. Many 
practicing evolutionary scientists and theorists are religious believers who find no 
contradiction between their work and their religious beliefs. Those evolutionary 
scientists and theorists who are theists, i.e., they believe in a God or gods, are called 
by intelligent design theorists “theistic evolutionists.” Theistic evolution refers to the 
view that theistic religious convictions are compatible with and can even be enriched 
by modem evolutionary ideas.
Evolutionary biologists who are devout theists and theologians who embrace 
the science of evolution argue that design theorists refuse to distinguish between the 
methodology of modem science which necessarily confines itself to natural causes 
and metaphysical inquiry which allows for the possibility of supernatural causes. 
According to Christian theologian John Haught, evolutionary science’s 
“methodologically godless way of reading nature is uncontroversial and justifiable... 
Natural science, for the sake of its own integrity, has to leave out all appeals to divine 
explanation.. .Science is a method, not a metaphysics” (Haught, 2003, p. 17,112).119
1I8As noted in footnote 1 in chapter three, ‘orthodox’ interpretations of Christian doctrine conform to 
the early creeds and confessions of the Christian faith. ‘Evangelical’ interpretations focus on the New 
Testament, especially the Gospels, and emphasize the salvation of humankind by faith in the 
atonement of Jesus.
119 Haught labels the conflation of metaphysical inquiry with scientific inquiry a “hybrid reading” of 
the natural world. Haught notes that “hybrid reading” is not unique to intelligent design; scientists are
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Consequently Haught and other theists consider themselves able, in good conscience, 
not only to regard evolutionary explanations for biological complexity as 
fundamentally correct, they are also able to mine evolutionary biology and cosmology 
for religious insight into “ultimate” metaphysical questions concerned with the nature 
of God, the meaning of human existence, the nature of evil and the foundations of 
moral behavior.
Not surprisingly, intelligent design theorists regard theistic evolutionary ideas 
such as Haught’s with deep concern. Theistic evolutionary ideas held by many, if not 
most, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant believers challenge the fundamental claim of 
design theory that natural causes are in principle incapable of creating biological 
complexity. They challenge William Dembski’s assertion that “Logically, 
naturalistic evolution and intelligent design are...mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
possibilities, one of these positions has to be correct” (Dembski, 2001b, p. 236). 
Ignoring the claims of evolutionary theorists that intelligent design theory does not 
distinguish between uncontroversial naturalistic methodologies and metaphysical 
inquiry, design theorists assert that methodological naturalism is an epistemological 
commitment that logically entails ontological materialism (Beckwith, 2003. p. 56; 
also p. 8, 21, 151 & 157).121 Ontological materialism (also called naturalism or
also prone to conflating scientific inquiry with metaphysical inquiry (Haught, 2003, p. 19-22). An 
example of hybrid readings are Phillip Johnson’s contention that “...Christianity is True (the initial 
capital letter signifying a universal [metaphysical] truth on the level of a scientific fact)...” (Phillip 
Johnson, 2002, p. 78) and Daniel Dennett’s statement that “Darwin’s idea has banished the Book of 
Genesis to the limbo of quaint mythology” (Haught, 2003, p. 19).
120 Theologian Edward T. Oakes labels this forced choice “the fallacy of the false dilemma.” See 
Oakes, 2001b, p. 17-18, for his critique of this fallacious dilemma in Phillip Johnson’s book The 
Wedge of Truth.
materialism) is “the view that the natural universe is all that exists and all the entities 
in it can be accounted for by strictly material processes without resorting to any 
designer, Creator, or non-material entity.. (Ibid, 2003, p. 151). Since the religious 
view of evolutionary theists includes belief in the existence of a God or gods who 
interact causally with the natural world in ways that are harmonious with natural 
causes creating biological complexity, the mere existence of widespread theistic 
evolutionary religious convictions poses a particularly sticky problem for ID 
theorists.
In fact, once the fundamental claim that natural causes are incapable of
creating biological complexity is granted, design theorists do not hesitate to offer
reasons why theistic evolutionary religious convictions are necessarily incompatible
with intelligent design. As noted earlier, Dembski considers theistic evolution to be
design theory’s “most implacable foe,” and incompatible with intelligent design.
“Intelligent design is incompatible with what typically is meant by theistic
evolution.. .When boiled down to its scientific content, theistic evolution is no
different from atheistic evolution, treating only undirected natural processes in the
origin and development of life” (Dembski, 2001b, p. 228). Since science is
considered “the only universally valid form of knowledge” in our culture, he argues,
I21Beckwith does not offer an argument supporting his contention that the methodological naturalism 
logically entails ontological materialism other than listing evolutionary theorists who conflate 
scientific inquiry with metaphysical inquiry -  e.g., Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and George 
Gaylord Simpson. Theologian John Haught regards assertions such as Beckwith’s as statements of 
faith. . .evolutionary biology neither requires a materialist metaphysics nor provides ultimate 
explanations. The claim that evolution entails materialism is a statement of faith...” (Haught, 2003, p. 
92). Edward Oakes points out that “In almost every regard except their theistic 
conclusions.. .advocates of Intelligent Design share the metaphysical presuppositions of their 
opponents...” (Oakes, 2001b, p. 18). Hence, if the claim that evolution entails materialism is a 
statement of faith, it is a faith shared by scientists who conflate science with religious inquiry.
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the methodological naturalism of evolutionary theism “become[s] functionally 
equivalent” with metaphysical naturalism and “religion...is seen as making no 
universal [knowledge] claims that are obligatory across the board... [Naturalistic 
evolution.. .remains[s] the only intellectually respectable option for the explanation of 
life” (Ibid, p. 236-237). In Dembski’s view, then, theistic evolutionary religious 
convictions are necessarily ruled out by intelligent design because: 1) theistic 
evolution allows “undirected” natural causes to explain the origin of life; 2) theistic 
evolution is indistinguishable from atheistic evolution; 3) theistic evolution privileges 
naturalistic explanations for the origin of life and does not recognize religion as 
making knowledge claims that are universally obligatory.
Francis Beckwith argues that just because theistic evolutionists profess belief 
in the compatibility of evolution and religion does not mean that they are indeed 
compatible. People’s subjective perception of their beliefs in evolutionary science 
and religion as compatible with one another is, Beckwith contends, at odds with the 
content of those beliefs. In fact, Beckwith claims, since the methodological 
naturalism of evolutionary science logically entails ontological materialism, the God 
or gods inherent in the religious views of evolutionary theists is only a logical 
possibility, not a God that actually exists. According to Beckwith, “belief in the 
existence of God is not logically inconsistent with materialism, but the existence of 
God.. .is inconsistent with materialism.. .to say [then] that belief in God’s existence is 
not inconsistent with naturalistic evolution is to imply that God is not really an object 
of knowledge” (Beckwith, 2003, p. 151-152; italics in original). In other words, only 
materialistic evolution counts as knowledge in evolutionary theism; non-materialist
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claims are merely beliefs, not knowledge. Since, in Beckwith’s view, the non­
material (unembodied) intelligent designer identified in ID theory exists as an object 
of knowledge, it follows that evolutionary theism is incompatible with intelligent 
design. Evolutionary theistic religious convictions, then, are necessarily incompatible 
with ID, according to Beckwith, because 1) evolutionary theistic religious beliefs are 
inconsistent with the existence of God; 2) God is not an object of knowledge in 
evolutionary theism; and 3) evolutionary theists do not regard the non-material 
intelligent designer identified by ID as an object of knowledge.
Phillip Johnson notes “Theistic evolutionists generally accept the entire 
Darwinian scientific picture, but say that God was invisible and undetectably behind 
it. For them God’s participation is known only by faith and not by anything 
detectable by scientific investigation” (Johnson, 2000, p. 65). He regards theistic 
evolutionary views simply as “bogus intellectual systems” that read the Bible 
“figuratively rather than literally” (Johnson, 1997, p. 111). “Theistic evolution” is a 
“disastrous accommodation” to “Darwinism” that provides “a veneer of biblical and 
Christian interpretation...to camouflage a fundamentally naturalistic creation story” 
(Johnson, 2002, p. 137). “Once.. .scientists have discovered something about how the 
world works,” he argues, theistic evolutionists “baptize it and invent some theological 
principle to cover it.. .Hence, one finds [theistic evolutionists] embracing [naturalism] 
not with reluctance but with enthusiasm on the theory that it describes a humble God 
who left nature to do its own creating” (Ibid, p. 67-68; see also p. 65). He regards 
educated Christians who “accept docilely” the naturalism of science as having a 
“cowardly faith” (Ibid, 97). The reasons Johnson gives, then, for the necessity of the
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incompatibility of ID with theistic evolution include: 1) evolutionary theists do not 
read the Bible literally; and 2) evolutionary theists accept a naturalistic creation 
story.122
Jay Wesley Richards, Vice President of the Discovery Institute, argues that 
theologians who offer theological justifications for methodological naturalism “seek 
to avoid conflict.. .fear being ridiculed or simply.. .succumb to the groupthink to 
which all humans are susceptible.. (Richards, 2001, p. 103). He contends that 
naturalism in all its forms “contradicts essential Christian beliefs.. .Christian belief is 
a type of ‘supematuralism,’ which connotes at least that nature is not the fundamental 
reality” (Ibid, p. 95, 98; italics in original). Further, . .if some Christian biblical 
scholar affirms the reality of Christ’s resurrection, he or she will deny the truth of any 
historical reconstruction that does not accommodate it...” (Ibid, p. 103). Richards, 
then, rejects theistic evolutionary religious convictions because: 1) they deny the 
reality and truth of essential Christian beliefs; 2) they do not affirm the fundamental 
reality of a supernatural realm.
Howard Van Till, Professor Emeritus of Physics at Calvin College and a 
devout Christian, embraces theistic evolutionary views. In a response to Van Till’s 
critical review of William Dembski’s book No Free Lunch, Dembski notes that 
although Van Till’s criticism is “rhetorically shrewd...[it] is hardly the only way to
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122 For more of Johnson’s views about theistic evolution (also labeled by Johnson as “liberalized 
Christianity” and “theistic modernism”) see Johnson, 1995, p. 97-103; Johnson, 1997, p. 100-101; and 
Johnson, 2000, p. 89-95.
,23In his book Intelligent Design Dembski labels Christian evolutionary theism “naturalized 
Christianity” (Dembski, 1999, p. 51).
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spin intelligent design theologically” (Dembski 2002a, p. 327). Dembski takes him to 
task for being “steeped in process theology.”
For the theist (though not for the panentheist o f process theology), nature is 
not a self-subsisting entity but an entirely free act o f God. Nature thus 
becomes a derivative aspect o f ultimate reality -  an aspect o f God’s 
creation.. .Hence, for the theist attempting to understand nature, God as 
creator is fundamental, the creation is derivative, and nature as the physical 
part o f creation is still further downstream. (Dembski, 2002d, p. 2)
According to Dembski, process theology endows “nature with purely natural 
capacities that then are on their own to work themselves out in natural history.” 
“But,” Dembski contends, “all such talk is empty. Absolutely anything that happens 
in the world is compatible with such divine guidance (the process God always bows 
to the freedom of creation; by contrast, within classical theism, creation always bows 
to divine freedom)... .Unlike Van Till’s theology, intelligent design is not compatible 
with any sort of world” (Ibid, p. 3). Dembski’s reasons, then, for necessarily 
rejecting Van Till’s theistic evolutionary views include: 1) Van Till promotes a 
panentheistic theology which allows natural causes (capacities) to account for natural 
history; 2) Van Till does not regard “God as fundamental” because he allows natural 
causes to work freely to create their own natural history; and 3) Van Till makes God 
“bow” or be subservient to the freedom of natural causes.124
l24Dembski has recently modified his name for theistic evolution and his views concerning its 
incompatibility with ID. In his 2004 book The Design Revolution, Dembski renames theistic evolution 
as “antisupernaturalist naturalism” (he notes “religious naturalism” and “theistic naturalism” are 
synonyms). He describes antisupernaturalist naturalism (AS) as “at once compatible with intelligent 
design but incompatible with Christian theism” (Dembski, 2004c, p. 173). AS is not compatible with 
Christian theism because it does “not allow supernatural intervention” in the world thereby not 
allowing, for example, “raising a man from the dead.” Also, “its doctrines of God and creation are 
totally unacceptable” (Ibid., 173-174). AS is, in Dembski’s convoluted new view, compatible with ID 
because it “leaves nature open to real teleology.” It is impossible, however, to square Dembski’s 
newfound compatibility theory with his contention that AS naturalism “views nature as the ultimate 
reality and one that is complete in itself’ and the fundamental claim of ID that “design implies giving
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Significantly, Dembski’s criticisms of Van Till exclude panentheistic religious 
views from intelligent design thereby directly contradicting the claim that 
panentheism is compatible with ID (Dembski, 2002a, p. 334; also Beckwith, 2003, p. 
149).125 In fact, the idea that natural causes are in principle incapable of creating 
biological complexity necessarily excludes other supposedly compatible religious
19 f\views as well.
Hinduism, for example, is, according to Dembski, “religious naturalism.” The 
cosmic order or law pervading the universe found in the Vedic literature of Hinduism 
is “embedded in nature and undergirds nature” thus supplanting divine creation. 
“There can be no transcendent God within such a framework. These gods of the 
Vedas are not prior to nature but intrinsic to it.. .These gods are pathetic because 
nature’s fundamental laws can always overrule them.” Hinduism, according to 
Dembski, is an idolatrous religion inimical to intelligent design because it invests
127nature “with a significance it does not deserve” (Dembski, 1999, p. 100-102). In
[nature] a capacity it did not possess before” (Ibid., p. 176). Whether it is labeled “theistic evolution” 
or “antisupematuralist naturalism,” this religious view is obviously necessarily incompatible with ID.
125 Dembski’s further expresses his contempt for the panentheism of process theology by noting that 
panentheism regards God as acting “merely as some all-enveloping mushy influence” instead of “as an 
agent who makes a difference in space and time and takes responsibility for features of the world” 
(Dembski, 2003a, p. 12).
126It should be noted that the idea that natural causes are incapable of creating biological complexity 
also rules out notions that the designer might be “embodied” space aliens. “Although there are, at least 
in theory, some exotic candidates for the role of designer that might be compatible with materialist 
philosophy (such as space aliens or time travelers), few people will be convinced by these and will 
conclude that the designer is beyond nature” (Behe, 2001, p. 101).
127 In addition to these objections to Hinduism, Dembski notes disapprovingly elsewhere that once 
“the logical outworkings” of their beliefs are examined, one finds that not only Hinduism but 
Buddhism “make the self rather than God the center of their attentions. In both Hinduism and 
Buddhism ‘the chief end of man’(to use a phrase from the Westminster Catechism) is not to ‘glorify 
God and enjoy him forever’ but to have the self absorbed into Brahman or annihilated in the Void so 
that it can escape the weary cycle of reincarnation” (Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 55).
Dembski’s view, then, Hinduism is necessarily incompatible with intelligent design
because: 1) the cosmic order described by Hindu religious texts supplants divine
creation; 2) natural causes can overrule the Hindu gods; 3) Hinduism does not allow
for a transcendent God.
Design theory also rules out deism because, Dembski claims, “front loading”
the entire universe at, for example, the moment of the “Big Bang” with all the design
found in the universe is “an entirely ad hoc restriction.” Deism is a “logical
possibility,” but “there is no evidence for it,” and interactive design where a designer
imparts information over the course of natural history better fits the evidence design
theorists have found that “information tends to appear discretely at particular times
and places.” Deism “restricts design to structuring the laws of nature and thereby
precludes design from violating those laws and thus violating nature’s causal
structure.” Deism, in other words, is an “unsatisfactory halfway house between
theism.. .and naturalism...” It is, according to Dembski, “entirely artificial to require
that science.. .treat all design in the world as front-loaded just because
methodological naturalism requires it or because it remains a bare possibility that
design was front-loaded after all” (Dembski, 2002a, p. 344-347) Furthermore,
Theists know that naturalism is false. Nature is not self-sufficient. God 
created nature as well as any laws by which nature operates. Not only has 
God created the world, but God upholds the world moment by moment.. .The 
world is in God’s hand and never leaves his hand. Theists are not deists.
God is not an absentee landlord. (Dembski, 1999, p. 104)128
The reasons Dembski gives for the incompatibility of the religious view of
deism with intelligent design are: 1) design theorists have found evidence that the
128 For an argument that intelligent design theologically ends up as ’’Deism put under a stroboscope,” 
see Edward T. Oakes, 2001b, p. 15-16.
205
designer imparts information at particular times and places throughout natural history; 
2) deism precludes the intelligent designer from violating nature’s causal structure; 3) 
it is artificial to assume deism just because the methodology of science requires it or 
it has the bare possibility of being true; and 4) Theists are not deists.
The idea in intelligent design theory that natural causes are in principle 
incapable of creating biological complexity leads design theorists to give reasons for 
rejecting certain religious convictions. Those reasons necessarily imply:
• divine creation
• supernatural guidance of the physical world
• a fundamentally transcendent, omnipotent God who exists and is an 
object of knowledge
• Christianity
• biblical literalism
• religion makes universally obligatory knowledge claims about reality 
and truth
• science offers evidence that supports particular religious viewpoints 
The reasons design proponents give for rejecting certain religious convictions
once design theory is granted its claim that natural causes are in principle incapable of 
creating biological complexity are religious reasons -  that is, they depend on the 
religious idea that an intelligent, supernatural designer created and guides life. They 
are also sectarian religious reasons -  that is, they are religious ideas that necessarily 
exclude competing religious understandings. Divine creation, belief in an omnipotent 
God existing in a transcendent supernatural reality that can be known, and
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supernatural guidance of the physical world are common religious ideas compatible 
with many of the world’s religions but necessarily incompatible with the commonly 
held anti-religious view of atheism. Religious belief in a God that allows no freedom 
for the natural world to create biological complexity and requires belief in 
Christianity are sectarian religious ideas that necessarily exclude other religious 
convictions. Literal belief in the Bible and the belief that science provides evidence 
for specific religious understandings are sectarian religious ideas that necessarily 
exclude even further competing religious convictions.
The reasons design theorists give for rejecting certain religious views clearly 
indicate the sectarian religious content of intelligent design theory. The sectarian 
content of the idea in intelligent design theory that natural causes are in principle 
incapable of creating biological complexity consists of necessarily implied religious 
ideas such as divine creation, the Christian God and literal interpretation of biblical 
text. If natural causes are in principle incapable of creating biological complexity, 
then intelligent design necessarily implies sectarian religious ideas such as divine 
creation, supernatural guidance of the physical world, the Christian God and biblical 
literalism. In other words, the meaning of the idea in intelligent design theory that 
natural causes are in principle incapable of creating biological complexity consists of 
necessarily implied sectarian religious ideas that exclude other religious and anti- 
religious views.
The Agency o f the Intelligent Unembodied Designer Is Empirically Detectable
In William Dembski’s critique of Van Till’s arguments against intelligent 
design, Dembski states “Unlike Van Till’s theology, intelligent design is not
compatible with any sort of world.” Dembski goes on to note that “A world in which 
natural capacities can provide no empirical evidence of anything other than chance 
and necessity and additionally can do all of nature’s design work is not a world in 
which intelligent design holds” (Dembski, 2002d, p. 3). The idea that the agency of 
an intelligent supernatural designer is empirically detectable is, therefore, not only 
fundamental to intelligent design theory, it also necessarily rules out any religious 
view of the world in which the intelligent design of nature through abiotic infusion 
cannot be detected by science. Clearly, once the claim of intelligent design theory 
that the agency of an intelligent unembodied designer can be detected through 
scientific inquiry is granted, all religious and anti-religious convictions that deny or 
methodologically rule out the possibility that the agency of a supernatural designer 
can be detected scientifically are logically excluded.
In this part of my discussion of the sectarian religious content of intelligent 
design, I examine the religious concept that design theorists consider to be the 
defining concept in intelligent design theory -  theistic realism. Theistic realism 
includes the idea of ‘objective reality’ and the idea of ‘objective truth.’ I argue, first, 
that the ideas of objective reality and objective truth in theistic realism lead design 
theorists to conflate scientific inquiry with religious metaphysical inquiry. I argue, 
second, that the conflation of scientific inquiry with religious metaphysical inquiry 
results in religious literalism -  i.e., the view that science literally can detect and study 
the divine. Finally, I argue that the idea in intelligent design that the agency of the 
supernatural designer is empirically detectable is a sectarian idea resulting from the 
religious literalism inherent in theistic realism.
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Phillip Johnson in Darwin on Trial states that one of his goals as an intelligent
design theorist is to “legitimate the assertion of a theistic worldview in the secular
universities” (Johnson, 1991, p. 165). This goal, apparently, is shared by fellow
design theorists because they share in common, according to Johnson, a religious
perspective called “theistic realism.” “My colleagues and I speak of ‘theistic
realism’.. .as the defining concept of our [intelligent design] movement. That means
that we affirm that God is objectively real as Creator, and that the reality of God is
tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly in biology” (Johnson,
1996, p. 5). Theistic realism
.. .assumes that the universe and all its creatures were brought into existence for 
a purpose by God. Theistic realists expect this “fact” of creation to have 
empirical, observable consequences that are different from the consequences one 
would observe if the universe were the product of nonrational causes...
(Johnson, 1995, p. 208-209)129
Because they are theistic realists, Johnson and his fellow design theorists “assert that
God is real and that the evidence [of science] reflects the truth that nature was created
by God...” (Ibid, p. 202); “.. .the point of the intelligent design.. .movement [is],”
according to Johnson . .to remind us of our roots.. .We come from creation by God,
not from unguided nature...” (Dembski & Kushiner, 2001, p. 9-10). In Johnson’s
view, then, the reason why the agency of the unembodied intelligent designer in
design theory is empirically detectable is because the defining concept, theistic
realism, underlying intelligent design assumes that the designer is an objectively real
God and that the biological sciences provide evidence of the objective truth that
nature was created by God.
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129 For more of Johnson’s views about theistic realism see Johnson, 1997, p. 91-92, and 95-96.
The theistic realism Dembski subscribes to mirrors that of Johnson’s.
Dembski states”. . .1 am a theist and believe that God created the world” (Dembski, 
2000a, p. 1). “Within theism God is the ultimate reality.. .Within theism divine action 
is not reducible to some more basic mode of causation” (Dembski, 1999, p. 214).130 
Additionally, for Dembski, just as it is for Johnson, “God is the God of truth...” (Ibid, 
p. 225) which means the reality of God is “true -  objectively true” and “objective 
truths.. .by their nature are obligatory across the board...” (Dembski & Kushiner, 
2001, p. 12). In Dembski’s view, “God’s act of creating the world is.. .the prime 
instance of intelligent agency” (Dembski, 1999, p. 224). Three things follow from 
Dembski’s theistic realism: first, divine intelligence “is an irreducible feature of 
reality” (Dembski, 2000a, p.15); second, “intelligent design is...a way of 
understanding divine agency” (Dembski, 1999, p. 13); and third, intelligent “design in 
nature is empirically detectable” (Ibid, p, 2). Again, as it was for Johnson,
Dembski’s adoption of the defining concept of the intelligent design movement, 
theistic realism, establishes the reason why the agency of the intelligent supernatural 
designer posited by design theory is empirically detectable -  theistic realism assumes 
that there is an objectively real God and that nature provides evidence of the objective 
truth that God is its creator.
The concepts found in theistic realism of ‘objective reality’ and ‘objective 
truth’ (also referred to simply as ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ or ‘real’ and ‘true’) figure 
prominently in ID texts because they are the basis for the reasons design theorists
l30Dembski’s penchant for speaking for all theists (“Theists know that naturalism is false;” “Theists are 
not deists;” “For the theist, nature is not a self-subsisting entity...;” etc.) is, I would argue, evidence of 
his religious orthodoxy. Many theologians would be surprised to find that, according to Dembski, they 
are not true theists.
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give for the empirical detectability of supernatural design. They also demonstrate the 
sectarian religious content of the idea that supernatural design is empirically 
detectable. Consequently, understanding their idiosyncratic meaning within the 
context of theistic realism is essential.
The first important feature to note is that within the ‘theistic realism’ espoused 
by design theorists, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are conflated, i.e., they refer to the same 
thing. The ‘truth’ in theistic realism is that which is “in accord with objective reality” 
(Johnson, 1995, p. 124), and ‘reality’ is that which is in accord with objective truth. 
What is true is what is real and what is real is what is true. So, for example, Johnson 
says “If God as Creator exists [is objectively real] and cares about what human beings 
do, then metaphysical realism is true...” (Ibid, p. 124), and “.. .if Darwinism is true, 
Christian metaphysics is fantasy” (Johnson, 2000b). He also states “...to follow the 
truth to the end is to assert that God is real and that the evidence reflects the truth that 
nature was created by God” (Ibid, 202).
The three statements just quoted by Johnson also demonstrate the second 
important feature to note: the word ‘reality’ within theistic realism refers to that 
which exists not only in the natural world but also in the metaphysical or 
supernatural realm. The ontology of theistic realism, then, consists not only of 
natural objects and entities but also of metaphysical or supernatural objects and 
entities. For a theistic realist, the natural world and the supernatural world are filled 
with objectively real fully interacting entities that are all, in principle, empirically
211
n i
detectable because they are objectively ‘real’ and ‘true.’ Thus, when design 
theorists refer to the ‘objective reality’ of the unembodied designer or God, they are 
referring to the actual presence of a supernatural being in the natural world who we 
may not see but whose actions leave empirically detectable evidence of the designer’s 
existence. William Dembski, for example, states that “Theism gives you not only 
nature, but also God and anything outside of nature that God might have created. The 
ontology of theism is far richer than that of naturalism” (Dembski, 1999, p. 212). 
“Nature,” according to Dembski, “points beyond itself to a transcendent reality” 
(Dembski, 2000a, p.I).132 He also claims intelligent design is “a new vision that 
captures our imagination and at the same time is grounded in reality” (Dembski, 
2004c, p. 28). Phillip Johnson claims that “Design is reality considered in its entirety; 
materialist reductionism is truncated reality, reality with the mind [intelligence] cut 
out” (Johnson, 2001, p. 1).
The third important feature to note is: the word ‘truth’ within theistic realism 
means that which is unquestionably, eternally and universally the case in the natural 
world and the metaphysical or supernatural realm. Theistic realism does not 
distinguish between scientific ‘truth’ and religious ‘truth.’ To be taken seriously, 
scientific ‘truth’ must, according to theistic realists, be equivalent to religious ‘truth.’ 
Dembski, for example, states “.. .objective truth and meaning have no legitimate 
place within a pure [scientific] naturalism” (Dembski, 1999, p. 227), and “ ...objective
131 Dembski notes that “theists typically ascribe to God the creation of an invisible world that is 
inhabited among other things by angels” (Dembski, 2002d, p. 2). Hence, the ontology of theistic 
realism includes objectively ‘real’ and ‘true’ angels.
132 In Dembski’s view, the “reality” of a blade of grass “derives not from its particulate constituents but 
from its capacity to communicate with other entities in creation and ultimately with God himself’ 
(Dembski, 1999, p. 232).
212
truths by their nature are obligatory across the board.. .the fundamental claims of 
Christianity [and theistic realism] are objectively true” (Dembski & Kushiner, 2001, 
p. 13). Phillip Johnson states “Darwin’s theory unquestionably has impressive 
explanatory power, but how are we to tell if it is true?'’'' (Johnson 1993, p. 66, italics 
in original), and “Claiming to have knowledge is not a triumph for science unless it is 
true knowledge...” (Johnson, 2000, p. 168). He also declares “.. .the evidence of 
science shows that ‘in the beginning was the Word’ is as true scientifically as it is true 
theologically, scripturally and in every other way.. .The very Word through whom all 
things were created lived on earth as a man, and this is not a statement merely of 
“religious belief’ but of fact”(Johnson, 2002, p. 141, italics in original). Finally, 
Johnson claims “Christianity is True (the initial capital letter signifying a universal 
truth on the level of a scientific fact)...” (Ibid, p. 78).
The identification of ( ‘objective’) reality with (‘objective’) truth and the 
(‘objective’) reality of natural world with the (‘objective’) reality of a supernatural 
world are, arguably, common religious ideas. Traditional religious belief includes the 
conviction that God actually exists, that religion is a response to something real that is 
apart from the surface of the natural world, and that faith leads people toward a 
truthful understanding of all that exists. The conflation, however, of scientific inquiry 
with religious inquiry in theistic realism is not a common contemporary religious 
idea. In fact, it is a ‘premodem’ religious idea that intelligent design theorists share 
with sectarian religious groups who read religious texts literally. William Dembski 
nicely summarizes how the idea that scientific inquiry reveals religious tmth operated
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in ‘premodem’ times and how he hopes to incorporate that view in intelligent design 
theory.
For modernity the world is a closed nexus o f cause and effect. Thus God cannot 
act within the world as by giving [empirically detectable] signs...Premodemity 
denotes that epoch before the rise of modem science with Copernicus, Kepler 
and Galileo.. .premodemity had one thing going for it that neither modernity nor 
postmodemity could match, namely, a worldview rich enough to accommodate 
divine agency.. .Premodemity.. .allow[s] God sufficient room to act in the world 
and specifically to act as [an empirically detectable] signgiver. How  
so?...Premodemity always maintained that the natural causes described by 
natural laws were fundamentally incomplete and that intelligent causes had free 
play in the world as w ell.. .Within the premodem worldview the world is not 
under the grip o f natural laws but is a stage in which natural causes form the 
backdrop and intelligent causes perform the primary action.. .Indeed, since the 
world is a divine act, freely created apart from any law, natural causes constitute 
a derivative mode of causation, dependent on divine action. Moreover the 
natural laws that govern natural causes are themselves contingent, dependent on 
the divine w ill.. .My aim [in articulating the theory of ID ).. .is to take the 
premodem logic o f [empirical] signs and make is rigorous. In doing so, I intend 
to preserve the valid insights o f modem science as well as the core commitments 
of the Christian faith. (Dembski, 1999, p. 44-47)
The conflation of the notions within theistic realism of objective reality and 
objective truth leads intelligent design theorists to conflate scientific inquiry with 
religious inquiry. This in turn leads to religious literalism. Intelligent design 
theorists claim that the theory of intelligent design is not related to the biblical 
literalism associated with ‘creationism’ and, therefore, is not ‘stealth creationism.’ 
Biblical literalism, however, is only one manifestation of religious literalism. 
Theologian John Haught argues that religious literalism consists of reading not only 
the Bible, but also the physical universe at a “plain or literal level of understanding.” 
It is equivalent to the “shallow perusal” of any text (Haught, 2003, p. 18, 31). In
133 See Dembski, 2000a, p. 1; also West, 2003.1 am arguing here that the idea in intelligent design that 
the agency of the supernatural designer is empirically detectable is a sectarian idea resulting from the 
religious literalism inherent in theistic realism. However, I argue in the next section that in spite of the 
denials of design theorists, intelligent design theory also results from sectarian biblical literalism. For 
an analysis of past and present continuities and commonalities between creationism and intelligent 
design, see Forrest & Gross, 2004, p. 273-296.
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Haught’s view, “Conflating metaphysical with scientific inquiry is one of the most
characteristic features of contemporary literalism” (Ibid, 20).
It is both scientifically and theologically fatal.. .to take refuge in ultimate 
explanations too early in our attempts to understand the natural world. One of 
the great lessons theology has learned from modem science is to postpone such 
metaphysical gratification. To introduce ideas about God as the “cause” of 
natural phenomena at soft points in our scientific inquiries is intellectually 
inappropriate and theologically disastrous.. .Postponing metaphysics, however, 
is a tough assignment... One way of manifesting this metaphysical impatience is 
to paste the fact of life’s complexity directly onto the cozy idea of divine 
intelligent design... (Ibid, p. 86-87)134
When the theistic realism of design theorists conflates scientific inquiry with 
metaphysical inquiry in the ‘science’ of intelligent design, empirical investigations 
literally become investigations of the divine. Divine agency is not only empirically 
detectable within the literalism of theistic realism, divine agency can literally be 
actively investigated by science. The ‘premodem’ view of the world inherent in the 
theistic realism of intelligent design, then, literally demonstrates through design 
theory that “The scientific picture of the world championed since the Enlightenment 
is not just wrong but massively wrong. Indeed entire fields of inquiry, especially in 
the human sciences.. .need to be rethought from the ground up in terms of intelligent 
design” (Dembski, 1999, p. 224).
l34Haught, as noted in footnote 10, criticizes not only intelligent design theorists for hastily rushing to 
“premature metaphysical gratification.” He also roundly criticizes “evolutionary materialists” for 
“dressing the scientifically proper, but still relatively abstract, idea of natural selection in the apparel of 
metaphysical finality” and thereby leading science “to an unnecessarily premature climacteric” 
(Haught, 2003, p. 87). Haught labels the literalism of evolutionary materialists who conflate science 
with metaphysics “cosmic literalism.” Importantly, Haught also recognizes that scientific theorizing is 
not entirely divorced from metaphysics.
There can be no objection, of course, to placing science within a metaphysical setting.
This is unavoidable. But in order to prevent any amalgamating of science with belief it 
should be done carefully, self-consciously and, above all, patiently. For the sake of 
science itself, our beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality should not be alloyed in a 
hasty way with scientific explanations. Otherwise, before long our metaphysics will be 
doing the work of science. (Ibid., p. 92-93)
In summary, once the idea in intelligent design theory that the agency of the 
unembodied designer is empirically detectable is granted, the concepts of ‘objective 
reality’ and ‘objective truth’ within the theistic realism assumed by ID theory provide 
the reason why the supernatural agency is detectable. They also demonstrate the 
sectarian religious content of the idea that supernatural design is empirically 
detectable.
Theistic realism is considered by design theorists to be the defining concept of 
intelligent design. Theistic realism is a religious idea. The religious content of 
theistic realism consists of the religious idea that an intelligent, supernatural designer 
created and guides life. The conflation of the notions within theistic realism of 
objective reality and objective truth leads intelligent design theorists to conflate 
scientific inquiry with religious inquiry. The conflation of science with religious 
metaphysical inquiry results in religious literalism where science is deemed literally 
able to detect and investigate divine agency.
The idea that divine agency is empirically detectable is not a religious idea 
commonly shared by all religions; it is a sectarian religious idea fundamental to 
theistic realism that necessarily excludes other religious and anti-religious 
convictions. The sectarian content of the idea in intelligent design theory that the 
agency of the intelligent supernatural designer is empirically detectable consists of 
the sectarian religious idea that science literally can detect and investigate divine 
agency. In other words, the meaning of the idea in intelligent design theory that 
divine agency is empirically detectable consists of the sectarian religious idea that 
science is literally able to detect and investigate divine agency. If the agency of the
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intelligent unembodied designer identified by design theory is empirically detectable,
then, intelligent design necessarily rules out competing religious and anti-religious
convictions that declare religious inquiry to be fundamentally different from scientific
inquiry. The sectarian religious literalism inherent in theistic realism is an essential
element of the sectarian religious content of intelligent design.
The Identity o f the Unembodied Intelligent Designer
The religious literalism of theistic realism not only requires that the actions of
a divine designer be empirically detectable, it necessitates forced choices. The
religious literalism inherent in intelligent design theory, for example, forces a choice
between evolutionary naturalism and Christian supematuralism.
.. .the conflict between the naturalistic worldview and the Christian 
supematuralistic worldview goes all the way down. It cannot be papered over 
by superficial compromises...It cannot be mitigated by reading the Bible 
figuratively rather than literally. From a modernist perspective, biblical 
Christianity is just as wrong figuratively as it is literally. The story of salvation 
by the cross makes no sense against a background of evolutionary 
naturalism.. .There is no satisfactory way to bring two such fundamentally 
different stories together, although various bogus intellectual systems offer A 
superficial compromise to those who are willing to overlook a logical 
contradiction or two. A clear thinker simply has to go one way or another.
(Johnson 1997, p. I l l )
Religious literalism declares that “If modernism (naturalism)135 is True (the initial
capital letter signifying that the claim is one of objective or universal truth), then
Jesus did not rise from the tomb...” (Johnson, 2002, p. 117). “The opposition
between the biblical and naturalistic stories is fundamental, and neither side can
compromise over it. To compromise is to surrender” (Johnson, 1995, p. 108).
I35lt is important to note that the religious literalism inherent in the theistic realism of design theory 
does not allow design theorists to distinguish between the methodological naturalism of science and 
philosophical naturalism.
In this part of my discussion of the sectarian content of intelligent design I 
argue that, contrary to the assertion by William Dembski that “the identity.. .of [the] 
designer lie[s] outside the scope of intelligent design,” his texts and the texts of other 
design theorists clearly identify the designing agent found through the specified- 
complexity criterion. The intelligent designer is the Christian God described in the 
Gospel of John as understood by orthodox evangelical Christians who read the Bible 
literally. The religious literalism inherent in the theistic realism of intelligent design 
theory results in transparent sectarian biblical literalism that identifies the 
unembodied intelligent designer as “Jesus Christ.. .the incarnate Word of 
God.. .through whom all things came into existence” (Johnson, 2000, p. 158). Since 
the religious literalism of theistic realism assumed by intelligent design identifies the 
intelligent designer as the Christian God, I conclude that the sectarian religious 
content of intelligent design includes the religious idea that the Christian God 
supematurally created and guides all life.
I argued above that the conflation of the notions within theistic realism of 
objective reality and objective truth leads intelligent design theorists to conflate 
scientific inquiry with religious metaphysical inquiry and this, in turn, leads to 
religious literalism. I noted that within the religious literalism inherent in intelligent 
design theory, empirical investigations literally become investigations of the divine. 
The religious literalism of design theory, however, also necessarily implies biblical 
literalism. When truth and reality are conflated in the theistic realism of intelligent 
design theory, a person is forced to choose between that which is literally 
(‘objectively’) true (real) and that which is false (unreal or fantasy). Phillip Johnson,
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for example, states either “God is our true Creator” and “really exist[s]” or “God is an 
invention of human culture” and is “a fantasy like Santa Claus” (Johnson, 1997, p. 
22-23). Also, if the “Christian doctrines [of] supernatural creation and the 
resurrection... are true, then materialism, as a general worldview, true” (Ibid, p. 
118; emphasis in original.) It follows that the Bible is either literally true or it is 
false. Johnson asks about the first verse of the Gospel of John, “’In the beginning 
was the Word.’ Is that true or false? Is it fact or pious platitude?” (Johnson, 2002, p. 
63). “If only matter existed in the beginning, then the first verse of the Gospel of 
John -  and the worldview of the Bible -  is false” (Johnson, 1997, p. 71).
The texts of design theorists clearly indicate which side of the forced choice 
between the truth and falsity of the Bible intelligent design theory comes down on — 
the Bible is true, literally true. According to Johnson, “Christianity makes sense only 
if its factual [Scriptural] premises are true...” (Johnson, 1995, p. 204), and “John 1:1- 
14 is really True” (Johnson, 2002, p. 78; capital letter in original).136 Because they 
are “True,” Johnson argues that the Gospel of John and Romans 1 from the Bible 
provide “the foundation of reality” (Johnson, 2000, p. 152). The Gospel of John 
states:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him and 
without him was not anything made that was made. (Jnl:l-3 RSV; cited in 
Johnson, 2000, p. 151)137
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136The “Truth (with a capital 7),” according to Johnson, “is truth as God knows it” (Johnson, 1997, p. 
89).
l37Johnson argues that the Gospel of John not only provides the foundation of reality, it also provides 
the “first premise” from which all reasoning begins, “...the ultimate premise, the beginning point from 
which logic should proceed” is the “Word” or the divine “Logos.” “That word encompasses both the 
human activity of reasoning and the divine foundation from which logic must begin” (Johnson, 2002, 
p. 88-89)
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Romans 1 states:
Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal 
power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. 
(Romans 1:20 RSV; cited in Johnson, 2000, p. 153)
According to Johnson, “These passages from John 1 and Romans 1 provide the
[proper] metaphysical basis for... science...By the Word, God created a rational and
contingent cosmos, and he created human beings in his image” (Ibid, 154).138 Since
“Only the Word creates,” science will not discover a natural mechanism “for the
creation of new complex genetic information. No such mechanism exists. God
created us” (Ibid, p. 153).139
William Dembski agrees. According to Dembski, God literally created the
world as described in the Gospel of John: “...as John’s Gospel informs us, it is the
divine Logos, the Word that in Christ was made flesh.. .through whom all things were
created” (Dembski, 1999, p. 225). “The Christian faith is stable and
unchanging.. .This faith is grounded in the truth of the gospel, a truth that must itself
l38The cited text reads more fully: “These passages from John 1 and Romans 1 provide the 
metaphysical basis for a Christian understanding of both science and pseudoscience. By the Word, 
God created a rational and contingent cosmos, and he created human beings in his image.. .The proper 
metaphysical basis for science is not naturalism or materialism...” Johnson might argue that I have 
misrepresented his meaning since he clearly says the biblical passages provide a “Christian 
understanding” of science. It is important to remember, however, that for the purposes of this paper, I 
have granted design theorists their central claims. Since Johnson, as a theistic realist, conflates 
scientific inquiry with religious inquiry, the “Christian understating of science” becomes the 
foundation of science once ID theorists are granted their central claims. In other words, once it is 
granted that: 1) an unembodied intelligent designer created and guides life; 2) natural causes in 
principle incapable of creating biological complexity; and 3) the agency of the unembodied intelligent 
designer is empirically detectable; then, the religious literalism inherent in the theistic realism of 
design theory necessitates that John 1 and Romans 1 become the proper metaphysical basis for all 
science, not just a “Christian understanding” of science. This conclusion is reinforced by another 
quote from Johnson, “...I predict that the foundations of modernism will be profoundly shaken in the 
twenty-first century as the public.. .learns that the best metaphysical platform, even for science, lies in 
divine creation rather than the fantasy that the human mind is the product of irrational forces” (Johnson 
2002, p. 119).
139“We might say that the point of Darwinism is to refute the otherwise compelling teaching of 
Romans 1:20, which is that God’s eternal power and deity have always been evident from the things 
that were created” (Johnson 1997, p. 113).
be stable and unchanging” (Dembski, 200Id, p. 32). The stable and unchanging truth, 
the literal truth, of the fact that “God speaks the divine Logos to create the world,” 
Dembski points out has “profound implications” (Dembski, 1999, p. 230-231). It 
means that “God’s act of creating the world [through the divine Logos] is the 
prototype for all intelligent agency...God’s act of creating the world makes possible 
all of God’s subsequent interactions with the world, as well as all subsequent actions 
by creatures within the world...God’s act of creating the world is thus the prime 
instance of intelligent agency” (Ibid, p. 224). “.. .God through the divine Logos acts 
as an intelligent agent to create the world...” (Ibid, p. 229).
The move by both Johnson and Dembski from the literal truth of the biblical 
passages in the Gospel of John and Romans to the “proper” metaphysical foundations 
for science and the identification of God as an intelligent agent who creates the world 
is a logical move. Once the Bible is deemed literally (“objectively”) true and 
naturalism is deemed false, it is logically necessary, from the point of view of a 
design theorist who is a theistic realist, that the Bible provide the metaphysical 
foundation for science and that God’s agency creates the world “through the divine 
Logos.” Thus, when the specified-complexity criterion in the science of intelligent 
design detects complex specified information (CSI) in complex biological systems, it 
is detecting “transcendent design” (Ibid, p. 233) -  i.e., the divine Logos or Word 
through which God created the world. Biologists who participate in the information 
theoretic research of intelligent design are “simply retracing God’s thoughts” (Ibid, p. 
234). “Information,” Dembski confidently notes, “is just another name for ” 
(Ibid, 233; emphasis in original). “Intelligent design is just the Logos theology of
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John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory” (Dembski, 2001c, p. 192). 
“The crucial breakthrough of the intelligent design movement has been to show that 
this great theological truth -  that God acts in the world by dispersing information .. 
has scientific content” (Dembski, 1999, p. 233). It logically follows from the biblical 
literalism inherent in the theistic realism of design theory that the identity of the 
unembodied intelligent designer detected by design theory is the Christian God 
described in the Gospel of John.
Biblical literalism is associated with orthodox evangelical interpretations of 
Christian doctrine. ‘Orthodox’ interpretations of Christian doctrine conform to the 
early creeds and confessions of the Christian faith. ‘Evangelical’ interpretations 
focus on the New Testament, especially the Gospels, and emphasize the salvation of 
humankind by faith in the atonement of Jesus. Biblical literalism is also associated 
with ‘reformed’ theological interpretations of Christian doctrine. Reformed 
interpretations refer to Protestant doctrine, especially the “.. .doctrine of inerrancy of 
the Word of God, and ultimate authority of Scripture over the Church, rather than 
Church leaders, i.e., it is self evident that following God means following God’s 
Word rather than following the words of men. The essence of Reformed theology is a 
willingness to constantly conform all of life to the Word of God” (Warren, 2004, p.l). 
Importantly, prominent intelligent design theorists self-identify as orthodox 
evangelical Christians. And, while most do not mention their reformed Christian 
biases, it is clear many embrace reformed interpretations of Christian doctrine. In the 
following brief discussion I merely note the orthodox evangelical and reformed 
Christian religious prejudices of leading design theorists and suggest that the theistic
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realism inherent in intelligent design theory results from their sectarian religious
140convictions.
In the book Unapologetic Apologetics William Dembski describes himself as
an “evangelical mathematician” (Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 53) and “singularist”
(Ibid, p. 50) who believes that Christianity is “humanity’s ultimate truth” (Ibid, p. 17)
and that “Christianity makes exclusive truth claims that are binding on the world at
large” (Ibid, p. 50). According to Dembski, the Christian faith consists of a core of
non-negotiable objectively real truths that are “stable and unchanging.” Those are:
To the physical core of the Christian faith belong the virgin birth, the crucifixion and 
the resurrection. To the theoretical core belong the incarnation, the redemption 
through Christ and the Trinity. To the regulative core belong the reliability of 
Scripture, the preeminence of Christ and a commitment to truth. (Ibid, p. 38)
To violate or repudiate the objective reality of core Christian truths is to deny 
Christianity (Ibid, p. 40). Christianity is not a “sociologically constructed faith or a 
historicized faith or a demythologized faith or a politicized faith or any other 
enculturated faith” (Ibid, p. 32). . .the truth of Christ is humanity’s chief truth.. .It
follow that Christians have a mandate to declare the truth of Christ. This mandate 
consists of bringing every aspect of life under the influence of this truth” (Ibid, p. 18). 
In Dembski’s view, evolutionary explanations for the origin of biological complexity 
that exclude the possibility of empirically detectable supernatural causation deny the 
objective reality and truth of Christianity. Intelligent design theory, on the other 
hand, allows for the objective reality of the Christian God and the objective truth of
140Barbara Forrest and Paul Gross in Creationism’sTrojan Horse document the influence of religious
organizations with orthodox evangelical and reformed Christian prejudices that provide essential 
financial support as well as essential political and media access for ID proponents. See chapter nine of 
Forrest & Gross, 2004.
core Christian doctrine through its two central assumptions: 1) natural causes are in
principle incapable of creating biological complexity, and 2) the agency of the
intelligent unembodied designer is empirically detectable.
Phillip Johnson is an evangelical Christian (Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 7)
who is attempting to teach ordinary orthodox Christians (Johnson, 2002, p. 11) how
they “can more effectively engage the secular world on behalf of the gospel”
(Johnson, 2000, p. 16) by uniting around the biblical passage “that is most relevant to
the evolution controversy...the opening of the Gospel of John” (Ibid, p. 151).
Johnson recognizes that “Genesis is not the best place to start when considering the
truth of the Bible as a whole...” (Johnson, 2002, p. 143), because Genesis tends “to
direct attention on the age of the earth rather than on the Darwinian mechanism.
Starting with Genesis also tends[s] to give people the impression that [the truth of]
only the first chapters of the Bible [are] threatened...” by Darwinian naturalism. In
fact, according to Johnson, naturalistic assumptions “negate the entire Bible from the
first word to the last” (Ibid, p. 137). Once intelligent design theory demonstrates,
however, that “.. .the evidence of science shows that ‘in the beginning was the Word’
is as true scientifically as it is true theologically, scripturally and in every other way”
(Ibid, 141), then it is possible to “take seriously the possibility” that the claims in
Genesis are really true.141 For example, Johnson states,
With the fall of Darwinism now in prospect, it is time to invite unprejudiced 
scientific investigation into the possibility that human beings thousands of years 
ago may have had longer life spans than they do now...All that is necessary to 
research the lifespans in Genesis 5 is to put aside the philosophical dogma of
141 It is important to note that establishing the truth of the Bible by first establishing the truth of the 
Gospel of John denies the truth of Jewish religious convictions. The sectarian religious content of 
intelligent design necessarily rules out Judaism.
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uniformitarianism [and naturalism] and proceed instead on the assumption that
the basic ‘constants’ of physics may have changed over time. (Ibid, p, 146-147)
In Johnson’s view, once the claims of intelligent design theory are granted, research 
into the literal truth of the Bible becomes a scientific project. Johnson’s orthodox 
evangelical and reformed Christian prejudices clearly drive the religious literalism of 
his theistic realism. Those prejudices are without doubt an essential element in his 
authorship and promotion of the theory of intelligent design.
Finally, William Dembski and Jay Wesley Richards associate intelligent 
design with the task of orthodox evangelical Christian apologetics.142 “At stake in 
apologetics is the question whether Christianity is true -  objectively true.” Since, in 
their view, “the fundamental claims of Christianity are objectively true.. .Christian 
apologists must... engage the secular world, reproving, rebuking and exhorting it, 
pointing to the truth of Christianity and producing strong arguments and valid 
criticisms that show where secularism has missed the mark” (Dembski & Richards, 
2001, p. 12, 15). Central to the task of apologetics is the “rooting out” of false ideas. 
Importantly, according to Dembski and Richards, “Darwinism” is a “false idea” (Ibid, 
chapters 13 and 14) that “prevents Christianity from being regarded as anything more 
that a harmless delusion” and so it must be replaced with a theory that will bring 
biology (and science in general) “under the authority of Christ.” Only when the 
"false idea" of “Darwinism” has been "analyzed, evaluated and refuted... will 
Christ’s authority over the life of the mind be reestablished and the doors of faith
142 "Apologetics" is a branch of theology that interprets proofs of and defends the Christian faith. 
Dembski and Richards describe apologetics as “rational argument on behalf of the Christian 
faith.. .throughout Scripture, Christians are enjoined to defend the faith through rational argument” 
(Dembski & Richards, 2001, p. 11).
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reopened” (Ibid, p. 19-21).143 Indeed, in his book Intelligent Design Dembski assets
that . .all disciplines find their completion in Christ and cannot be properly
understood apart from Christ.. .any view of the sciences that leave Christ out of the
picture must be seen as fundamentally deficient” (Dembski, 1999, p. 206; see also
Johnson, 1995, p. 103-105).
The undeniable conclusion to be drawn from Dembski’s and Richards’ work
is that the theory of intelligent design is an exercise in orthodox evangelical
Protestant Christian apologetics. Richards reinforces this view in his article “Proud
Obstacles and A Reasonable Hope: The Apologetic Value of Intelligent Design.”
.. .intelligent design.. .is a valuable resource for Christian apologetics.
Positively, not only can intelligent design become -  by extension -  an 
apologetic argument, but it also proposes a view of natural science compatible 
with the Christian doctrine of creation. Negatively, it not only provides a more 
empirically adequate framework for natural science than scientific materialism, 
but also presents a much-needed critique of this contemporary adversary of 
Christian belief. (Dembski & Kushiner, 2001, p. 51-52)
The texts of design theorists leave no doubt about the identity of the
unembodied intelligent designer detected through the complexity-specification
criterion of intelligent design theory. The intelligent designer is the Christian God
described in the Gospel of John as understood by orthodox evangelical Christians
who read the Bible literally. When truth and reality are conflated in theistic realism,
religious literalism dissolves into transparent sectarian biblical literalism which forces
a choice between the literal truth and falsity of the Bible. Design theorists are
confident the Bible is true, literally true. Consequently, the unembodied intelligent
143 Remarkably, Dembski and Richards view Christian apologetics as a “call to martyrdom -  perhaps 
not a martyrdom where we spill or blood (although this too may be required) but a martyrdom where 
we witness to the truth without being concerned about our careers, political correctness, the current 
fashion or toeing the party line. We are not called to please the world; we are called to proclaim the 
truth...” (Id., p. 15).
designer who creates and guides life is the Christian God who “speaks the divine 
Logos to create the world” (Dembski, 1999, p. 230). The religious content of 
intelligent design, therefore, necessarily includes the sectarian religious idea that the 
Christian God supematurally created and guides all life.
The first two sections of this chapter examined the religious content of 
intelligent design, including its sectarian religious content. I argued, first, that the 
religious content of intelligent design theory consists of its assertion of the religious 
idea that an intelligent supernatural designer created and guides life. The essential 
meaning of the idea that an unembodied intelligent designer created and guides life is 
religious. Intelligent design, therefore, is a religious theory. I argued, second, that 
the reasons design theorists give for rejecting certain religious convictions once 
design theory is granted its claim that natural causes are in principle incapable of 
creating biological complexity include sectarian religious ideas such as divine 
creation, the Christian God and literal interpretation of biblical text. The sectarian 
reasons offered by design theorists necessarily exclude competing religious 
understandings. The meaning of the idea in intelligent design theory, then, that 
natural causes are incapable of creating complex biological systems consists of 
necessarily implied sectarian religious ideas which exclude other religious and anti- 
religious views. Third, I argued that the idea in intelligent design theory that the 
agency of the supernatural designer is empirically detectable is a sectarian idea 
resulting from the religious literalism inherent in the defining concept of ID -  theistic 
realism. The sectarian content of the idea in ID theory that supernatural intelligent
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agency is empirically detectable consists of the sectarian religious idea that science 
literally can detect and investigate divine agency. Finally, I argued that the religious 
literalism of the theistic realism assumed by intelligent design theory forces a choice 
between the truth and falsity of the Bible. The biblical literalism of design theorists 
results in the identification of the unembodied intelligent agent detected by design 
theory. That agent is the Christian God. The sectarian religious content of intelligent 
design includes the religious idea that the Christian God supematurally created and 
guides all life. Intelligent design theory, then, is not only a religious theory; it is a 
sectarian religious theory that necessarily excludes competing religious and anti- 
religious convictions.
In the final section of this chapter I examine, from a deliberative democratic 
political perspective, the consequences the religious content of intelligent design has 
for public school policy decision-making.
A Deliberative Perspective on the Religious Content of Intelligent Design 
The religious content of intelligent design has, from a deliberative perspective, 
a determinative effect on the process and content of deliberations over the appropriate 
placement of ID in public school curricula. I have argued that policymakers can 
justifiably exclude intelligent design from science classrooms as a scientific 
alternative to evolutionary theory, but I have not considered if it might appropriately 
be placed elsewhere in the curriculum. Clarifying the religious content of ID allows 
me to now consider ways in which the deep concerns of ID proponents might be 
accommodated in other areas of public school curricula.
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This section demonstrates how the religious content of ID settles, from a 
deliberative perspective, past questions over whether it belongs in public school 
science curricula and discusses ways in which citizens might affirm some of the 
concerns of ID proponents thereby contributing to the possibility of reducing the 
range of future disagreements over the teaching of evolutionary theory. This section 
is divided into four parts. First, I review past arguments based on the moral claims of 
ID proponents for including intelligent design in public school science classes as a 
scientific theory and show how those arguments are affected by the religious content 
of ID. Second, I briefly return to the conflict in Ohio over the model lesson plan to 
show where ID concepts and references occur in the plan and to resolve the 
arguments that depended on knowing the scientific and religious status of ID. Third,
I discuss the moral stakes ID proponents perceive to be at risk in the dispute between 
citizens over intelligent design theory. Finally, I suggest that respect for the dignity 
and worth of ones opponents requires ID critics to practice civic magnanimity toward 
ID proponents. I argue that when ED critics extend civic magnanimity towards their 
opponents, ID critics are promoting values that can contribute to resolving the 
conflict over intelligent design and/or contribute to reducing the range of conflict 
between citizens.
The Effect o f the Religious Content o f ID on the Moral Arguments
The central arguments based on the moral claims of intelligent design 
proponents have been documented in the preceding chapters. Assessments of those 
arguments from a deliberative perspective were often inconclusive because the
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scientific and religious status of ID had not been determined. I now return to those 
arguments to see the effect the religious content of ID has on them.
Fairness and freedom o f thought. Intelligent design proponents in Ohio and 
in rebuttals to critics have claimed that it is only fair to allow the unbiased teaching in 
science of the full range of relevant scientific evidence both for and against 
evolutionary theory, including the evidence that supports an inference to design. I 
previously noted that this argument is not justifiable from a deliberative perspective 
for the following reasons. First, the principle of reciprocity requires empirical claims 
to be conditioned by methods and standards mutually accepted by the wider scientific 
community. Teaching students alternative theories that reject the methods and 
standards of modem science that have been arrived at by a consensus of practicing 
scientists over the past three centuries violate the basic opportunity of students to 
receive an adequate education in science. Second, rejecting the methods and 
standards of modem science and the opinions of scientists who support them 
demonstrates that ID proponents reject the principle of reciprocity. A rejection of the 
principle of reciprocity by citizens ends in non-deliberative disagreement. I also 
noted that the refusal to pursue the scientific claims of ID in terms that are acceptable 
to practicing scientists signals the possibility that ID proponents are disguising a 
religious agenda.
Clarifying the religious content of intelligent design supports the conclusion 
that ID proponents are pursuing a religious agenda under the guise of arguments for 
fairness and freedom of thought. ID proponents are violating the principle of 
publicity by deceptively pursuing an agenda that takes advantage not only of the
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scientific ignorance and religious fears of Americans, but also their commitment to 
democratic moral values. In addition, the religious content of ID ensures that the 
basic liberty of students would be violated by teaching ID as a scientific theory. It 
would constrain the present and future religious beliefs of students by teaching certain 
sectarian religious beliefs as true in science classes.
Academic freedom. Proponents of intelligent design argue that academic 
freedom allows teachers to teach criticisms of evolutionary theory that are based on 
scientific evidence offered by fully qualified, credentialed scientists. I noted earlier 
that this argument depends crucially on the scientific status of the evidence offered 
against evolutionary theory and the scientific status of the alternative theory that 
supports the evidence, intelligent design.
The lack of scientific support for the critical evidence offered against 
evolutionary theory and the sectarian religious content of ID theory demonstrates that 
appeals to academic freedom are appeals to unrestricted freedom that fail to meet the 
requirements of the principle of accountability. The principle of accountability 
requires teachers to maintain the scholarly boundaries of inquiry associated with the 
discipline of science. Teaching conclusions that have proven to demonstrably false, 
e.g., that natural causes can be proven mathematically to be incapable of creating 
biological complexity, based on mutually accepted methods and standards adopted by 
the wider scientific community violates the professional integrity of teachers and the 
integrity of science. The principle of accountability constrains appeals to academic 
freedom.
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Censorship. Proponents of intelligent design assert that the methodological 
naturalism practiced by scientists necessarily entails ontological naturalism, thereby 
censoring design inferences from science through definition. I noted earlier that this 
argument is not justifiable from a deliberative perspective because design proponents 
offer neither compelling evidence nor argument for their assertion that 
methodological naturalism necessarily entails ontological naturalism. The refusal of 
design theorists to offer reasons for objecting to methodological naturalism based on 
mutually agreed upon rules of evidence and argument violates the principle of 
reciprocity. However, I also pointed out that the argument depends on knowing if 
design inferences refer to supernatural causes and knowing if ID theory offers 
compelling evidence for design inferences. To change the methods and standards of 
science to allow supernatural causes in scientific explanations, design proponents 
must offer compelling evidence that can be accepted by the wider scientific 
community.
The investigation into the scientific claims and religious content of ID 
revealed that design inferences refer to supernatural causes associated with sectarian 
religious belief and that ID proponents do not offer compelling evidence for the 
supernatural causation of biological phenomena based on mutually agreed upon 
scientific standards. Intelligent design proponents therefore continue to violate the 
principle of reciprocity. They also violate the principle of accountability by failing to 
address the claims of scientists, in terms they can accept, who would be significantly 
affected by the inclusion of supernatural causes in scientific explanations.
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Honesty. Intelligent design proponents argue that failure to teach the 
criticisms of evolutionary theory found in intelligent design texts violates the 
fundamental value of honesty in education. They argue that students ought to know 
that many scientists question the ability of natural selection to create biological 
complexity. I argued earlier that this argument depends on whether intelligent design 
is a religious theory.
The religious content of intelligent design clearly demonstrates that teaching 
criticisms of evolutionary theory based on the methods and standards of ID would not 
be consistent with the fundamental value of honesty in education. Honesty demands 
that public school policymakers acknowledge the sectarian religious content of ID 
and that policies that require scientific theories to be critically judged based on 
religious standards violates the basic liberty of students. Students in public schools 
are less able to identify and to resist sectarian religious beliefs when they are taught 
as true in science classrooms.
Ohio Revisited.
Some arguments in the conflict over the model lesson plan in Ohio depended 
on the answers to three questions: Is intelligent design a scientific theory? Is 
intelligent design a religious theory? and, Are intelligent design concepts and 
references in the model lesson plan? Answers to the first two questions have been 
provided, but I have yet to address the last. In this part of this section I will briefly 
suggest areas in the model lesson plan where ID concepts and references can be
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found.144 I also return to those arguments that required answers to the three questions 
to determine the effect of the answers on the arguments.
The first trace of the influence of intelligent design on the model lesson plan 
occurs in the fact that the lesson exists at all. The very idea of a “critical analysis of 
evolution” is central to the efforts of ID proponents to achieve a presence in public 
school science classrooms. The fact that the model lessons in the other sciences do 
not include “critical analysis” components indicates a connection between ID 
proponents and the existence of the plan. Historically, creationists have relied heavily 
on negative arguments against evolutionary theory to create doubts in unsophisticated 
minds about the power of natural selection to create biological complexity. The 
lesson plan appears to be just one more instance in a historical chain of creationist 
attempts at negative argumentation against evolutionary theory.
The presence of intelligent design concepts occurs most clearly in the 
definitions that are given for scientific terms and in the misleading text, with often 
unsupported claims, that accompanies the “Five Aspects of Evolution.” One of the 
signature traces ID theorists leave behind when they have been theorizing is, as Van 
Till pointed out, a “web of words that have been assigned extraordinarily unusual 
meanings” and misleading or false characterizations of evolutionary terms (Van Till, 
2002, p. 24-25). A theory is, for example, described as a “supposition,” and an 
“anomaly” is described as an idea rather than an observation or datum inconsistent 
with a theory. The lesson on homology contains misleading and false claims in the
1441 rely on some analyses provided by OCS, an anti-ID group in Ohio. It should be noted that this is a 
cursory review of the content of the lesson plan. My purpose is merely to establish the fact that 
intelligent design concepts and references do occur in the lesson plan. A more thorough review is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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“challenging answer.”145 The lesson on the fossil record contains misleading text in 
the “supporting answer” and unsupported claims, misrepresentations and a term not 
found in the technical vocabulary of biology (‘forms’) in the “challenging answer.” 
The lesson on antibiotic resistance includes an appeal to the ID standard of “causal 
specificity” by noting that the “speciation of bacteria has not been observed.” The 
lesson on peppered moths does not include recent research and makes a false claim in 
the “challenging answer.” And, finally, the lesson on endosymbiosis also contains an 
appeal for the intelligent design standard of “causal specificity” -  “scientists have not 
observed these cells changing into organelles such as mitochondria or chloroplasts.”
Direct references to intelligent design sources, including references to 
Jonathan Wells’ book Icons o f Evolution and to websites devoted to disseminating ID 
ideas, were deleted from the final lesson plan. However, the plan suggests that 
students do research on the web which includes looking up certain vocabulary words, 
and that research is likely to lead students directly to intelligent design sources, 
including www.am.org. www.discoverv.org and www.iscid.org.
Given the fact that the lesson plan “critically analyzes” only evolutionary 
theory and includes false definitions, misleading text, errors of fact, and unsupported 
claims that are associated with the negative arguments of intelligent design theorists, 
it is clear that the lesson plan is intended to indirectly and subtly promote ID as a 
scientific alternative to evolutionary theory. How, then, are the arguments in Ohio 
affected by the presence of intelligent design in the model lesson plan?
145 Case Western University professor Patricia Princehouse claims that the lesson plan “lies outright 
about the current content of scientific literature” in the lessons on the fossil record and peppered 
moths. In addition, the challenging answer in the lesson on homology is, in her view, “a clear 
argument for ‘special creation” (P. Princehouse, personal communication, March, 2004).
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I argued earlier that if the model lesson plan presents intelligent design theory 
as an appropriate standard for criticizing evolutionary theory, and if intelligent design 
allows supernatural causes in scientific explanations, then the lesson plan violates 
several deliberative principles. The lesson plan does, indirectly, through negative 
argumentation, present ID methods and standards as appropriate standards for 
criticizing evolutionary theory. And, as was argued earlier, ID does allow 
supernatural causes in scientific explanations. Consequently, the following principles 
are violated by the lesson plan. First, the principle of reciprocity is violated since the 
lesson plan indirectly requires students to apply a standard that is not mutually 
accepted by the wider community of scientists. Students would offer reasons for their 
criticisms of evolutionary theory based on the standards of intelligent design theory 
which are not mutually agreed to by the wider scientific community. Second, the 
principle of publicity is violated by the lesson plan because the lesson plan fails to 
state explicitly that the methods and standards of ID are indirectly promoted by the 
lesson. Third, the principle of accountability is violated because policymakers failed 
to give mutually acceptable reasons for indirectly adopting the methods and standards 
of ID in the lesson plan to all constituents who are affected by the plan. Fourth, and 
finally, the principle of basic opportunity is also likely violated because students are 
likely to reach conclusions about evolutionary biology that contradict the conclusions 
of decades of sound science. To the extent that those conclusions impair their ability 
to make sound scientific judgments in their personal and civic decisions, the basic 
opportunity of students to receive and adequate science education is violated.
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I also argued earlier that if critically analyzing evolutionary theory according 
to the lesson plan introduces supernatural causal explanations as appropriate for 
science and if the supernatural explanations of ID necessarily imply sectarian 
religious ideas, then the basic liberty of students would be violated. Since the lesson 
plan indirectly supports the introduction of supernatural causal explanations in 
scientific explanation for biological complexity, and since the supernatural 
explanations of ID necessarily imply sectarian religious beliefs, then the lesson plan 
violates the basic liberty of students by constraining their present and future religious 
beliefs.
The conflict over the Ohio model lesson plan and the conflict over the 
inclusion of intelligent design as an alternative scientific theory in school board 
rooms across the nation continue to be marked by nondeliberative disagreement even 
when the scientific and religious claims of ID are thoroughly investigated. I 
suggested earlier that taking the scientific and religious claims of ID proponents 
seriously and investigating those claims would not only yield judgments about ID’s 
scientific and religious status, but also illuminate areas of possible agreement. It 
appears, however, that there is no possibility of coming to any agreement since the 
claims of ID proponents appear to be corrupted by the deceptive pursuit of a religious 
agenda. The question now occurs: Why? Why are intelligent design proponents 
disguising their religious intent to “legitimate the assertion of a theistic worldview” 
behind unsupportable appeals to fairness, academic freedom, and honesty in 
education and through model lesson plans that indirectly introduce ID? I argue next
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that the answer to the question “Why?” lay in the perceptions ID proponents have 
about what is at stake in the conflict over ID.
The Perceived Stakes
The remarkable candor intelligent design theorists demonstrate in their early 
texts and pubic appearances about the religious consequences of ID is in marked 
contrast to their recent public pronouncements in school board meetings and in the 
content of their most recent texts. The notable difference between their religious 
pronouncements in certain venues and recent denials of any religious content in other 
venues is obvious. William Dembski, for example, described intelligent design in 
1999 as “a way of understanding divine action” (Dembski, 1999, p. 13); in 2001 as 
“.. .the Logos theology of John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory” 
(Dembski, 2001c, p. 192); and in 2002 as “a design-theoretic research program” that 
reconceptualizes biology “in information-theoretic terms” and considers “abiotic 
infusion of exogenous information [by an unembodied designer] as the great mystery 
confronting modem” biology (Dembski, 2002a, p. 324, 321).146 Now Dembski 
describes intelligent design in minimal terms. In 2003 he described ID as “the 
science that studies how to detect intelligence” (Dembski, 2003c, p. 1) and in 2004 as
146 In 1999 Dembski was also quite open about the scope of the effect he hoped intelligent design 
would have on the intellectual world.
“The implications of intelligent design are radical in the true sense of this much 
overused word. The question posed by intelligent design is not how we should do 
science and theology in light of the triumph of Enlightenment rationalism and scientific 
naturalism. The question rather is how we do science and theology in light of the 
impending collapse of Enlightenment rationalism and scientific naturalism. These 
ideologies are on the way out. They are on the way out not because they are false 
(although they are that) or because they have been bested by postmodemity (they 
haven’t) but because they are bankrupt. They have run out of steam. They lack the 
resources for making sense of an information age whose primary entity is information 
and whose only coherent account of information is design” (Dembski, ID, 1999, p. 14- 
15).
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“the science that studies signs of intelligence” (Dembski, 2004c, p. I).147 This sharp
excision of religious pronouncements is not only further evidence of an attempt to
deceptively insert sectarian religious ideas into public school science classes, it is
also, I contend, evidence of what ID proponents perceive to be at stake in the conflict
over ID -  proof of the truth of their sectarian religious ideas and the comprehensive
moral understandings that accompany it.
Mark Kelly, author of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The End o f Christian
Apologetics, is an intelligent design supporter who does not hesitate to state exactly
what is at stake if intelligent design can’t prove that Christianity is true.
The truth is religion and morals cannot be matters of personal opinion. They 
must be matters of fact that can be proven, or there is no way to create a society 
that is just and good. If no one can say what is true for others, then our world’s 
slide into moral chaos cannot be stopped.. .Science leads us to the conclusion 
that Creator God is real.. .The fact.. .is that the scientific evidence for intelligent 
design and historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that Christianity is true. (Kelly, 2004, p. 1,2)
Kelly is not alone among ID proponents who fear that the truth of Christianity and
Christian morality are at stake. Nancy Pearcey, for example, states “...people sense
instinctively that there is much more at stake here than a scientific theory -  that a link
exists between the material order and the moral order.. .the question of origins
determines our destiny.. .In God’s revelation we have s solid basis for morality,
purpose and dignity” (Pearcey, 2001, p. 45). Discovery Institute Senior Fellow John
G. West claims “intelligent design concerns the defense of traditional morality...it
may provide a powerful way to check the moral relativism spawned by scientific
materialism, especially in the areas of family life and sexual behavior” (West, 2001,
147 Nathalie Des Rosiers, President of the Law Commission of Canada noted in a speech that “a war of 
definitions designed to minimize [the] complexity [of an issue] does not provide a service in a 
deliberative society: it is merely a brutal exercise of power. Reducing a complex problem to its 
simplest expression deprives society of the benefits of deliberation...” (Des Rosiers, 2001, p. 9).
p. 67). And, as noted earlier, Phillip Johnson and William Dembski also hold that the 
truth of Christianity and the basis for Christian morality depend on the defeat of 
“Darwinism” by intelligent design.
Intelligent design proponents appear to realize that if they state their religious 
intentions clearly and publicly, they risk losing the opportunity to prove the scientific 
truth of their sectarian religious beliefs in public schools. Hence, their public appeals 
for ID consist of calls for “fairness,” “freedom of thought,” and “honesty” instead of 
“the truth of Christianity” and “the truth of Christian morality.” Minimal definitions 
of intelligent design serve the same purpose. Providing complete definitions and 
descriptions of ID would clarify the religious content of the idea of intelligent design 
and risk the exclusion of ID from science curricula.
Again, it appears that there is no possibility of finding common ground 
between ID proponents and opponents to ID. The perceived stakes in the minds of ID 
supporters are unlikely to resonate with those opposed to it. In the final part of this 
section, I suggest that there are values that citizens might come to hold in common in 
this conflict, and I suggest areas of the public school curricula where these common 
values could be promoted.
Accommodating Values
The virtue of mutual respect, I argued earlier, requires citizens to maintain an 
attitude of respect for the dignity and worth of one’s opponents even when they refuse 
to seek reasons for public policies that can be accepted by all citizens bound by those 
policies. In my view, when conflicts among citizens end in nondeliberative 
disagreement, citizens who are willing to seek reciprocal reasons for policies ought to
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continue to reason together and, without compromising their own moral convictions, 
accommodate the values of their opponents to the greatest extent possible. Citizens 
who continue to reason reciprocally after a nondeliberative disagreement ought to, in 
my view, extend the principles of accommodation, civic integrity and civic 
magnanimity, toward their opponents. The principle of civic integrity would require 
ID opponents to maintain consistency in their speech and actions and to accept the 
broader implications of the moral principles they espouse. But, since civic integrity 
requires individual citizens to affirm the moral status of their own political views, the 
principle of magnanimity which asks citizens to acknowledge the moral status of the 
positions they oppose has wider implications following nondeliberative disagreement. 
Applying the principle of magnanimity to the conflict over intelligent design would 
have the following consequences.
First, intelligent design opponents should acknowledge the deep religious and 
moral convictions of ID proponents. This does not mean that the ID critics ignore the 
false appeals ID supporters make to moral values such as “honesty” and “fairness,” 
Rather, it means that ID opponents acknowledge the deeper religious and moral 
convictions of ID proponents as worthy of respect even though there are justifiable 
reasons for not promoting those religious and moral convictions through public 
school policies and even though ID opponents may regard those convictions as 
wrong. If, as cultural anthropologist Christopher Tourney points out, advocating for 
intelligent design by proponents is “the existential stuff of their lives, the glue that 
binds together all the disparate selves of a self-respecting scientist or engineer, a 
righteous Christian, a dutiful parent, and a good citizen,” then the religious and moral
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convictions of ID proponents are more than just strategic or political attitudes that can 
easily be changed or discarded (Toumey, 1994, p. 264-265). Their convictions are, 
for them, the source of their dignity and worth, and, therefore, are worthy of respect 
by all citizens even though the arguments and tactics ID proponents engage in are not 
worthy of respect.
Second, extending civic magnanimity means that ID opponents ought to 
maintain an attitude of open-mindedness toward ID proponents by being willing to be 
convinced by some of the claims of ID advocates if they prove to be well grounded. 
The claim by ID advocates, for example, that some scientists, and perhaps some 
public school teachers, teach atheism as true because they believe evolutionary theory 
proves atheism is true may be a claim worth investigating. If methodological 
naturalism does not entail ontological naturalism, then teachers and scientists should 
not teach religious or anti-religious conclusions as true in public school science 
classrooms. Maintaining an open mind, then, can contribute to resolving some areas 
of concern to ID proponents thereby reducing the range of citizen disagreement and 
contributing to the possibility of living together in some measure of mutual respect .
Third, magnanimity asks citizens to provide rationales for public policies that 
minimize the rejection of the position they oppose. This is what Gutmann and 
Thompson call the disposition to seek an “economy of moral disagreement.”148 This 
means that ID critics should avoid unnecessary conflict in characterizing their own
148 Interestingly, Gutmann and Thompson state in a footnote that “the economy of moral disagreement 
supports mutual respect of conflicting moral perspectives as an end in itself, not just as a means for 
achieving agreement on political questions or promoting public reason” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 
p. 378, n44). It is interesting because it appears to contradict their earlier claim that, in the case of 
nondeliberative disagreement, citizens are not obligated to fulfill the obligations of mutual respect. If 
an economy of moral disagreement supports mutual respect of conflicting moral perspectives an end 
in itself, then it would seem that it is a disposition one would extend to one’s opponents in both 
nondeliberative and deliberative disagreements.
position or the position of ID proponents and that ID critics should search for areas of 
agreement with ID proponents. ID critics, for example, should restrain themselves 
from characterizing intelligent design as “a load of horseshit” and “worthless crap” as 
was done recently on a weblog devoted to, among other things, the integrity of 
science and science education (Dembski, 2004d, p. 4).149 Importantly, seeking 
rationales for policies that require minimizing the differences of citizens and 
encourages the search for common ground helps reveal those values that may be 
acceptable to all and worth pursuing in other areas of the curriculum.
In the remainder of this part, I briefly explore three possible values that may 
come to be held in common and be practiced by ID opponents and proponents alike, 
thereby helping to resolve and reduce the range of disagreement between them. I also 
suggest possible areas of the curriculum where the values could be promoted. The 
values are: the dignity and worth of individuals, humility and charity.
These three values appear to be required for the extension of civic 
magnanimity toward one’s opponents. I argue, then, that by extending civic 
magnanimity towards their opponents, ID critics are promoting values that can 
contribute to resolving the conflict over intelligent design and/or contribute to 
reducing the range of disagreement between citizens involved in this conflict. By 
embracing and modeling these values, ID critics signal their continued willingness to 
seek reasons for policies concerning intelligent design that can be accepted by all 
citizens bound by those policies.
149 Of course, if ID proponents were willing to seek reciprocal reasons for public school science 
education policies, they too should refrain from saying such things as “Darwin perpetrated the greatest 
intellectual swindle in the history of ideas” and that scientists “keep the propaganda mills running 
overtime, inflating Darwinism’s paltry successes” (Dembski, 2004e, p, 1, 3).
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Dignity and worth o f individuals. Respecting the dignity and worth of
individuals means that citizens recognize the deepest moral and religious convictions
of others as worthy of respect even if those convictions are not shared by all. One
important way of manifesting respect for the moral and religious convictions of others
is to acknowledge in public school curricula their role in the past and present life of
the United States, especially U.S. civic life. Unfortunately, public education in the
United States has, according to many scholars, failed to teach students about religion
and its important role in our history and civic life.150 Consequently, public schools,
including public universities, are accused of tacitly undermining or disparaging
religious belief and of helping create and sustain religious controversies.
Cell biologist and ID critic Ken Miller notes that when his students ask about
his religious convictions and find out that he is a practicing Catholic, students are
courteous, but surprised. How could he believe in God and be an ardent proponent of
evolutionary theory? According to Miller
It is simply taken for granted that smart, modem, well-informed people have 
risen above the level of petty superstition, which is exactly how any serious faith 
is regarded. Religion as culture.. .may be grudgingly accorded obligatory 
respect -  just enough, I am sure, to evade the nasty charge of cultural 
imperialism. But religion itself, genuine belief, just doesn’t belong. (Miller,
1999, p. 19; italic in original)
Yale Law School professor Stephen L. Carter adds that many educational, legal and
political leaders “refuse to accept the notion that rational, public-spirited people can
take religion seriously.” He sees a trend
...toward treating religious beliefs as arbitrary and unimportant, a trend 
supported by a rhetoric that implies that there is something wrong with religious 
devotion. More and more, our culture seems to take the position that believing 
deeply in the tenets of one’s faith represents a kind of mystical irrationality, 
something that thoughtful, public-spirited American citizens would do better to
150 See Nord & Haynes, 1998.
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avoid If you must worship your God, the lesson runs, at least have the courtesy 
to disbelieve in the power of prayer; if you must observe your Sabbath, have the 
good sense to understand that it is just like any other day off from work. (Carter, 
1993, p. 6-7)
Miller and Carter both agree that the lack of understanding and respect for the
important role religion plays in the lives of Americans helps fuel the conflict over
evolution. Miller argues that “public acceptance of evolution.. .doesn’t turn on the
logical weight of carefully considered scientific issues.” Rather, in Miller’s view, it
hinges on the effect the acceptance of evolution would have on their view of the
meaning and purpose of life itself.
In one sense, the popular culture embraces evolution just as it has the rest of 
science.. .But in another sense it rejects that premise soundly. Less than half of 
the US public believes that humans evolved from an earlier species. The reason,
I would argue, is not because they aren’t aware of the strength of the scientific 
evidence behind it. Instead, it is because of a well-founded belief that the 
concept of evolution is used routinely, in the intellectual sense, to justify and 
advance a philosophical worldview that they regard as hostile and even alien to 
their lives and values. (Miller, 1999, p. 167)
Carter argues that the “perception of creationists as backward, irrational, illiberal
fanatics -  not too smart and not too deserving of respect” is unwise given the fact that
scores of millions of Americans may actually approve of teaching creationism in
biology classrooms. These Americans are not “utterly stupid,” they just do not draw
“a neat line between the religious and the secular, either on questions of politics and
morality or on questions about the natural world” (Carter, 1993, p. 159-160).
It certainly appears that fostering the value of the dignity and worth of
individuals through a deeper understanding of and respect for their moral and
religious convictions could contribute to resolving some areas of the conflict over ID
and/or to reducing the range of disagreement. Boston Law School professor Jay D.
Wexler argues that the remedy to the conflict over intelligent design is “not to reform
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science education but rather to teach students more about religion and, specifically,
about religious views on the origins of life” (Wexler, 2003, p. 759-760; italics in
original). In his view, teaching about religion ought to occur in social science
classrooms as part of a general civics program that prepares students for citizenship.
“If public education is best conceived of as ‘civic education’.. .then the omission of
religious studies is harmful because it is simply impossible to understand the public
life of the nation (or the world) without understanding something about religion.
(Wexler, p. 778). Wexler further argues that a strong case can be made for including
religious views on origins as a way to achieve civic goals. One goal of civic
education that can be furthered by teaching religious views on origins is the goal of
understanding how government laws affect religious belief. The conflict between
religious views on origins and evolution “represents a paradigmatic and accessible
example of how government action can burden religious believers... students... will
gain insight into how believers feel when they are forced to study something that
violates their basic beliefs” (Ibid, p, 783).15i Another goal of civic education that can
be furthered by teaching religious views on origins is the goal of understanding how
religious and nonreligious people think about important civic questions.
...citizens who are deeply religious will often think about public issues 
differently from those who are not.. .for a great many Americans, religious 
claims about origins simply take precedence over conflicting scientific claims.
This is because those religious citizens have a different way of understanding 
the world; their epistemology is at odds with those that consult science
151 Phillip Johnson, for example, writes
Creationists are disqualified from making a positive case, because science by definition 
is based upon naturalism. The rules of science also disqualify any purely negative 
argumentation designed to dilute the persuasiveness of the theory of evolution. 
Creationism is thus out of court and out of the classroom - before any consideration of 
evidence. Put yourself in the place of a creationist who has been silenced by that logic, 
and you may feel like a criminal defendant who has just been told that the law does not 
recognize so absurd a concept as “innocence” (Johnson, 1990, p. 9).
first.. .For those who take science as their starting point.. .this just seems 
completely incomprehensible. As a result, meaningful discourse over origins 
and origins education becomes impossible, and the discourse often turns uncivil 
and hostile. (Ibid, p. 784-785)
In Wexler’s view, teaching about religion and religious views on origins as part of 
civic education could lead citizens to treat each other with greater “empathy, 
tolerance, and mutual respect” (Ibid, p. 786).
Respecting the deepest moral and religious convictions of ID proponents may 
not solve the conflict over intelligent design, but knowledge that their dignity and 
worth as individuals is recognized by ID critics and promoted by public school 
curricula may encourage them to begin to seek reasons for public policies on ED that 
are mutually acceptable to all who are bound by those policies.
Humility. Civic magnanimity asks citizens to remain open to the possibility 
that some of the views or claims of their adversaries may have merit. Gutmann and 
Thompson point out that institutional and personal habits can discourage citizens 
from modifying their views in the direction of their opponents or from accepting their 
opponents’ position in the future if the facts of a case change (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996, p. 83). To break out of those institutional and personal habits and 
to begin to be open minded toward one’s opponents means that one must, I argue, 
embrace the value of humility. Embracing the value of humility does not mean that 
one cannot affirm one’s own moral and religious or anti-religious views strongly and 
consistently. Rather, it means that people ought to “seek a balance between holding
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firm convictions and being prepared to change them when one encounters objections
that, on reflection, one cannot answer” (Ibid, p. 83-84).152
Intelligent design proponents have the firm conviction that their religious
understandings have great epistemic worth, i.e. that their religious convictions count
as ‘knowledge.’ That conviction is shared by many religious people who are not ID
supporters. In fact, many religious people place such great value on their religious
knowledge that they use that knowledge to inform every facet of their lives, including
their political lives. Some opponents to ID reject the view that religious
understandings result in any sort of meaningful knowledge and, in fact, are
epistemically worthless. This is an example, I would argue, of a place where the
value of humility and virtue of open-mindedness can be brought to bear in the conflict
over intelligent design.
Some scholars argue that religious convictions are an appropriate basis for
developing the reasons one gives for voting and for supporting public policies and
those reasons do not necessarily need to be conditioned by secular concerns. Notre
Dame philosopher Paul Weithman, for example, argues that “citizens may rely on
religious arguments and vote their religious convictions even if they are not prepared
to make good their arguments or justify their votes by appeal to reasons of other
kinds” (Weithman, 2002, p. 212). U.S. Naval Academy philosophy professor
Christopher Eberle agrees. He argues that
A citizen has an obligation sincerely and conscientiously to pursue a widely 
convincing secular rationale for her favored coercive laws, but she doesn’t have 
an obligation to withhold support from a coercive law for which she lacks a 
widely convincing secular rationale. (Eberle, 2002, p. 10)
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152 Gutmann and Thompson do not mention the value or virtue of humility. I am arguing that humility 
is necessary for the practice of civic magnanimity.
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Of course other scholars take exception to the views of Weithman and Eberle 
and argue that religious reasons for political actions and decision-making must be 
tempered by secular standards of ethics. Philosopher Robert Audi, for example, 
argues that
.. .where religious considerations appropriately bear on matters of public 
morality or of political choice, religious people have a prima facie obligation -  
at least insofar as they have civic virtue -  to seek an equilibrium between those 
considerations and relevant secular standards of ethics and political 
responsibility. (Audi, 2000, p. 136)
Importantly, Audi does not dismiss the value of religious reasons for political
decisions; he only argues they must be conditioned by secular concerns.
By remaining open to the possibility that there can be good arguments for
relying on religiously grounded moral beliefs when giving reasons for political
actions and decisions, and by remaining open to being convinced or partially
convinced by those arguments, intelligent design critics may help create an
atmosphere of mutual cooperation among citizens. Such an atmosphere could
encourage ID proponents to seek reciprocal reasons for public policies on ID; it also
could contribute to reducing the range of disagreements among citizens over
intelligent design. Importantly, it is humility that makes possible the virtue of open-
mindedness which is required for the extension of civic magnanimity.
Charity. The final component of civic magnanimity is the disposition to seek
an economy of moral disagreement where citizens attempt to provide reasons for
public policies that minimize the rejection of opposing positions. Simply put, it
means that citizens are charitable in their characterizations of their opponents and
their views and charitable in affirming those aspects of the moral views of their
opponents that are acceptable to all. ID critics must embrace the value of charity in 
order to seek an economy of moral disagreement with intelligent design proponents.
It is obviously difficult to act charitably toward others who refuse to seek 
mutually acceptable reasons for public policies and who may unjustly vilify those 
who do. Acting charitably, however, can defuse and redirect the often hostile context 
of discourse that occurs between ID proponents and opponents thereby creating an 
opening for the search for common ground. Of course, this does not mean that those 
aspects of the claims and actions of intelligent design proponents that are 
unacceptable and pernicious should be ignored. Rather, extending charity towards 
one’s opponents may create an atmosphere in which moral growth can occur in both 
ID proponents and those who oppose them thereby increasing the possibility of 
finding ways in which the domain of public disagreement over intelligent design may 
be reduced.
An example of another, more contentious and dangerous, public conflict in 
which the extension of charity helped diffuse and redirect, but not excuse or ignore, 
unacceptable claims and behavior is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa following the defeat of the policy of apartheid. While that situation was 
far more extreme and more deeply unjust than the conflict over intelligent design and 
public school science curricula, there are lessons critics of ID can learn from those 
who were able to acknowledge the humanity of their oppressors despite the deep 
injustices the oppressors inflicted on South Africans. It also helps to put the conflict 
over ID in perspective. Too often the overwrought claims of ID proponents and 
opponents create the impression that the conflict over teaching evolutionary theory
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focuses on the primary injustice in public schooling today. While it is a great 
injustice to withhold an adequate science education from public school students and 
to violate their basic liberty to resist compulsory religious belief, there are arguably 
much greater injustices that take place in public schools every day.153 ID critics 
would be wise to embrace the value of charity and seek an economy of moral 
disagreement with those who oppose them so that the difficult task of reducing the 
range of moral disagreement among citizens over science education can begin.
This chapter began with an investigation into the claim by ID proponents that 
determining the characteristics and identity of the unembodied intelligent designer 
who abiotically infuses information into physical systems to create and guide life is 
beyond the scope of ID. I argued that when design theorists claim that intelligent 
design is compatible with many religious traditions but not with theistic evolutionary 
religious convictions, they begin to reveal the sectarian religious content of intelligent 
design theory. The religious content of ID refers to religious ideas that constitute the 
essential meaning of the theory. I argued that since the content of the animating idea 
of intelligent design theory is identical to the content of the central animating idea of 
traditional religions, ID is undeniably a traditional religious idea. I also argued that 
the meaning of the idea in intelligent design theory that natural causes are incapable 
of creating complex biological systems necessarily implies sectarian religious ideas.
In addition, the idea in ID theory that supernatural intelligent agency is empirically 
detectable is a sectarian idea resulting from the religious literalism inherent in the 
defining concept of ID -  theistic realism. I concluded that intelligent design theory is
153 See Howe, 1997.
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not only a religious theory; it is a sectarian religious theory that necessarily excludes 
competing religious and anti-religious convictions.
In the final section of this chapter I investigated, from a deliberative 
perspective, the effect the religious content has on the arguments by design theorists 
for including ID in public school science classrooms. I argued that the religious 
content has a determinative effect on the arguments that appealed to fairness and 
freedom of thought, academic freedom, censorship and honesty. In each of those 
arguments, ID proponents violated in some way the process and content principles of 
deliberative democratic theory. I also revisited the conflict over the model lesson 
plan in Ohio to determine if ID concepts and references are included in the plan. I 
concluded that the model lesson plan indirectly promotes the methods and standards 
of intelligent design theory thereby violating the principles of reciprocity, publicity, 
accountability, basic liberty and basic opportunity. The model lesson plan cannot be 
justified, from a deliberative perspective, to all citizens who are bound by it.
Clearly, ID proponents perceive the truth of their religious faith and the moral 
understandings which accompany it to be at stake in the conflict over intelligent 
design. I argued at the end of this chapter that even though ID proponents refuse to 
candidly reveal their religious fears and intentions and even though they continue to 
offer reasons for including ID theory in science classrooms that cannot be justified 
from a deliberative perspective, ID critics should extend the accommodating 
principles, especially civic magnanimity, to their opponents. By extending civic 
magnanimity, ID critics promote values that can contribute to resolving the conflict
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over intelligent design and/or contribute to reducing the domain of the conflict 
between citizens.
In the concluding chapter to this dissertation I briefly address the question of 
where intelligent design can justifiably be placed ID in school curricula, and I reflect 
on the promise a deliberative perspective brings to the conflict over ID and public 
school science education.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
On May 15,2004 the Minnesota legislature adopted new science standards for 
Minnesota public schools. Included in the science standards for the ninth through 
twelfth grades is a “benchmark” under the “History and Nature of Science” that reads 
in part, “The student will be able to explain how scientific and technological 
innovations as well as new evidence can challenge portions of or entire accepted 
theories and models including.. .[the] theory of evolution.. ..”154 The associated press 
reported on May 17 that it was “critical” for the Minnesota legislature to adopt new 
science standards this year “because the [state] education department is in the process 
of designing three new science exams pegged to the standards. They are required 
under the federal No Child Left Behind law.”155
In a press release issued on the same day as the AP story, the Discovery 
Institute announced that “Minnesota has become the second state to require students 
to know about scientific evidence critical of Darwinian evolution in its newly adopted 
science standards.” Noting that the Discovery Institute “supports teaching students 
more about evolutionary theory including introducing them to mainstream, peer- 
reviewed scientific debates over key aspects of modem evolutionary theory,” John 
West, associate director of the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture, 
stated
154 Minnesota Department of Education, “Minnesota Academic Standards: Science K -  12.” Available 
at http://education.state.mn.us/content/072583.pdf. ,  p. 16. Accessed 6/04.
155 “Meet Minnesota’s New Social Studies Standards,” Associated Press International, May 17, 2004.
This is a significant victory for the vast majority of Americans who favor 
teaching evolution but who want it taught fully, including scientific criticisms of 
the theory.. .Undoubtedly some Darwin-only supporters will claim that the 
standard doesn’t really mean what it says, or that schools don’t really need to 
follow it. Minnesotans who support the standard will need to make sure that it is 
actually implemented in Minnesota schools. (Discovery Institute, 2004d)
John West’s comments and the comments of Bob Lattimer from Ohio
regarding the need for questions on state science exams that cover “critical analysis”
of evolution indicate that battles over the teaching of evolutionary theory and the
introduction of intelligent design in public school science classrooms in the United
States will continue to endure. The aim of this dissertation has been to advance
public understanding of the conflict over teaching intelligent design in public schools
and to encourage policymakers to reduce the range of moral disagreement among
citizens on this topic by engaging in principled deliberative decision-making when
formulating public school policy concerning intelligent design. I have addressed
three of four important questions that public school policymakers face when they are
confronted with requests to include, either directly or indirectly, design theory in
school science curricula: 1) How can public school policymakers reach justifiable
policy decisions on the topic of ID when citizens have deep moral disagreements
about its placement in school curricula? 2) Is intelligent design theory a scientific
theory? and 3) Is intelligent design a religious theory? The fourth question this
dissertation set out to answer -  Where does intelligent design belong in public school
curricula? -  has only partially been addressed.
In this conclusion I briefly address the question of where public school 
policymakers can justifiably place ID in school curricula, and I defend once again the 
choice of a deliberative perspective by public school policymakers for weighing the
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claims of citizens in the conflict over intelligent design and public school science 
education.
Justifiable Public School Policies on Intelligent Design 
A deliberative perspective on public policy decision-making asks 
policymakers to weigh the content of public policies against the principles of basic 
liberty and basic opportunity. Earlier in this dissertation I suggested that a plausible 
paternalistic argument could be made for excluding ID as a scientific theory in public 
school science classes and for restricting public school science investigations to 
natural causal explanations based on the principle of basic liberty. I also suggested 
that three areas of educational opportunity are relevant to the conflict over ID -  
education in the biological sciences, education about religion and civic education. In 
the discussion that follows, I return to the paternalistic argument to consider whether 
it is justifiable from a deliberative perspective. I also offer reasons based on the 
principle of basic opportunity for including ID in classes that teach about the history 
and philosophy of science, in classes that teach about religion and in civics classes. 
Basic Liberty — A Paternalistic Argument
A paternalistic argument for excluding ID from science classes as a scientific 
theory and for restricting public school science investigations to natural causal 
explanations can be made as follows. First, intelligent design allows supernatural 
causes in scientific explanations. The supernatural causes associated with ID 
necessarily imply certain sectarian religious understandings. Second, it is not in the 
best interest of children to teach sectarian religious views as true in science classes.
To do so would violate the present and future mental integrity of students, i.e., it
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would constrain their present and future religious beliefs. Third, public school 
policymakers have an obligation to protect the basic liberty of all public school 
children. Fourth, restricting scientific explanations to natural causes places fewer 
constraints on religious belief than teaching certain sectarian religious beliefs as true 
in science classes. Fifth, and finally, since most people would resist compulsory 
sectarian religious belief and children are less able to understand and resist sectarian 
religious beliefs that are presented as true in public school science classes, public 
school policymakers should exclude ED from science classes as a scientific theory and 
limit scientific explanations offered in public school science classes to natural causal 
explanations.
An objection to this paternalistic argument could be made by parents who 
claim to have the exclusive right to educational authority over their children, 
including the right to pass on their sectarian beliefs and values unimpeded by the 
state. They could argue that schools who teach evolutionary theory in public school 
science classes are violating the absolute freedom of parents to teach their children 
that their sectarian religious beliefs are scientifically true. In their view, their 
sectarian religious beliefs are not a matter of “free choice;” their religious beliefs are 
an inescapable obligation that follows from the truth of their religious convictions
At least two responses can be made to this objection from a deliberative 
perspective. First, when public schools protect the present and future basic liberty of 
children, the schools are exercising their duty to educate children in good citizenship. 
Good citizenship requires all citizens to respect the basic liberty of others to resist 
compulsory sectarian religious belief. When parents insist that schools must teach the
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sectarian views of their family to all children in public schools, they are claiming to 
have unconditional authority not only over their own children, but also over all future 
citizens. That claim cannot be accepted by others as a basis for resolving 
disagreements about school policies. Schools and parents share authority over the 
education of future citizens, and “no citizen can fairly claim that what constitutes 
good citizenship is whatever happens to conform to his or her particular religion” 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 67). The claim of unconditional authority over 
the education of future citizens by parents who want their sectarian religious beliefs 
taught as true in public school science classes does not meet the requirements of 
reciprocity.
Second, when public schools protect the present and future basic liberty of 
students, they are teaching future citizens the value of mutual respect. Mutual respect 
is essential for making reciprocal claims and, therefore, for principled deliberative 
political reasoning and for the principles of accommodation. Parents who want their 
sectarian religious beliefs taught as true in public schools deny the value of mutual 
respect and thereby signal their rejection of the principle of reciprocity and the 
principled political reasoning and accommodating principles reciprocity supports. To 
criticize or reject the value of mutual respect and the principles it supports, parents 
must propose some other basis for cooperation among citizens who disagree other 
than merely arguing that their religious beliefs are true. In the absence of justifiable 
alternatives to reciprocity and the value of mutual respect, public schools can 
justifiably, based on the paternalistic argument from basic liberty, exclude intelligent
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design as a scientific theory from public school science classes and limit scientific 
explanations offered in public school science classes to natural causal explanations. 
Basic Opportunity and Public School Policy on ID
The basic opportunity principle requires public school policy makers to 
provide students with an adequate education, i.e. an education that allows citizens to 
live a good or decent life and to participate in a deliberative democracy. The purpose 
of the basic opportunity principle is to “help create the background circumstances that 
are necessary for adequate deliberation itself’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p.
349). Three areas of educational opportunity are relevant to the conflict over 
intelligent design in public schools -  education in the biological sciences, education 
about religion and civic education. In the paragraphs that follow, I offer brief 
reasons, based on the opportunity principle, for including ID in classes that teach 
about the history and philosophy of science, in classes that teach about religion and in 
civics classes.
History and philosophy o f science. Supernatural causal explanations for 
natural phenomena were, for millennia, common among people who sought to 
explain those phenomena. Even after the advent of modem science, appeals to 
supernatural causes for the origin of complex biological systems were accepted as 
plausible explanations among naturalists for hundreds of years. It is understandable, 
then, that the theory of evolution created a furor among religious believers one 
hundred and fifty years ago when it claimed to demonstrate that natural causes alone 
can create biological complexity. The theory of evolution was perceived as a threat 
to religious belief by many, especially by biblical literalists, and efforts immediately
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were undertaken to rebut the claims of evolutionary theorists. From an historical 
perspective, the intelligent design movement is only the latest in a long line of 
attempts by religious literalists to refute the theory of evolution and to reinstate 
religious explanations for the origin of complex biological systems, especially the 
origin of human beings.
Given the long history of religious attempts to reinstate supernatural causal 
explanations for biological phenomena in scientific explanations, it is plausible to 
argue that an adequate education in science would be lacking if students were unable 
to locate the conflict over intelligent design within the history and philosophy of 
science and to understand why the wider community of scientists now practice 
methodological naturalism. The ability to place the conflict over ID within the broad 
context of the history and philosophy of science and to appreciate the reasons why 
scientists practice methodological naturalism could contribute to reducing one of the 
sources of moral conflict in the dispute over ID -  incomplete understanding.
Teaching about religion. Teaching about the conflict over intelligent design 
in classes that teach about religion can contribute to the basic opportunity of students 
to receive an adequate education in two ways. First, as I noted earlier, it is not 
implausible to argue that a minimally decent life is one in which the value of mutual 
respect inhibits human antipathy toward religious belief or anti-religious belief. 
Teaching about the religious content of ID and the significance of religious belief in 
the lives of ID proponents in classes that teach about religion can lead to a deeper 
understanding of and respect for the religious grounds of their convictions. 
Specifically, it may contribute to reducing vitriolic attacks on the religious beliefs of
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ID proponents and focus attention on the fact that those beliefs provide, in the view of 
ID proponents, the basis of their dignity and worth as individuals. A reduction in the 
antipathy some ID critics have toward ID proponents through the recognition of their 
religious beliefs as the source of their dignity and worth may contribute to a 
minimally decent, more civil life for all citizens.
Second, teaching respect for the religious grounds of the convictions of ID 
proponents in classes that teach about religion may promote the value of humility 
thereby enabling future citizens to practice civic magnanimity toward others with 
whom they nondeliberatively disagree. Civic magnanimity asks citizens to remain 
open to the possibility that some of the views or claims of their adversaries may have 
merit. By teaching respect for the religious views of others in classes that teach about 
religion, students may learn to remain open-minded when considering the claims of 
ID proponents.
Civic education. A deliberative perspective on the conflict over intelligent 
design depends on the ability and willingness of citizens to seek fair terms of social 
cooperation for their own sake. Civics courses that teach the value of offering 
reasons for political actions based on principles that can be accepted by others 
contribute to the basic opportunity of students to participate in democratic 
deliberations, including deliberations over the appropriate placement of ID in school 
curricula. Importantly, teaching students about other political frameworks for 
decision-making that are available to citizens and applying them to the conflict over 
ID can help students learn the advantages of a deliberative perspective when 
disagreements among citizens have deep moraPdimensions.
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The Promise of a Deliberative Perspective on Intelligent Design 
Deliberative democratic political theory promotes a conception of democracy 
that seriously attempts to address moral conflicts in American civic life. The core 
idea of a deliberative democracy consists of the simple notion that “when citizens or 
their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to 
reach mutually acceptable decisions” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 1). In this 
dissertation I have adapted and applied the deliberative democratic political 
framework for decision-making that Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson developed 
in their book Democracy and Disagreement to the conflict over intelligent design and 
public school science education. I have argued that the conflict over ID is rooted in 
deep moral disagreement over values that are perceived to be at stake in this conflict, 
and that a deliberative approach to public school policy decision-making offers the 
best possibility for resolving and/or reducing the range of disagreements among 
citizens over the appropriate placement of ID in school curricula. When the decisions 
of public school policy makers are conditioned by the process and content principles 
promoted by a deliberative perspective, the policies that result from their decisions 
are more likely to be justifiable to all citizens who are bound by them.
A deliberative perspective on the conflict over intelligent design, as I have 
developed and applied it, encourages not only policymakers but all citizens to 
maintain an attitude of respect for the dignity and worth of ID proponents even when 
they refuse to seek reasons for public school policies that can be accepted by all 
persons bound by those policies. The virtue of mutual respect, in my view, requires 
people who are willing to continue to reason reciprocally even in the face of
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nondeliberative disagreement to extend the accommodating principle of civic 
magnanimity toward ID proponents. By 1) acknowledging the moral status of the 
views they oppose, 2) maintaining an attitude of open-mindedness, and 3) seeking 
reasons for public policies that minimize the rejection of opposing views, citizens 
promote values that may come to be held in common and practiced by ID opponents 
and proponents alike, thereby promoting moral learning.
That is the promise of a deliberative perspective on the conflict over 
intelligent design -  it supports a political process that promotes moral learning. In a 
deliberative democracy, “citizens put their moral beliefs to the test of public 
deliberation, and strengthen their convictions or change their minds in response to the 
arguments presented in a politics governed by reciprocity” (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996, p. 93). Importantly, a deliberative perspective does not require people to 
change their first order moral beliefs, but it does “encourage them to discover what 
aspects of those beliefs could be accepted as principles and policies by other persons 
with whom they fundamentally disagree” (Ibid., p. 93). Thus, when public school 
policy makers engage in deliberative democratic political decision-making in the 
conflict over ID, they encourage all citizens to leam the most defensible way they can 
attempt to gain collective acceptance of individual moral beliefs.
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Department of
Education APPENDIX A
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
Ohio Standards 
Connection:
Life Sciences
Benchmark H 
Describe a foundation of 
biological evolution as the 
change in gene frequency 
of a population over time. 
Explain the historical and 
current scientific 
developments, mechanisms 
and processes of biological 
evolution. Describe how 
scientists continue to 
investigate and critically 
analyze aspects of 
evolutionary theory. (The 
intent of this benchmark 
does not mandate the 
teaching or testing of 
intelligent design.)
Indicator 23 
Describe how scientists 
continue to investigate and 
critically analyze aspects of 
evolutionary theory. (The 
intent of this indicator does 
not mandate the teaching 
or testing of intelligent 
design.)
Scientific Ways of  
Knowing
Benchmark A 
Explain that scientific 
knowledge must be based 
on evidence, be predictive, 
logical, subject to 
modification and limited to 
the natural world.
Indicator 2
Describe that scientists 
may disagree about 
explanations of 
phenomena, about 
interpretation of data or 
about the value of rival
Lesson Summary:
This lesson allows students to critically analyze five 
different aspects o f evolutionary theory. As new scientific 
data emerge, scientists' understandings of the natural world 
may become enhanced, modified or even changed all 
together. Using library and Internet sources, groups of 
students will conduct background research for one of the 
aspects o f evolution in preparation for a critical analysis 
discussion. Students also will listen to, and take notes on, 
their classmates' critical analyses o f evolution theory.
Estimated Duration: Four to six hours
Commentary:
This lesson should be used midway or toward the end of a 
unit on evolution. This will allow students to “carry over” 
their knowledge of basic evolutionary concepts into this 
lesson. The strength of this lesson lies in having students 
research topics that interest them about evolutionary 
biology. Students are encouraged to consider the research 
and discuss their findings with fellow students.
Pre- Assessment:
• The following items can be used to stimulate dialogue 
with the students.
• Instruct students to copy the following items from the 
chalkboard in their science lab notebook.
1. Describe anomalies and explain why they exist.
2. Are there any benefits to exploring scientific 
anomalies?
3. How do scientists make and test predictions?
How do scientists critically analyze conflicting data? 
Define the following terms in your own words:
• Theory
• Critical analysis
• Natural selection
• Biological evolution
• Macroevolution
• Microevolution 
Direct students to respond to the questions in their science 
notebook in as much detail as possible leaving space to 
record information from the ensuing dialogue to add to 
their notes.
4.
5.
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response to criticism and 
open communication are 
integral to the process of 
science.
Indicator 3
Recognize that science is a 
systematic method of 
continuing investigation, 
based on observation, 
hypothesis testing, 
measurement, 
experimentation, and 
theory building, which 
leads to more adequate 
explanations of natural 
phenomena.
Scoring Guidelines:
Collect pre-assessments and evaluate for indication of 
prior knowledge and/or misconception. Sample definitions 
for question five in the pre-assessment include, but are not 
limited to, the following:
• Theory
A supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain 
something, especially one based on general principles 
independent of the thing to be explained.
• Critical analysis
The separation of an intellectual idea into its 
constituent parts for the purpose of a careful, exact 
evaluation and judgment about those parts and their 
interrelationships in making up a whole. (This 
definition combines the definition for critical and 
analysis.)
• Natural selection
The principle that in a given environment, individuals 
having characteristics that aid survival will produce 
more offspring, and the proportion of individuals 
having such characteristics will increase with each 
succeeding generation.
• Biological evolution
Changes in the genetic composition of a population 
through successive generations.
• Macroevolution
Large-scale evolution occurring over geologic time 
that results in the formation of new taxonomic groups.
• Microevolution
Evolution resulting from a succession of relatively 
small genetic variations that often cause the formation 
of new subspecies.
Post-Assessment:
• Describe why scientific critical analysis of evolution is 
important.
• Describe one major pieces of evidence used to support 
evolution and explain why it is important.
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• Describe one piece of evidence used to challenge 
evolution and explain why it is important.
• Compare and contrast the supporting and 
challenging information regarding the aspect of 
evolution you studied.
• Evaluate the scientific data supporting and 
challenging areas of evolution in light of the 
scientific method. In other words, is the data that is 
used to support or challenge evolution consistent or 
inconsistent with the scientific method? Are there 
any limitations? (NOTE: steps of scientific method: 
Observation, hypothesis, test, retest and conclusion)
Instructional Procedures:
Instructional Tip:
Scientists make a distinction between two areas of 
evolutionary theory. First, scientists consider mutation, 
natural selection, genetic drift and gene flow 
(immigration and emigration) as the processes that 
generate evolutionary changes in organisms and 
populations. Second, the theory of universal common 
descent describes the historical pattern of biological 
change. This theory maintains that all living forms have 
descended from earlier living forms and ultimately 
from a single common ancestor. Darwin envisioned the 
theory of universal common descent as a necessary 
result of evolutionary changes in organisms and 
populations, and represented it in his branching tree of 
life. Students will investigate and analyze these two 
areas of evolutionary theory in this lesson.
In addition to the distinctions between different areas of 
evolutionary theory, scientists also find it helpful to 
distinguish amounts of biological change or evolution. 
Microevolution refers to evolution resulting from a 
succession of relatively small genetic variations that 
often cause the formation of new subspecies. 
Macroevolution refers to large-scale evolution 
occurring over geologic time that results in the 
formation of new taxonomic groups. These terms are 
helpful distinctions in the course of analyzing
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evolutionary theory. These terms have appeared in 
OhioLink research databases, numerous Internet sites, 
and biology and evolution textbooks. Though “micro” 
and “macro” are prefixes, it is quite clear that the 
scientific community recognizes and acknowledges the 
distinction between the words. To help ensure academic 
clarity, this lesson distinguishes between 
microevolution and macroevolution. Teachers may 
need to provide support to students to help them 
understand this distinction throughout the lesson.
Student Engagement
1. Write the following statement on the chalkboard or 
overhead:
Anomalies are observations in science that depart 
from the general consensus of the time. Many 
anomalies occur in science. Scientists create 
hypotheses to explain these anomalies and then 
carry out experiments to try to disprove their 
hypotheses. Disproven hypotheses are rejected and 
those that are not disproven are subjected to further 
testing.
2. Ask students to think through the following science 
topics and discuss where anomalies led to the 
collection of data that further explained the 
phenomena and contributed to changing scientific 
understandings.
• Spontaneous generation versus 
biogenesis
Several pieces of data could be used.
One example is Francesco Redi’s 
observation that flies must contact meat 
in order for maggots to appear on the 
meat.
• Geocentric versus Heliocentric 
Several pieces of data could be used.
One example is the observed phases of 
Venus.
3. Ask students to cite additional areas where critical 
analysis is needed by the scientific community.
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4. Present supporting and challenging information for 
five aspects of evolution found in Attachment A. 
This will give students background information 
concerning both supporting and challenging 
evidence. Students can use this information to focus 
their research.
Instructional Tip:
Alternative strategies for beginning this lesson could be 
to engage students in a Socratic discussion or a mini­
lecture. See the Web site for student research at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory for guidelines on the 
Socratic method. The Web address is listed in the 
Technology Connections section.
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5. Form groups consisting of two to four students. 
Assign each group a number to help monitor their 
activities and assignments during the lesson.
6. Allow the groups to pick (or assign) one of the five 
aspects of evolutionary theory. Assign two groups 
to research each aspect. The aspects are:
Aspect 1: Homology (anatomical and 
molecular)
Aspect 2: Fossil Record 
Aspect 3: Anti-Biotic Resistance 
Aspect 4: Peppered Moths 
Aspect 5: Endosymbiosis
7. Distribute Attachment B, Investigative Worksheet, 
to help guide research. Allow time for the two 
groups assigned the same aspect to research their 
topic by answering questions on the Investigative 
Worksheet. Have groups use the worksheet as a 
guide to help them research supporting and 
challenging data on their particular aspect of 
evolution. The worksheet will help students 
organize their ideas and facilitate their critical 
analysis.
Instructional Tip:
Attachment B, Investigative Worksheet, has questions 
that can be applied to all five aspects. This will help 
students become familiar with the data, and therefore be 
able to critically analyze the evidence for either the 
supporting side or the challenging side. As they 
complete the worksheet, the group members may all 
work together on each question, or divide the questions 
among themselves and then share their findings as a 
group.
8. After the groups have completed their research, 
collect the Investigative Worksheets and review them. 
Return the worksheet to them prior to the next step of 
the instructional procedures; the critical analysis 
activity. The Investigative Worksheet is a formative 
assessment which will enable the teacher to check the 
student work and if necessary, assist in any way to help
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ensure student success on his or her critical analysis 
activity.
Critical Analysis Activity
9. Allow the students to spend time researching and 
preparing for the critical analysis activity on both 
the supporting and challenging information. Prior to 
the activity, randomly determine which of the two 
groups will present supporting information and 
which will present challenging information. You 
may have groups draw cards to help objectively 
determine if they will research the supporting or 
challenging information.
Instructional Tip:
Encourage all students to participate in the critical 
analysis activity because the experience will be a 
learning opportunity. Be prepared, however, to 
distribute alternate assignments to students who do not 
want to participate.
10. Hand out Attachment C, Critical Analysis Rubric, 
to help students understand the materials they need 
to prepare and how they should conduct their 
presentations.
11. Ask each group to write out their introduction, 
outline their presentations and write their 
conclusions. Have students practice their 
presentations to be sure that they are concise.
12. Have two pairs of students address each aspect.
Have one group present the data that support an 
aspect and the other group present the data that 
challenge the aspect. Flip a coin to decide which 
group begins the critical analysis activity. Instruct 
each side to present its research. The teacher will 
serve as facilitator to assure that the groups remain 
on task and on time. There are no winners or losers
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in this critical analysis activity. This is a sharing of 
the results of their research concerning evolution.
13. Encourage students to actively participate as they 
critically analyze their assigned aspect. To ensure 
that they remain
engaged as they watch and listen to the other 
groups, distribute copies of Attachment D, Critical 
Analysis
Worksheet, and have them take notes. At the 
conclusion of the lesson, this worksheet will be 
turned in for a grade.
14. Use Attachment C, Critical Analysis Rubric, to 
evaluate each group's presentation.
15. Proceed to the post-assessment to evaluate students' 
understanding.
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Differentiated Instructional Support:
Instruction is differentiated according to learner needs, 
to help all learners either meet the intent of the 
specified indicator(s) or, if the indicator is already met, 
to advance beyond the specified indicator(s).
• Make a copy of the post-assessment available to all 
students at the beginning of the lesson. This will 
allow students to clearly understand what is 
expected from them.
• Have students submit an outline of their 
presentation, including introductory remarks and 
conclusion, to assist in their organizational skills. 
This allows the teacher to give feedback to the 
students and to help prepare them for the critical 
analysis activity.
Extension:
Have students consider other aspects of evolutionary 
biology that are critically analyzed by scientists. 
Possible topics include:
• Hox (homeotic) genes
• Biogeography
• Vestigial organs
• Four winged fruit fly
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• Galapagos finches
Interdisciplinary Connections:
Social Studies Skills and Methods Standard
Benchmark A Evaluate the reliability and
credibility of sources.
Indicator 1 Determine the credibility of
sources by considering the 
following:
a. The qualifications and reputation 
of the writer;
b. Agreement with other 
credible sources;
c.Recognition of stereotypes;
d. Accuracy and consistency 
of sources;
e.The circumstances in which the 
author prepared the source.
English Language Arts Research Standard
Benchmark B
Indicator 3
Evaluate the usefulness and 
credibility of data and sources. 
Determine the accuracy of sources 
and the credibility of the author by 
analyzing the sources’ validity 
(e.g., authority, accuracy, 
objectivity, publication date and 
coverage, etc.).
Benchmark C
Indicator 2
Indicator 4
Organize information from various 
resources and select appropriate 
sources to support central ideas, 
concepts and themes.
Identify appropriate sources and 
gather relevant information from 
multiple sources (e.g., school 
library catalogs, online databases, 
electronic resources and Internet- 
based resources).
Evaluate and systematically 
organize important information, 
and select appropriate sources to
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support central ideas, concepts and 
themes.
Materials and Resources:
The inclusion o f a specific resource in any lesson 
formulated by the Ohio Department o f Education 
should not be interpreted as an endorsement o f that 
particular resource, or any o f its contents, by the Ohio 
Department o f Education. The Ohio Department o f 
Education does endorse any particular resource. 
The Web addresses listed are for a given site’s main 
page, therefore, it may be necessary to search within 
that site to find the specific information required for a 
given lesson. Please note that information published on 
the Internet changes over time, therefore the links 
provided may no longer contain the specific 
information related to a given lesson. Teachers are 
advised to preview all sites before using them with 
students.
For the teacher, attachments, resource materials such 
as the Internet, World Wide Web, 
library resources 
For the studen: attachments, resource materials such
as the Internet, World Wide Web, 
library resources
Vocabulary;
• Biological evolution
• Critical analysis
• Evolutionary theory
• Macroevolution
• Microevolution
• Natural selection
• Theory
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Technology Connections:
• Access the Web site for student research at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, at http://set.lanl.gov, 
for guidelines to the Socratic Method. From the 
homepage, navigate to Programs, and then Critical 
Issues Forum.
Research Connections:
Marzano, R. et al. Classroom Instruction that Works: 
Research-Based Strategies for Increasing Student 
Achievement. Alexandria: Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development, 2001.
• Identifying similarities and differences enhances 
students’ understanding of and ability to use
knowledge. This process includes comparing,
classifying, creating metaphors and creating analogies 
and may involve the following:
• Presenting students with explicit guidance in 
identifying similarities and differences.
• Asking students to independently identify 
similarities and differences.
• Representing similarities and differences in 
graphic or symbolic form.
• Summarizing and note taking are two of the most 
powerful skills to help students identify and 
understand the most important aspects of what they 
are learning.
General Tips:
• Students should use school library resources such as 
InfOhio's Access Science to locate information on 
aspects of evolutionary theory.
• See the following resources for information that 
supports or challenges different aspects of 
evolution.
1. Ayala, Francisco, "The Mechanisms of
Evolution." Scientific American, 239:3 (1978): 
56-69.
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2. Brickhouse, Nancy. "Diversity of Students’ Views 
about Evidence, Theory." Journal o f Research in 
Science Teaching. 37:4 (2000).
3. Carroll, Robert L. (1997/98). “Limits to 
Knowledge of the Fossil Record”. Zoology. 100 
(1997/98): 221-231.
4. Carroll, Robert L. “Towards a New Evolutionary 
Synthesis.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 15 
(2000): 27-32.
5. Cherfas, J. "Exploring the Myth of the Melanie 
Moth." New Scientist. (1986): 25.
6. Chinn, Clark. "An Empirical Test of a Taxonomy of 
Responses to Anomalous Data in Science." Journal 
of Research in Science Teaching. 35:6 (1998).
7. Chinn, Clark. "The Role of Anomalous Data in 
Knowledge Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework 
and Implications for Science Instruction." Review 
o f Educational Research.
63:1 (1993): 1-49.
8. Darwin, Charles. On the Origin o f Species: A 
Facsimile o f the First Edition. Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1975.
9. Denton, Michael. Evolution: A Theory in Crisis. 
Bethesda: Adler and Adler, 1986.
10. Doolittle, W. Ford “Uprooting the Tree of Life,” 
Scientific American, 282 (2000): 90-95.
11. Erwin, Douglas. “Macroevolution is More Than 
Repeated Rounds of Microevolution,” Evolution & 
Development 2 (2000): 78-84.
12. Erwin, Douglas. “Early Introduction of Major 
Morphological Innovations,” Acta Palaeontologica 
Polonica 38 (1994): 281-294.
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13. Evans, Margaret E. "The Emergence of Beliefs 
About the Origins of Species in School- Age 
Children." Merrill-Palmer Quarterly. 46:2 (2000): 
221-253.
14. Faust, David. The Limits o f Scientific Reasoning. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
15. Fitch, W., and E. Margoliash, "Construction of 
Phylogenetic Trees." Science 155 (1967): 281.
16. Gilbert, Scott F., et al. “Resynthesizing 
Evolutionary and Developmental Biology,” Journal 
o f Developmental Biology 173 (1996): 357-372.
17. Jeffares, D. “Relics from the RNA World.” Journal 
o f Molecular Evolution 46 (1998): 18-36.
18. Lee, Michael. “Molecular Phylogenies become 
Functional” Trends in Ecology and Evolution. 14
(1999): 177-178.
19. Levinton, Jeffrey S. “The Big Bang of Animal 
Evolution.” Scientific American 267 (1992): 84-91.
20. Lewin, Roger. "Evolutionary Theory Under Fire." 
Science. 210 (1980): 883.
21. Mahoney, Michael. "Publication Prejudices: an 
Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in the 
Peer Review System." Cognitive Therapy and 
Research. 1:2(1977): 161-175.
22. Margoulis, L., and D. Sagan. "Bacterial 
Bedfellows." Natural History 96 (1987): 26-33.
23. Martin W., and M. Muller. "The Hydrogen 
Hypothesis for the First Eukaryote." Nature 392 
(1998): 37-41.
24. Mikkola, K. "On the Selective Forces Acting in the 
Industrial Melanism of Bis ton oligia Moths."
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Biological Journal o f the Linnean Society 21 
(1984): 409-421.
25. Mynatt, Clifford. "Confirmation Bias in a Simulated 
Research Environment: An Experimental Study of 
Scientific Inference." Quarterly Journal o f 
Experimentalsychology. 29 (1977): 85-95.
26. National Academy of Science. Teaching About 
Evolution and the Nature o f Science. Washington: 
National Academy Press, 1998.
27. National Academy of Science. National Science 
Education Standards. Washington, National 
Academy Press, 1996.
28. Pennisi, E. “Direct descendants from an RNA 
world.” Science 280 (1998): 673.
29. Philippe, Herve, and Patrick Forterre. “The Rooting 
of the Universal Tree of Life is Not Reliable.” 
Journal o f Molecular Evolution 49 (1999): 509-523.
30. Pious, Scott. The Psychology o f Judgment and 
Decision-making. New York: McGraw Hill, 1993.
31. Samarapungavan, Ala. "Children’s judgment in 
theory choice tasks: Scientific rationality in 
childhood." Cognition. 45 (1992): 1-32.
32. Shubin, Neil H. and Charles R. Marshall. “Fossils, 
Genes, and the Origin of Novelty.” Deep Time
(2000): 324-340.
33. Smith, John M., and Eors Szathmary. The Major 
Transitions in Evolution. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995.
34. Smith, Mike U. "Counterpoint: Belief, 
Understanding, and Teaching of Evolution."
Journal o f Research in Science Teaching. 3:5 
(1994): 591-597.
Department erf
Education APPENDIX A
294
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
Department of
Education APPENDIX A
35. Thagard, Paul. Mind, Society, and the Growth of 
Knowledge. Philosophy o f Science. (1994): 61.
36. Thomson, Keith S. “Macroevolution: The 
Morphological Problem,” American Zoologist 32 
(1992): 106-112.
37. Thomson, Keith S. "Marginalia: The Meanings of 
Evolution.” American Scientist. 70. (1982): 529- 
531.
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Attachments:
Attachment A, Five Aspects of Evolution 
Attachment B, Investigative Worksheet 
Attachment C, Critical Analysis Rubric 
Attachment D, Critical Analysis Worksheet
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Attachment A 
Five Aspects of Evolution 
Aspect 1: Homology
Citations in the General Tips Section may provide a starting point for student 
research. It is suggested that students employ additional resources in their research.
Brief Supporting Sample Answer: Different animals have very similar 
anatomical and genetic structures. This suggests that these animals share a 
common ancestor from which they inherited the genes to build these 
anatomical structures. Evolutionary biologists call similarities that are due to 
common ancestry “homologies.” For example, the genes that produce 
hemoglobin molecules (an oxygen carrying protein) in chimps and humans are 
at least 98% identical in sequence. As another example, bats, humans, horses, 
porpoises and moles all share a forelimb that has the same pattern of bone 
structure and organization. The hemoglobin molecule and the “pentadactyl 
limb” provide evidence for common ancestors. Also, the genetic code is 
universal, suggesting that a common ancestor is the source.
Brief Challenging Sample Answer: Some scientists think similarities 
in anatomical and genetic structure reflect similar functional needs in different 
animals, not common ancestry. The nucleotide sequence of hemoglobin DNA 
is very similar between chimps and humans, but this may be because they 
provide the same function for both animals. Also, if similar anatomical 
structures really are the result of a shared evolutionary ancestry, then similar 
anatomical structures should be produced by related genes and patterns of 
embryological development. However, sometimes, similar anatomical 
structures in different animals are built from different genes and by different 
pathways of embryological development. Scientists can use these different 
anatomical structures and genes to build versions of Darwin family trees that 
will not match each other. This shows that diverse forms of life may have 
different ancestry.
Aspect 2: Fossil Record
Citations in the General Tips Section may provide a starting point for student 
research. It is suggested that students employ additional resources in their research.
Brief Supporting Sample Answer: The fossil record shows an increase 
in the complexity of living forms from simple one-celled organisms, to the 
first simple plants and animals, to the diverse and complex organisms that live 
on Earth today. This pattern suggests that later forms evolved from earlier 
simple forms over long periods of geological time. Macroevolution is the
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large-scale evolution occurring over geologic time that results in the formation 
of new taxonomic groups. The slow transformations are reflected in 
transitional fossils such as Archaeopteryx (a reptile-like bird) and mammal­
like reptiles. These transitional fossils bridge the gap from one species to 
another species and from one branch on the tree of life to another.
Brief Challenging Sample Answer: Transitional fossils are rare in the 
fossil record. A growing number of scientists now question that 
Archaeopteryx and other transitional fossils really are transitional forms. The 
fossil record as a whole shows that major evolutionary changes took place 
suddenly over brief periods of time followed by longer periods of “stasis” 
during which no significant change in form or transitional organisms appeared 
(Punctuated Equilibria). The “Cambrian explosion” of animal phyla is the best 
known, but not the only example, of the sudden appearance of new biological 
forms in the fossil record.
Aspect 3: Antibiotic Resistance
Citations in the General Tips Section may provide a starting point for student 
research. It is suggested that students employ additional resources in their research.
Brief Supporting Sample Answer: The number of strains of antibiotic 
resistant bacteria, such as of Staphylococcus aureus, have significantly 
increased in number over time. Antibiotics used by patients to eliminate 
disease-causing bacterial organisms have facilitated this change. When some 
bacteria acquire a mutation that allows them to survive in the presence of 
antibiotics, they begin to survive in greater numbers than those that do not 
have this mutation-induced resistance. This shows how environmental 
changes and natural selection can produce significant changes in populations 
and species over time.
Brief Challenging Sample Answer: The increase in the number of 
antibiotic resistant bacterial strains demonstrates the power of natural 
selection to produce small but limited changes in populations and species. It 
does not demonstrate the ability of natural selection to produce new forms of 
life. Although new strains of Staphylococcus aureus have evolved, the 
speciation of bacteria (prokaryotes) has not been observed, and neither has the 
evolution of bacteria into more complex eukaryotes. Thus, the phenomenon of 
antibiotic resistance demonstrates microevolution.
Aspect 4: Peppered Moths ( Biston betulari)
Citations in the General Tips Section may provide a starting point for student 
research. It is suggested that students employ additional resources in their research.
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
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Brief Supporting Sample Answer: During the industrial revolution in 
England, more soot was released into the air. As a result, the tree trunks in the 
woodlands grew darker in color. This environmental change also produced a 
change in the population of English peppered moths (scientifically known as 
Biston betularia). Studies during the 1950s have suggested a reason for this 
change. It was observed that light-colored moths resting on dark-colored tree 
trunks were readily eaten by birds. They had become more visible by their 
predators compared to
their dark-colored counterparts. This different exposure to predation explained 
why the light-colored moths died with greater frequency when pollution 
darkened the forest. It also explained why light-colored moths later made a 
“comeback” when air quality improved in England. This whole situation 
demonstrates how the process of natural selection can change the features of a 
population over time.
Brief Challenging Sample Answer: English peppered moths 
show that environmental changes can produce microevolutionary changes 
within a population. They do not show that natural selection can produce 
major new features or forms of life, or a new species for that matter—i.e., 
macroevolutionary changes. From the beginning of the industrial revolution, 
English peppered moths came in both light and dark varieties. After the 
pollution decreased, dark and light varieties still existed. All that changed 
during this time was the relative proportion of the two traits within the 
population. No new features and no new species emerged. In addition, recent 
scientific articles have questioned the factual basis of the study performed 
during the 1950s. Scientists have learned that peppered moths do not actually 
rest on tree trunks. This has raised questions about whether color changes in 
the moth population were actually caused by differences in exposure to 
predatory birds.
Aspect 5: Endosymbiosis (formation of cellular organelles)
Citations in the General Tips Section may provide a starting point for student 
research. It is suggested that students employ additional resources in their research.
Brief Supporting Sample Answer: Complex eukaryotic cells contain 
organelles such as chloroplasts and mitochondria. These organelles have their 
own DNA. This suggests that bacterial cells may have become established in 
cells that were ancestral to eukaryotes. These smaller cells existed for a time 
in a symbiotic relationship within the larger cell. Later, the smaller cell 
evolved into separate organelles within the eukaryotic ancestors. The separate 
organelles, chloroplast and mitochondria, within modem eukaryotes stand as 
evidence of this evolutionary change.
299
Department of
Education APPENDIX A
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
Brief Challenging Sample Answer: Laboratory tests have not yet 
demonstrated that small bacteria (prokaryotic cells) can change into separate 
organelles, such as mitochondria and chloroplasts within larger bacterial cells. 
When smaller bacterial cells (prokaryotes) are absorbed by larger bacterial 
cells, they are usually destroyed by digestion. Although some bacterial cells 
(prokaryotes) can occasionally live in eukaryotes, scientists have not observed 
these cells changing into organelles such as mitochondria or chloroplasts.
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Attachment B 
Investigative Worksheet
Name:
This activity will help you to prepare for the critical analysis activity. Complete the 
following table by addressing the following points when you record supporting and 
challenging data for one aspect of evolution. Record your responses on the 
appropriate space on the chart.
• Write a brief summary of what you have read and discovered regarding your 
particular aspect and how it supports evolutionary theory.
• Write a brief summary of what you have read and discovered regarding your 
particular aspect and how it challenges evolutionary theory.
• Were any scientific tools, instruments or other forms of technology used by
scientists to support this evidence and how it supports a key aspect of 
evolutionary theory? Briefly explain your answer.
• Were any scientific tools, instruments or other forms of technology used by 
scientists to challenge this evidence and how it challenges the key aspect of 
evolutionary theory? Briefly explain your answer.
• How do scientists critically analyze this aspect of evolution?
• Is the information you found supported by using the scientific method? Are
there any limitations?
• Are there any other type(s) of research that scientists need to do in order to 
critically analyze evolution? Briefly explain your answer.
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Attachment B (cont'd)
Aspect of 
Evolution Supports Challenges
What comparisons can be made between the supporting and challenging information 
you have found? Briefly explain.
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Attachment B (cont'd)
A. In the space below, write your introduction for the critical analysis activity.
B. In the space below, outline the body of your informational presentation.
C. In the space below, write your conclusion.
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Critical Analysis Rubric
1. Group was able to articulate and demonstrate knowledge of the aspect of evolution 
they presented.
3 2 1 0
2. Students were courteous and respectful toward their fellow students.
3 2 1 0
3. Students were able to effectively use research (scientific data) to support their 
presentation.
3 2 1 0
4. Students were logical in presenting their information.
3 2 1 0
5. Students used visual aids (e.g., graphs, tables, pictures, etc. displayed on posters, 
transparencies, chalkboard or presentation software) effectively.
3 2 1 0
6. Provide an opportunity for all group members to speak. Allowing for all group 
members to speak is very important for it will enable the students to verbally 
engage in the analysis of evidence.
3 2 1 0
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
1 8 -1 6 = Excellent (mastery)
15-13 = Good (acceptable)
12-9 = Poor (needs revision)
8 - 0 “ Not acceptable (remediation required)
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Attachment D 
Critical Analysis Worksheet
Directions: Fill in the following worksheet with information you have learned from 
the groups.
Aspects of 
Evolution Supports Challenges
Attachment D (cont'd) 
Student Reflection:
1. Why is it important for scientists to critically analyze evolution?
APPENDIX A
Critical Analysis of Evolution -  Grade 10
Department o f
Education
2. How has the information presented by the various groups added to your 
understanding of evolutionary theory? Cite examples.
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APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE MODEL LESSON PLAN
Important Note: Dr. Steve Rissing, Professor in the Department o f Evolution, 
Ecology, and Organismal Biology and Director o f the Introductory Biology program 
at The Ohio State University, Dr. Patricia Princehouse o f Case Western Reserve 
University's multidisciplinary program in Evolutionary Biology, and others prepared 
this draft Lesson Plan aligned to Benchmark H, Indicator 23, at the request o f 
President Sheets and other members o f the Ohio State Board o f Education present 
January 13th, at 5 p.m., for consideration as a replacement lesson for the 
problematic "Critical Analysis" lesson originally submitted to the Board. At the 
February meeting o f the Board, the authors o f this alternative lesson were informed 
that it would not be considered until next Fall. This delay was attributed to a 
decision by the Chairman o f the Standards Committee o f the Ohio Board o f 
Education. Also see Dr. Rissing's comments at the end o f this Lesson Plan.
As noted, the Lesson Plan is still in draft form and needs finishing touches. However, 
even in this unfinished form it clearly shows how the letter and spirit o f the Indicator 
can be met in a scientifically responsible and rigorous way. treats a genuine 
scientific issue in evolutionary biology, speciation, and links it to practical concerns 
in the economy o f Ohio, thus illustrating the relevance o f the issue to both science 
and our concerns as citizens.
Lesson Title: How do new species form? A critical analysis of current evolutionary 
concepts
Ohio Standards Connection:
Grade: 10
Standard(s): Life Science
Benchmark(s): H Describe a foundation of biological evolution as the change in 
gene frequency of a population over time. Explain the historical and current scientific 
developments, mechanisms and processes of biological evolution. Describe how 
scientists continue to investigate and critically analyze aspects of evolutionary theory. 
(The intent of this benchmark does not mandate the teaching or testing of intelligent 
design.)
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Indicator(s): 23. Describe how scientists continue to investigate and critically 
analyze aspects of evolutionary theory. (The intent of this benchmark does not 
mandate the teaching or testing of intelligent design.)
Lesson Summary
This lesson presents examples with experimental data that suggest alternative 
methods of species formation. The standard "textbook" model of speciation requires 
some form of geographic isolation of one population into two or more for a long 
period of time. This standard model is compared with the more controversial 
explanation that under some circumstances a single population may give rise to one 
or two new species without geographical isolation and in a short period of time.
A "learning cycle" pedagogical approach is used. Students are presented the standard 
model of species formation with data to support it. Then a counter-example and data 
are presented which suggest that new species can and do form within a single 
population. Finally, data suggesting possible formation of new species of 
economically important insects in Ohio (com rootworms) are presented for student 
consideration of the concept of species and discussion of com rootworm population 
changes underway in Ohio constitute speciation.
Optional/extended applications of this lesson permit discussion of genetic 
modification of com in light of material presented regarding speciation processes 
possibly underway currently in this major Ohio industry.
Estimated Duration:
Pre-assessment:
• Ask students to write and explain the definition of a species in their own 
words
• It is commonly known that a horse can breed with a donkey resulting in an 
offspring that is a mule. Do all mules in the US constitute a species? Why or 
why not?
• Gregor Mendel demonstrated some of his early insights into the mechanisms 
of genetics by working with populations of purple-flowered and white- 
flowered pea plants. Did Mendel consider/demonstrate that such populations 
were of the same or different species? How or how not?
• Consider the following statement:
"There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been 
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, 
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, 
from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful 
have been, and are being evolved."
• Who might have written this statement?
• Are the "forms" referred to in the above statement different species?
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Direct students to respond to the questions in their science notebook in as much detail 
as possible leaving space to record information from the ensuing dialogue to add to 
their notes.
Scoring Guidelines:
A student should show one or more of the following points.
• "Textbook answer": Individuals of two different species cannot mate and have 
viable, fertile offspring.
• Common experience suggests that the two organisms mentioned by the 
student (e.g. a bluegill vs a perch; a daisy vs a violet; a monarch butterfly vs. a 
luna moth; an ant vs a wasp) simply cannot interbreed.
• The "species concept" is arbitrary, defined by humans not nature.
• The "species concept" is much looser in plants. For example, cabbage, 
broccoli, kale and Brussels sprouts are all one species.
• The organism must be part of an interbreeding population in nature.
• It must be able to produce fertile offspring.
• It must have DNA, which is similar to other members of the proposed species 
and different from other similar species.
• There should be some mechanism which prevents it from interbreeding with 
similar species.
Reference for quotation above: Darwin, C. 1859. On the Origin o f Species By Means 
o f Natural Selection. Sixth Edition, (last sentence of last page).
Instructional Procedures;
The Standard Theory for the Formation of New Species:
The commonly theory for the formation of new species suggests that individuals in a 
single population of interbreeding organisms must become isolated into two or more 
separate populations usually over a long period of time. These separate populations 
then experience different effects of various evolutionary mechanisms (natural 
selection, genetic drift, gene flow, mutation) sometimes resulting in the development 
of new species.
If the populations are isolated geographically for a very long time, they may undergo 
so many physical and behavioral changes that individuals of the two populations may 
not even recognize each other as possible mates. Even if they do recognize each 
other as possible mates, they may have accumulated so many genetic changes that 
they cannot produce any live offspring, or their offspring would not be able to
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reproduce as, for example, in the case of horses mating with donkeys to produce 
sterile mules.
Diagrammatically, textbooks often present this standard model of speciation like this:
(b)
Geographic isolation 
between populations
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Figure adapted from Strickberger, M. W. 1996. Evolution. Jones 
and Barlett Publishers, Sudbury, Mass. 670pp (see Fig. 23-8, p. 558).
Darwin's finches and many other species are widely considered to have arisen 
through such processes.
Student Engagement
A. Consider (or find) two very similar organisms that you think represent different 
species. How can you tell they are different species?
Teacher tip: You may want to have students answer this question after they have 
taken a (brief?) field trip outside where they may collect different leaves (oak and 
maple or white oak versus black oak). Students might use field guides (available in 
libraries) to pick two similar species o f flower, insect or bird. Students in agricultural 
areas could cite the differences between wheat and oats. Hunters, birdwatchers, and 
other outdoor enthusiasts could cite differences in or game such as
gray vs red squirrels or Canada goose versus
B. How do you suppose they can tell they are different species?
C. What kind of cellular mechanisms might be involved in plants that appear to result 
in only pollen from a few individuals (usually in the same species) fertilizing eggs?
D. What kinds of things in nature might cause geographic isolation for some 
populations?
Instructional Procedures:
Divide students into groups (2-4 individuals)
Teacher tip: Be sure to follow standard guidelines for cooperative learning. Students 
should not normally be permitted to form groups haphazardly on their own.
1. However students have chosen at least two similar species to conduct pre­
assessment (e.g. a brief field trip on or near school grounds), have each student 
explain to his/her cooperative group how they consider these two samples to represent 
different species.
2. Have each student describe how the above "textbook" illustration of the 
process of speciation may apply to their pair of individuals.
3. Have each group of students read the following textbook passages. ( 
tip: students might also be able to locate their own textbook passages in a local 
library or on the internet by searching for the term "speciation.
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"Most biologists agree that in the vast majority of cases the initiating factor in 
speciation is geographical isolation." (Keeton, W.T. 1980. Biological Science; 3rd 
edition. Norton Publishers, New York, 1080 pp. See p. 795)
".. .[F]or years theorists have argued over whether sympatric speciation 
(speciation within a population occupying a single habitat) occurs at all in 
animals." (Wallace, R. A., G. P. Sanders, R. J. Ferl, 1996. Biology. The Science of 
Life; 4th Edition. Harper Collins Publisher, 1073 pp; see p. 389.
"While sympatric speciation has not been widely accepted, Bush (an 
evolutionary biologist) has made the strongest case for its existence; it is far from 
proven." (Powell, J. R. 1982. In: Barigozzi, C.(Ed.) Mechanisms of speciation. Alan 
R. Liss, New York, 546 pp; see p. 70.
"While allopatric speciation (speciation with geographical isolation) is 
undisputed, whether sympatric speciation is likely and common, or can only occur 
under restrictive conditions has been controversial." Steams, S. C. and R. F. Hoekstra. 
2000. Evolution: An introduction. Oxford University Press, 381 pp; see p. 222.
Answer these questions:
1. Why don't scientists all agree that geographical isolation is required for the 
formation of new species through natural selection or genetic drift?
2. What does it mean for students taking biology in high school or college to 
realize that all evolutionary biologists do not agree that all speciation must occur with 
geographical isolation?
3. Can you or someone in your group consider a circumstance in which a new 
species may form from another without geographical isolation?
Consider this graphical representation of speciation with and without geographical 
isolation:
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(b)
Geographic
isolation
between
populations
(c . l )
Genetic
divergence
increases
(c.2) 
Selection for 
reproductive 
isolation
While sympatric speciation is generally considered highly unlikely, 
evolutionary biologist Guy Bush has suggested exactly this type of model for the 
evolution of the apple maggot fly, an agricultural pest in Ohio and elsewhere in the 
US.
The apple maggot fly originally was found only on wild hawthorn trees. Adult 
flies mate, and females lay eggs on adult trees. The fly larvae ("maggots" but also 
called "caterpillars" in moths and butterflies) feed on the wild haw apples and 
eventually fall off the tree and enter the ground. They spend the winter in the ground 
as pupae (just like moths and butterflies) and re-emerge from the ground the next 
year; the cycle then starts all over again.
About 160 years ago some flies began to emerge from the ground at a slightly 
earlier time of the year when no haw apples were available. They began to feed and 
lay eggs on apples that were available at that time of the year. This resulted in 
establishment of an annual cycle with different seasonality and dependent upon apple
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trees not haw thorn trees. This change in annual cycle that influences which flies in 
the formerly single interbreeding population came to breed at different times of year 
and on a different species of tree, appears to result from a single mutation in the 
flies.
Even though haw maggot flies and apple maggot flies occurred in the same 
geographical region, the preference for different hosts by the two populations appears 
to have provided sufficient isolation for speciation to proceed resulting in a new 
species (the apple maggot fly found on introduced apples) and the original haw apple 
maggot fly. Bush argues these represent two separate species that formed without 
geographical isolation.
But under some laboratory conditions individuals of the two species can 
sometimes mate and produce offspring that are able to reproduce on their own. 
Because of this, others have argued that while the process of speciation is occurring 
right before our eyes in these two populations, they are not yet fully separate species.
Optional application 1
Pre-assessment questions
E. Are genes found in all com plants?
F. Have you ever eaten any genetically modified food? If so, what and when? 
Instructional Procedures (optional application 1):
Every major agricultural crop, not just apples, are vulnerable to some kind of 
organism(s) that we consider "pests" although biologically it might be more 
appropriate to consider them competitors. In Ohio, com contributes almost $1 billion 
in annual revenues. Not surprisingly, com has an array of pests that compete with 
farmers for the food value of com crops.
Many agricultural pests, like the apple maggot fly and a number of com pests, 
display a natural history trait such as over-wintering in the soil as a pupa and 
emerging the next growing season to feed on another com crop planted in the same 
field. One environmentally safe and economic weapon in Ohio com growers arsenal 
to fight such pests is crop rotation: com is grown in a field one year and a different 
crop, often soybeans (another billion dollar crop in Ohio), is grown in the same field 
the next year. Emerging com pests can’t eat soybeans just as soybean pests emerging 
in alternate years can’t eat com plants. Further, most com and soy pests don't fly far 
if at all making crop rotation in a given field even more effective.
Alas, like any other method designed to combat crop pests, such efforts 
always result in the development of resistance in the target pest(s) through natural 
selection. As far as farmers are concerned, pest resistance is inevitable. If they
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weren’t competing with us for our food and livelihood, we might call some instances 
of resistance brilliant; understandably, farmers consider them devious at best.
Com root worm, a common and sometimes serious pest for Ohio com 
growers, has developed a number of resistance traits to farmers’ attempts to control 
them. Perhaps the most surprising is the spontaneous appearance of a strain of 
rootworms that take two years instead of the normal one year to emerge as adults 
from the soil. This means they stay underground as soybeans are grown in the field 
above them only to emerge the next year when com is grown in the field once again. 
The insects have developed resistance to crop rotation.
Questions:
1. Discuss the ability of pest/competitor insects to develop resistance to agricultural 
practices such as crop rotation and spraying standard pesticides from the 
perspectives of what you have learned about natural selection acting on 
populations of pest insects.
NOTE: If introduced in the lesson on natural selection, above answer should include:
1.) there must be variance in the trait (resistance), 2.) Some of that variance must be 
heritable, i.e. be of genetic origin, 3.) Because of that variation, some individuals are 
more likely to survive and reproduce.
2. In the table below compare and contrast the modified life history traits and other 
aspects of the haw apple maggot discussed above with that of the crop rotation 
resistant com root worm discussed here.
Life history trait Haw maggot fly "Normal" corn rootworm
Change in time to emerge 
from the soil
Change in preferred "host"
Change in likely mates
Results from genetic change
Improves chances of 
surviving and reproducing 
in current environment
Source of economic loss for 
growers and income for the 
state
Scoring guideline:
Life history trait Haw maggot fly "Normal" corn rootworm
Change in time to emerge 
from the soil
Yes Yes
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| Change in preferred "host" Yes No
Change in likely mates Yes Yes
Results from genetic change Yes Not currently known (hypothesized)
Improves chances of 
i surviving and reproducing 
in current environment
Apparently 
(population is growing)
Apparently 
(population is growing)
Source of economic loss for 
growers and income for the 
state
Yes Yes
3. Does your discussion group consider the new, crop rotation resistant, com 
rootworm population to represent the formation of a new species?
4. What difference, if any, does your answer to the question immediately above 
make to a com farmer in Ohio?
Scoring guideline: Answers should address the question of whether or not the two 
possible species are capable of interbreeding and producing viable, fertile 
offspring. At this point, we don’t know the answer to this question, but there can be 
pedagogical value in raising questions for which we have no current answers. 
Students in this class addressing this question may someday answer it.
Instructional Procedures (optional application 2):
Many, if not most, life history traits that can change resulting in the process of 
speciation often change subtly and slowly. This often occurs because the trait itself in 
under the control of many genes. In these situations, slight changes in a life history 
trait likely do not cause speciation. Nonetheless, over many generations and many 
small changes, dramatic difference can develop between populations of 
organisms. Not too surprisingly, these have been documented best in agriculturally 
important crops where farmers and agricultural researchers can select over many 
generations for individuals that produce the most useable amounts of materials most 
economically important to their growers and the rest of the society.
Once again, we can turn to com and the economic importance of this crop to 
address this question about possible speciation. Economic value of most com crops 
increases with their oil content. The following graph displays the results of 76 
(annual) generations of selection to increase oil content of com; a simultaneous effort 
to decrease oil content of com was also done for comparison:
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low oil
high oil
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
year
Figure modified from: Dudley, J.W. 1977. 76 generations of selection for oil and 
protein percentage in maize. Pages 459-473. In Poliak, E., Kempthome, O. and 
Bailey, jr., T. B. (eds.) Proceedings of the International Conference on Quantitative 
Genetics; August 16-21, 1976. Iowa State University Press, Ames; 872pp.
Consider these questions:
1. In 1896 were the high and low oil content populations of com different 
species?
Scoring guideline: Obviously not; all com plants are part of one interbreeding 
population
2. By 1972 are the high and low oil content populations separate species? 
Scoring guideline: Can't tell until we find out if individuals of the two 
populations can still interbreed and give rise to offspring com plants that are 
viable and fertile. Likely, they are all one species.
3. Could similar selection experiments generate similar results for time for 
emergence from soil for haw maggot flies and com rootworms?
Scoring guideline: Yes.
4. If oil content can be selected, can sugar content (used to make ethanol) be 
selected similarly?
Scoring guideline: Yes. The ability to use com grown in Ohio for the 
production of ethanol as a gasoline additive/substitute has emerged recently as 
a major economic opportunity for Ohio com growers. This also may preserve 
Ohio coal supplies.
5. Why might com farmers be interested in harvesting more oil in their com 
crops?
Instructional Procedures (optional application 3):
Another way for a genetic change to occur within a population is for a "foreign" gene 
to be inserted into one or more individuals in that population. "Jumping genes" are an
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example of this process occurring naturally and possibly causing major changes, even 
speciation, in the recipient individual(s).
Recently, we have learned how to insert genes from one species into another. Often 
the two species can be from different Kingdoms of life (e.g. from bacteria 
[prokaryotes] to com or soy bean plants [eukaryotes]). Once again, agricultural 
economics have driven research and development in this area. Perhaps the best- 
known example of this technological advancement is the insertion of a single gene 
from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) into crop plants including com and 
soybeans. "Bt" is a common bacterium that infects larvae (caterpillars) of butterflies 
and moths; the bacterium completes its life cycle on the dead body of the caterpillar.
A Bt produced toxin kills the caterpillar; a single gene in the bacterium is responsible 
for the production of this poison. Many com and soybean pests are moths and 
butterflies (often called "worms" because their caterpillars appear worm-like.)
We can now identify and cut out this gene from the Bt genome; it can then be
inserted to another organism, especially com and soybeans. The gene once
inserted into a com or soybean seed acts just as it did in the original bacterium
producing a molecule that can kill pest moths or butterflies. Moth or butterfly
larvae eating the com or soybean plant will ingest the molecule produced by the
Bt gene inserted into the com or soybean plant and die. This results in less
dependence by soybean and com growers on chemical pesticide spraying and
more economical production of their crops. But these crops are now classified as
"genetically modified (GM)," a term that concerns many consumers. Indeed, most
of these crops are not eaten directly by people. While only about 9% of the com
grown in Ohio in 2003 was "GM" almost 75% of the soybeans grown in Ohio in
2003 were GM (see following map and table).
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Source for the above map and table:
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/display.php3?FactsheetID=2 
Consider the following questions:
1. Do non-GM com and soybean plants have genes?
2. Are GM com and soybean populations different species from non-GM com 
and soybean plants?
Learning how to isolate bacterial genes and insert them into agriculturally important 
plants like com and soybeans has required years of research at great expense. Not
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surprisingly, one gene has been developed and inserted into GM plants to cause their 
seeds, while still nutritious, to be infertile. This acts as a "patent" of sorts on the 
genetically modified seeds and protects the research costs invested into them. A 
grower who buys GM seeds from a producer cannot simply save some of this year’s 
"seed com" (or seed soybeans) to plant next year—they won’t grow. This gene and 
the technology to develop it has been given the name of "the terminator gene."
Consider these questions:
1.) Are two fields of GM soybeans planted next to each other with all plants 
in both populations containing the "terminator" gene separate species?
Scoring guideline: Technically, yes because by definition none of the individual 
plants are capable of producing offspring at all with any other individual of their 
"species." This question takes the arbitrary definition of the concept of a "species" to 
the ultimate limit and shows the useful limits of species concept in some areas of 
biology.
2.) Is it ethical to sell GM plants containing terminator genes?
Scoring guideline: This is a wide open question designed for student appreciation of 
the complexities and opportunities deriving from our ongoing revolution in 
understanding of the molecular genetics of the speciation process and bioagricultural 
techniques of identifying and inserting genes from one organism (or biological 
kingdom) into another. Most bioethicists seem to think that the marketing of 
terminator gene seeds in developed countries is acceptable, while their position 
regarding the sale of GM plants with terminator genes in third world countries where 
people produce crops just to subsist and may not understand the implications of 
growing GM and "terminator" is much less clear.
Additional questions for possible discussion or expansion of this lesson:
1. The genetic changes described above in apple maggot flies and com rootworm 
are likely the result of single point mutations in the genome of the
insects. Mutations can also occur from gene duplication, deletion, 
translocation, polyploidy and other mechanisms. How might one or more of 
these kinds of genetic changes result in reproductively isolated populations, 
possibly leading to speciation?
2. There are a number of "living fossil" species such as the coelacanth (80 
million year old fish recently rediscovered off Madagascar and India) and 
hermit crab (xx million year old arthropod common along the east coast of 
North America and the Gulf of Mexico). Would you expect an individual of 
these species alive today to be able to mate and have fertile offspring with an 
individual of the same "species" from 80 million years ago? Why or why not?
3. In the San Joaquin Valley of southern California seven closely related species 
of Ensati salamanders form a distributional "ring" around the mountain
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sides of the valley. Each "species" of salamander can mate and reproduce 
with the species next to it on either side of this ring. No species, however, can 
mate successfully with species that occur on the other side of the valley. How 
might this pattern of species distribution have developed according to the 
various models of speciation presented above?
NOTE: Identify science indicator that discusses the impact of technological advances 
on all aspects of society?
As a conclusion, point out that most research creates more questions, and scientists 
rarely learn all the answers. Understanding the process scientists use to determine 
how a specific organism evolved and by what mechanisms is the scientific goal 
behind the indicator "Describe how scientists continue to investigate and critically 
analyze aspects of evolutionary theory."
This is still an unresolved issue in 2003.
Web links cited in this lesson (NOTE: All websites are *.edu, *.oh)
Darwin's finches:
http://www.rit.edU/~rhrsbi/GalapagosPages/DaminFinch.html#anchor725315
Ohio fish species:
http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/dnap/rivfish/default.htm 
Red vs. gray squirrels in Ohio:
http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/news/jan02/0125squirrelcolumn.htm 
Canada goose:
http://www.ducks.org/waterfowling/gallery/index.asp?duck=4 
Snow goose:
http://www.ducks.org/waterfowling/gallery/index.asp?duck=17 
Apple maggot fly:
http://ohioline.osu.edu/hyg-fact/2000/2041.html 
Hawthorn trees:
http://ohioline.osu.edu/b700/b700_40.html 
Economic impact of com:
http://ohioline.osu.edu/eso-fact/2578/2578_3 .html 
Soy bean crop rotation:
http://www.soyohio.org/agro/nematode.cfm 
Com rootworm in Ohio:
http://ohioline.osu.edu/ent-fact/0016.html 
Crop rotation resistant com rootworms:
www.soils.wisc.edu/extension/FAPM/approvedppt2003/
Jensen_Rootworm.pdf
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Economic value of com oil content:
http://www.oardc.ohio-state.edu/hocom/hoc_index.htm 
Ethanol from com in Ohio:
http://www.state.oh.us/agr/Ethanol/ethanoloped.htm 
Jumping genes:
biocrs.biomed.brown.edu/Books/Essays/JumpingGenes.html 
Ensatina salamanders (ring species)
http://www.pbs.Org/wgbh/evolution/library/05/2/l_052_05.html
Note regarding the development of this draft lesson.
In early 2000 I was asked to join the advisory committee for the development 
of the Ohio science content standards. In that capacity I was involved directly in the 
preparation of the tenth grade indicators for evolutionary theory. When those 
indicators were considered and modified by the Ohio state board of education, I 
testified against having students understand that scientists critically analyze aspects of 
evolutionary theory only. Rather, I argued that such understanding should be 
expected for all scientific theories. Since this did not occur and evolution was the 
only theory in science treated thusly in the indicators, I decided to follow the 
development of model lessons aligned to this indicator (# 23 in the 10th grade life 
sciences standards).
In Fall 2003 I volunteered to act as an outside reviewer for lessons developed 
for indicator 23. I eventually received two draft lessons not associated with this 
indicator and requested all lessons associated with it specifically. I then received two 
additional lessons: L10H20 (Scientists, wolves and the United States government) 
and L10H23 (Critical analysis of evolution) and provided complete reviews for them 
and one of the first pair I was sent as well.
I observed the writing committee meeting on 4-5 December where all outside 
reviews were considered. I made a public request for records to see final versions of 
the two lessons pertaining to indicator 23 on 16 December and received those 
documents on 8 January 2004.
On 13 January I testified to the state board of education that many points in 
L10H23 remained false and uncorrected even after the outside review process and 
that in general, the lesson was hopelessly flawed. I was asked by board members 
(Hovis and others) during my testimony and after to develop a new lesson that might 
better prepare teachers and students to meet the requirements of indicator 23.
I have used the general format and some of the materials of lesson L10H20 
and L10H23 as presented to the board as my starting document for the draft lesson 
presented above.
Dr. Steve Rissing
Department of Evolution, Ecology and Organismal Biology 
The Ohio State University 
26 January 2004
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APPENDIX C
A Glossary of Intelligent Design Terms
Specified Complexity - the mark of intelligent agency; it renders intelligent causes 
empirically detectable. An object exhibits specified complexity if it is 
contingent, sufficiently complex (its probability is less than 10'150) and 
specified (exhibits a distinctive, detachable pattern).
Irreducible Complexity - a special case of specified complexity. An irreducibly
complex biological system cannot function if one small part of the system is 
removed.
Discrete Combinatorial Object (DCO) - a biological object with numerous and
diverse parts that must converge in one location and configure all at once in a 
particular arrangement to establish and maintain a function. A DCO is 
irreducibly complex.
Complexity-Specification Criterion ( ‘The Explanatory Filter’) - a series of questions 
and probability calculations that determine if an inference to intelligent design 
is warranted. The criterion detects the probability of the presence of specified 
complexity in a biotic system
Complex Specified Information (CSI) - novel information created by an unembodied 
intelligent agent; natural processes cannot generate CSI. When the 
complexity specification criterion detects specified complexity, it detects CSI.
Abiotic Infusion - the causal process an unembodied intelligence employs to introduce 
exogenous information into a physical system.
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APPENDIX D
Scientific Claims of Intelligent Design
1. “Darwinism ”is unable to account for the irreducible complexity o f biological 
systems.
•  Irreducibly complex biological systems are systems that cannot 
function if one small part of the system is removed; function is 
attained only when all components of the system integrate 
simultaneously in one place.
• An irreducibly complex system is a discrete combinatorial object 
(DCO).
• The irreducible core of a DCO consists of a set of diverse parts that are 
indispensable to maintaining a minimal level of the DCO’s function.
• “Darwinian” theory requires the gradual formation of complex 
biological systems by exploiting functional intermediates.
• The diverse parts of an irreducible core have no functional 
intermediates that can maintain the minimal function and complexity 
of a DCO.
• To refute this claim, Darwinists must provide detailed, step-by-step, 
testable proposals for how Darwinian mechanisms could produce 
irreducible complexity.
2. Intelligent causes are empirically detectable, and these causes are necessary 
to explain the origin o f irreducibly complex biological structures.
• Intelligent causes create specified complexity (e.g. Shakespeare’s 
sonnets).
• Irreducible complexity is a special case of specified complexity.
• Irreducibly complex biotic systems have an intelligent cause.
3. The complexity-specification criterion empirically determines when an 
inference to design is warranted.
•  If an object is contingent and specified, then a probability calculation 
determines if an object is sufficiently complex to infer intelligent 
design.
• The relevant equation is: PdC0 = Pong x Piocai x PConfig
a. Pdco = the probability that a biotic object is irreducibly 
complex
b. Pong = the probability of originating the diverse parts of the 
object
c. Piocai = the probability of locating the parts in one spot all at 
once
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d. Pconfig = the probability of configuring the parts all at once
• If Pdco < 10'150, then an inference to design is warranted.
4. Intelligent design theory is a theory o f information
• The fundamental intuition underlying information is contingency.
• Information arises when one contingent possibility occurs out of many 
possible occurrences.
• Since the principal characteristic of intelligent causation is directed 
contingency or choice, intelligent design theory can be formulated as a 
theory of information.
• Since contingency signals the presence of information, and 
contingency is an essential element in the complexity-specification 
criterion, then the complexity-specified criterion not only detects 
specified complexity, it also detects complex specified information or 
CSI.
• To infer design by means of the complexity-specification criterion is 
equivalent to detecting complex specified information (CSI).
5. Intelligent design is the sole source o f complex specified information.
• Evolutionary biologists rely on the cumulative power of natural 
selection over vast expanses of time to explain the origin of novelty in 
biotic systems and describe that power as "algorithmic."
• Computer simulations of evolutionary algorithms merely harness the 
specified complexity inherent in their construction and are therefore 
incapable of generating CSI.
• Since natural algorithmic processes fail to produce CSI and since the 
complexity specification criterion indicates when an inference to 
design is warranted, intelligent design is the best explanation for the 
origin of CSI.
6. An unembodied intelligence abiotically infuses exogenous information into 
the physical world to create complex biological phenomena
• Specified complexity originates outside physical systems -  it is 
exogenous information.
• An unembodied intelligent designer abiotically infuses CSI in a 
persuasive, non-energy producing, “word-like” fashion to a receptive 
medium to create complex biological phenomena
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7. Intelligent design offers a rigorous scientific research agenda for the life 
sciences.
• Detectability Problem -  Is an object designed?
• Functionality Problem -  What is a designed object’s function?
• Transmission Problem -  What is the causal history of a designed 
object?
• Construction Problem -  How was a designed object constructed?
• Reverse-Engineering Problem -  In the absence of a reasonably 
detailed causal history, how could the object have come about?
• Constraints Problem -  What are the constraints within which the 
designed object functions optimally?
• Perturbation Problem -  How has the original design been modified and 
what factors have modified it? This requires an account of both the 
natural and intelligent causes that have modified the object over its 
causal history
• Variability Problem -  What degree of perturbation allows continued 
functioning? Alternatively, what is the range of variability within 
which the designed object functions and outside of which it breaks 
down?
• Restoration Problem -  Once perturbed, how can the original design be 
recovered? Art restorers, textual critics, and archeologists know all 
about this.
• Optimality Problem -  In what sense is the designed object optimal?
• Separation of Causes Problem — How does one tease apart the effects 
of intelligent causes from natural causes, both of which could have 
affected the object in question?
• Ethical Problem -  Is the design morally right?
• Aesthetic Problem -  Is the design beautiful?
• Intentionality Problem -  What was the intention of the designer in 
producing a given designed object?
• Identity Problem -  Who or what is the designer?
(Source: Dembski, 2002a, p. 312-313.)
